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Generalized trust is about trust in people we do not know. It refers to a general 
optimism and faith in the good will of people at large. It is among the significant civic 
attitudes that relate to democratic performance because it allows for citizen level 
association and participation. Turkey ranks low in terms of generalized trust.  
The present dissertation aims to test the hypotheses set forth by the social capital 
literature regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust for the 
Turkish case. It employs social network measures which are based on tie level 
information. The dissertation seeks to answer questions such as: “Do social networks 
influence generalized trust? Can we talk about the relevance of social networks and 
relational ties for low trust countries such as Turkey? How do country level differences 
interact with social network influence on generalized trust?” In order to answer these 
questions, a survey analysis which was conducted in 2008-2009 and was representative 
of Turkey’s urban population, is used. Findings from the Turkish case are discussed 
within a comparative framework. A cross-country analysis, which is based on the 
International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) survey of 2001 on social networks, is 
used for comparison. 
 
vi 
 
The study shows the relevance of social networks for generalized trust however, 
it further points out the need for qualifications of social networks according to the 
network boundary and the tie properties. Also, it emphasizes the importance of the 
socio-political context to make better sense of social network influence on generalized 
trust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
GENELLEġTĠRĠLMĠġ GÜVEN ÜZERĠNE SOSYAL AĞ DEĞERLENDĠRMESĠ: 
KARġILAġTIRMALI TÜRKĠYE ÖRNEĞĠ 
 
 
 
 
IĢıl Cerem Cenker Özek 
 
 
Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora Tezi, 2012 
 
 
DanıĢman: Prof. Dr. Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Demokrasi, siyasi kültür, sosyal ağlar, Türkiye, kantitatif analiz 
 
 
GenelleĢtirilmiĢ güven tanımadığımız kiĢilere duyulan güven ile alakalıdır. 
Ġnsanlarla ilgili genel bir iyimserliğe ve insanların genelde iyi niyetli olduklarına dair 
inanca iĢaret eder. GenelleĢtirilmiĢ güven demokratik performans ile iliĢkilendirilen 
önemli bir eğilimdir. Güven duygusu vatandaĢların ortak amaçlar için bir araya 
gelebilmesini kolaylaĢtırır ve siyasi katılımcılığı teĢvik eder.  Türkiye kiĢiler arası 
güvenin düĢük olduğu ülkeler arasındadır.  
Bu çalıĢma, sosyal sermaye literatürünün, kiĢilerarası güvenin sosyal ağ 
belirteçleri ile alakalı öne sürdüğü hipotezleri test etmeyi amaçlar. Analiz Türkiye 
örneği üzerine yoğunlaĢmaktadır. ÇalıĢmanın yeniliği sosyal ağ ölçümünü kiĢilerarası 
bağlar seviyesinde değerlendirmesidir. ÇalıĢmanın cevap aradığı sorular Ģu Ģekilde 
sıralanabilir: “Sosyal ağlar kiĢilerarası güveni etkiler mi? KiĢilerarası güvenin düĢük 
olduğu Türkiye gibi ülkelerde sosyal ağ etkisinden bahsedilebilir mi? Ülkeler arası 
sosyo-politik farklılıklar sosyal ağların kiĢilerarası güven üzerine etkisini ne Ģekilde 
değiĢtirir?” Bu sorular 2008-2009 yıllarında Türkiye’de gerçekleĢtirilen ve Ģehirli 
nüfusu temsil eden bir anket çalıĢmasına dayanarak araĢtırılmıĢtır. Bulgular, 
Uluslararası Saha AraĢtırmaları Programı’nın (ISSP) 2001 yılında sosyal ağlar üzerine 
gerçekleĢtirdiği benzer bir anket çalıĢması kullanılarak karĢılaĢtırmalı olarak 
değerlendirilmiĢtir. 
viii 
 
ÇalıĢma, sosyal ağların genelleĢtirilmiĢ güven üzerinde etkili olduğunu 
göstermiĢtir. Bununla beraber araĢtırılan sosyal ağların, ağ sınırları ve bağ özeliklerine 
göre değerlendirilmesinin önemine dikkat çekilmiĢtir. Ayrıca, sosyal ağların 
genelleĢtirilmiĢ güven üzerine etkisinin sosyo-politik bağlamla birlikte ele alınması 
gerektiği vurgulanmıĢtır.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Turkey has proven more successful in economic terms, less ambitious in 
democratic terms, and a failure in terms of citizens‟ worthy regard of one another. 
Political analysis seldom accounts for this last feature, although the widespread 
pessimistic operational code of Turkish citizens regarding the trustworthiness of people 
in general may well underscore Turkey‟s long delayed quest for democratic 
institutionalization.  
The present dissertation focuses on the social network underpinnings of 
generalized trust in Turkey. Political science interest in civic attitudes such as 
generalized trust and tolerance has increased in recent decades due to worldwide 
democratization efforts, which have accelerated since 1970s. Sweeping institutional 
reforms have guided democratic transitions, yet they have frequently fallen short of 
giving rise to a liberal democratic order in cases when the citizens lacked cultural 
resources to make democracies work.  
Culture matters for democratization, though it changes slowly. Hence it is 
important to uncover those cultural features which are in abundance across well-
institutionalized democracies in comparison with under-institutionalized democracies as 
well as non-democracies. Research based on individual and/or country level attitudinal 
and behavior data proves well equipped for this task.   
The emphasis on culture democratizes the arena for political analysis as well. 
More often than not, scholars mention the significance of citizens‟ support for the 
survival and sustenance of democratic regimes before they lapse into research restricted 
mostly to political institutions and the political elite. Notwithstanding the important 
contributions this line of research has made in understanding the political aspect of 
societies, citizens‟ side of politics is important as well. After all, information regarding 
 2 
citizens‟ attitudes and behaviors towards the political regime, political actors and fellow 
citizens closely relates to much-praised citizens‟ support.  
The dissemination and discussion of this type of information is relevant to the 
citizens‟ participation in politics in an informed way too: this may even be the most 
relevant issue for citizens whose countries have stagnated in the electoral democracy 
track for decades. Citizens in those countries have undergone wave after wave of 
democratic reforms only to be faced with a new sequence of reforms. It is only natural 
to expect citizens to be critical of their countries‟ persistent failures in democratization 
efforts if the distinctiveness of democratic regimes lies in the extent they recognize the 
agency of the individual citizen. This distinctiveness demands an account of mass level 
attitudes and behaviors of the citizens themselves besides their demands of 
accountability from the political elites and institutions. All aspects of the citizens‟ 
accounts relate to questions of political culture. The particular question “Why have we, 
as a society, consistently failed in our democratization effort?”, in turn, relates to 
whether or not the society under question is endowed with generalized trust. 
Generalized trust relates to the general optimism and faith in the good will of 
people at large. Hence it does not concern with trust in people we know; on the 
contrary, it is about trust in people we do not know. We exhibit such trust to strangers 
because we regard them as fellow men. Though they are strangers, we choose to extend 
trust because we find them familiar. We regard them not only as harmless, but also 
worthy of respect for association and co-operation as well as deliberation and 
competition. In short, generalized trust is an operational code, which relates individual 
citizens to one another as fellow citizens, and to the larger society as political and 
economic agents.  
Trusting individuals make up trusting environments in which public goods are 
better attended, economic transactions become more sophisticated, and political 
institutions function more responsively and effectively. The contrary case is that of an 
environment with pervasive distrust whereby individuals refrain from each other and 
retreat into their worlds of local importance. In these environments, citizens only attend 
their individual affairs, and bonds for common undertakings are impaired for good. 
Economic transactions shrink and both the public goods and the responsiveness of 
political actors and institutions cease to be common concerns for the citizens.  
Turkey is among the countries which ranks low in terms of generalized trust. 
According to the World Values Survey (WVS), between 1989 and 2007, only 
 3 
approximately ten percent of the respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement that 
most people can be trusted, compared with the corresponding figures of more than sixty 
percent in Norway and Sweden and nearly fifty percent in Australia, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland. In addition, across the EU‟s new member states of Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, generalized trust levels range between twenty-
five and thirty-five percent. Turkey is in the same league as Brazil, Cyprus, Malaysia 
and Peru.
1
 
Although comparatively lower levels of generalized trust in Turkey are frequently 
mentioned as a curious feature of Turkish democracy, the reasons for this low figure 
and its possible implications have not been the subject of many studies. In his study on 
political culture in Turkey, Esmer, for instance, mentioned low generalized trust, though 
his analysis did not go as far as to situate generalized trust within the Turkish political 
context.
2
 Likewise, in his 2002 study, Kalaycıoğlu compared generalized trust levels in 
Turkey with a host of democratic countries, and Turkey emerged as the country with the 
lowest generalized trust levels together with Brazil.
3
 Despite the author‟s discussion 
about the possible influence of socialization process on low generalized trust, the 
suggested hypotheses were not tested because the study focused on generalized trust 
only as a feature of associability.
4
 Hence generalized trust was discussed only in 
relation to civil society participation in Turkey. This relationship, however, was 
significant because it was among the pioneering accounts on generalized trust in 
Turkey, which provided an explicit link to social capital.
5
  
                                                          
1 See Table 3.3 in Chapter 3, which lists generalized trust levels for all countries 
included in WVS for the 1981-2007 periods. 
 
2 Yılmaz Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal ve Ekonomik 
Değerler (İstanbul: TESEV, 1999), 22-26. 
 
3 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Civil Society in Turkey: Continuity or Change?” in Turkish 
Transformation: New Century-New Challenges,  ed. Brian W. Beeley (Huntington, 
Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 2002), 64.  
 
4 Ibid., 71-72. Early socialization in the family and at school, and lifetime influence of 
the media were mentioned as the possible reasons for low levels of generalized trust. It 
is argued that these agents of socialization in Turkey reinforce an image of unknown 
people as unpredictable and unreliable which, in turn, breeds a culture of lack of trust in 
the fellow man.  
 
5 Ibid., 74. In its concluding section, the author explicitly mentioned generalized trust as 
a feature of social capital. 
 4 
The advent of social capital literature in the 1990s has proven a breakthrough for 
studies in political culture in general, and generalized trust in particular. Although 
Bourdieu
6
 and Coleman
7
 had used the concept in sociological studies earlier, Putnam 
and his collaborators gave the concept a particularly political meaning. They used social 
capital to denote the widespread availability of generalized trust and networks of civic 
engagement in a given polity, which had significant bearings on democratic and 
economic institutional performance.
8
 The concept gained immediate attention because it 
pointed to democracy‟s behavioral foundations with implications for democratic 
institutional performance as well.  
Making Democracy Work was published at a time the once-authoritarian Latin 
American and Southern European regimes collapsed and many of the former communist 
states completed their democratic transitions. During this period, discussions about the 
challenges of democratic institutionalization intensified. The accumulated experience 
showed that the mass level positive behavioral and attitudinal orientations towards a 
democratic regime were as important in democratic institutionalization as were the 
constitutional and the institutional reforms. Indeed the behavioral and attitudinal 
component was found to be crucial in order to render democracy “the only game in 
town”.9  
Social capital fit neatly into this line of research, though its implications went 
beyond the account of individual level pro-democratic values; it concerned the 
                                                          
6 See Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Handbook of Theory and Research 
for the Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1986), 241-261. 
 
7
 See James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” in Social 
Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective,  eds. Partha Dasgupta and Ismael Serageldin 
(Washington: The World Bank, 2000), 13-40. 
 
8
 Robert Putnam, Rafealla Nanetti, and Robert Leonardi. Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1993).  
 
9 Democratic consolidation literature was keen about the behavioral and attitudinal 
component of democratic institutionalization. Citizens‟ regard of democratic regime as 
the “only game in town” is widely accepted as a short hand definition of democratic 
consolidation. Linz and Stepan first used this expression. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” in Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, eds. Larry Diamond et.al. (Baltimore, London: 
The Johns Hopkins University, 1997), 15.  
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aggregate societal resources which tie individuals together and ease their associability 
for common purposes. Putnam and his collaborators regarded norms of trust, reciprocity 
and co-operation, and networks of civic engagement as among those resources. 
According to the authors, they were instrumental in crosscutting the existing societal 
cleavages and they therefore enhanced the feelings of solidarity among the citizens. 
 The unfolding research agenda resulted in a multiplicity of social capital 
indicators which ranged from generalized trust to informal relations with family and 
friends and formal relations of civil society activism. Social capital literature proves 
inattentive at best towards the conceptual confusion these multiple indicators have 
created, but despite its conceptual shortcomings, the significance of this literature for 
the present dissertation is twofold.  
The first significant contribution of social capital literature is its account of 
societal relationships in order to understand the political phenomenon. These 
relationships, in turn, render individuals more visible within their social milieu. As a 
result, these individuals cease to be atomistic. On the contrary, their multiple 
relationships are assumed as significant variables for social and political mobilization. 
In other words, filling the gap between the individual and the political, the social capital 
literature pointed to the micro-macro linkage which is missing in much of the social 
science research.
10
  
The second significant contribution of the social capital literature – which also 
relates to the first - is the account of social network underpinnings of generalized trust. 
Once societal relationships in which individuals are embedded have come under closer 
scrutiny, different types of social networks are designated, which exert varying 
influence on generalized trust. In social capital literature, this varying social network 
influence has been conceptualized under the more general labels of bonding and 
bridging social capital respectively.  
Bonding social capital refers mostly to primordial relations of the strong ties such 
as with the family and relatives. These types of relations expose individuals to similar 
others and this exposure is likely to breed normative pressure for conformity at the 
group level. An individual‟s constriction only to ascriptive relations, in turn, is argued 
                                                          
10 Granovetter discussed the lack of the social science account of the micro-macro 
linkage and he suggested the study of social networks as intermediary structures of the 
micro-macro divide. See Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American 
Journal of Sociology 78, no.6 (1973): 1360-1380. 
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to influence generalized trust negatively. An alternative is the bridging social capital, 
which refers to the individual‟s relations with different others through an extension of 
their weak ties. Relations which are induced by modern institutions such as the work 
place, education, and the civil society, are among the stocks of bridging social capital. 
Individuals socialize into variable human conditions through these types of relations, 
which encourage feelings of familiarity with the fellow men. Hence bridging social 
capital is argued to influence generalized trust positively. 
Although social capital literature frequently accounts for these hypotheses 
regarding social network influence, their tests remained limited. Rather, it has focused 
more intensely on civil society involvement in order to operationalize societal 
relationships. Moreover, the empirical studies which operationalized social networks, 
relied on various social groups such as the family and the peer group relations rather 
than tie-based information. The latter, however, is crucial because the conceptual 
definition of social capital and its variants rely on relational ties. 
The present dissertation aims to test the hypotheses set forth by the social capital 
literature regarding the social network underpinnings of generalized trust. It focuses on 
Turkey as the case study, and employs social network measures derived from the 
sociological literature, which are based on tie level information. In that capacity, it 
significantly diverges from mainstream social capital literature. The dissertation seeks 
to answer questions such as: “Do social networks influence generalized trust? What 
types of relational ties induce trust in the fellow men? Can we talk about the relevance 
of social networks and relational ties for low trust countries such as Turkey? How do 
country level differences interact with social network influence?”  
Not surprisingly, social networks are not the only determinants of generalized 
trust; on the contrary, generalized trust has multiple determinants. Country level 
dynamics, for instance, have significant bearings on generalized trust. After all, the 
conceptual basis of generalized trust boils down to citizens‟ willingness to live together 
so that they will crosscut the differences easily when needs be. Seen from this 
perspective, it is not surprising that long-lasting societal divisions such as a conflictual 
and divisive historical heritage
11
, religious, ethnic, and economic differences prove 
                                                          
11 Many authors associated pervasive distrust across South Italian regions to foreign 
domination of first Spanish, then French rule. Both powers pursued a divide and rule 
policy to sustain extractive policies. See Putnam, Nanetti and Leonardi, Making 
Democracy Work. Also see Anthony Pagden, “The Destruction of Trust and Its 
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detrimental to generalized trust.
12
 Besides country level macro dynamics, individual 
level optimism is positively related to generalized trust.
13
 This means that individuals 
assume a more positive outlook towards the people at large when they are content with 
themselves and their circumstances. 
Notwithstanding the significance of these alternative indicators, the present 
dissertation focuses on social network underpinnings of generalized trust not only 
because this aspect is under-tested, but also because its implications are especially 
curious for long-lasting electoral democracies such as Turkey. Although the conceptual 
roots of social capital lie in the individuals‟ social relationships, this literature only 
gives lip service to the discussion of these relationships, let alone its frequently used 
concepts such as the strong and weak ties and the bridging relationships. On the other 
hand, sociological accounts of social networks have discussed these concepts for quite a 
long time. Hence the adoption of social network measures, which are used in sociology 
to test the social capital literature‟s hypotheses about social network influence on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economic Consequences in the Case of Eighteenth-century Naples,” in Trust: Making 
and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd, 1988), 127-142 and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business 
of Private Protection (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
 
12 In their cross-country study of sixty countries, Delhey and Newton designated 
Protestantism and ethnic divisions as significant exogenous determinants of generalized 
trust. Religion was used to operationalize the historical heritage. Protestant culture was 
positively related to generalized trust. On the other hand, ethnic divisions influenced 
generalized trust negatively. The authors also tested the influence of a series of 
endogenous variables. Good government and wealth influenced generalized trust 
positively, whereas income inequality influenced generalized trust negatively. See Jan 
Delhey and Kenneth Newton, “Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global 
Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?” European Sociological Review 21, no.4 (2005): 
311-327. A similar study was conducted by Christian Bjornskov, “Determinants of 
Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison,” Public Choice 130, no.1 (2007): 1-
21. Similar to Delhey and Newton, Bjornskov accounted for the influence of religion to 
operationalize historical heritage. In his analysis, Catholic and Muslim cultures and 
income inequality were found to exert negative influence on generalized trust. Though 
the analysis found constitutional monarchies as positively related to generalized trust, 
most of the constitutional monarchies included in the dataset were the Western 
European countries with well-institutionalized competitive and liberal systems. Lastly, 
in his analysis of generalized trust, Uslaner showed negative influence of economic 
inequality on generalized trust. See Eric Uslaner, Moral Foundations of Trust (New 
York, Madrid, South Africa: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
13 Uslaner, Moral Foundations of Trust, 94-100. 
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generalized trust, has the potential to provide new information about this relationship. 
Yet why do individuals‟ social network relations matter for democratic political orders? 
Political science is mostly concerned with constitutional orders, political regimes, 
institutions and actors. Studies which focus on elite level interactions within the 
institutionally constricted arena, are quite distanced from individuals‟ daily under-
takings. Though individuals become more visible in attitudinal research, this line of 
research also strips individuals of their daily social relationships, because the data are 
frequently collected at the individual level and translated into country level summary 
information about cultural trends. Both strands of research set political science away 
from individual face-to-face interactions and social relationships, and this distance is 
further widened through the analytical differentiation made between the modern and the 
traditional society.  
From Simmel to Giddens, the modern society is associated with the progressive 
decrease in the weight of individuals‟ primordial ties and ascriptive relationships, and a 
corresponding increase in new types of ties based on secondary and rational 
relationships. This assertion is frequently an acknowledgement of the interference of the 
ever more complex bureaucratic and economic institutions in individuals‟ daily life. 
After all, modern democratic society is as much about the changes at the individual 
level such as occupational diversity, increase in literacy and education levels, urban 
settlements, media exposure, and personal income as it is about the organizational 
sophistication at the abstract systems levels. The latter aspect concerns political, 
economic, and social systems, which demand both the direct and indirect participation 
of citizens for effective functioning. Being so, in modern societies, individuals are in 
constant relationship with the agents of the impersonal political system when they vote, 
pay their electricity bills, or issue a complaint about the lack of municipal services. 
Likewise, they relate to the economic system when they sign a business contract, apply 
for a bank loan, or form an occupational association. However, why do those 
undertakings necessarily result in a decrease in individuals‟ face-to-face close 
relationships? 
The point is that modernization theory relies on abstract systems so assertively 
that it neglects the possibility that individuals‟ daily encounters with their immediate 
social associates are agents of the modern processes as well. The critical question is: 
How do individuals familiarize complex modern systems? For political scientists, this 
question boils down to: How do the individuals‟ social networks influence their political 
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information, knowledge, and opinions? What role do relations with family and friends 
play in this process? What about the alternative networks of colleagues and civil society 
associates? Such questions have been explored more vigorously in the last decade 
thanks to the availability of social network measures that count on tie-based information 
at the level of individuals‟ social relations. Studies of this strand are already indicative 
of the fact that relational ties are significant agents of attitude and opinion formation.
14
  
Familiarizing the complex through individuals‟ relations is closely related to 
generalized trust as well. After all, what social capital regards as bridging relations is an 
enquiry into the extent to which individuals succeed in diversifying their relational ties. 
The diversity of ties, in turn, is argued to influence generalized trust positively because 
they make individuals aware of the variable human condition. Hence it is worth 
exploring the possible social network influence on generalized trust in order to 
designate the extent to which bottom-up initiatives of more varied connections may help 
in the generalization of the good will about human agency. Such good will is expected 
to bring people together for more effective undertakings regarding common problems, 
which is imperative for democratic institutionalization. 
Explorations of the potential for bottom-up initiatives are especially relevant for 
long standing electoral democracies such as Turkey. Limitations put on political and 
civil liberties hinder Turkey‟s status as a liberal democracy. Students of Turkish politics 
are well familiar with the structural reasons for the delay in basic liberties such as the 
historical strong state tradition, the deep-rooted cleavage between the modernizing elite 
and their more traditional adversaries, the military‟s frequent intervention in politics and 
the ensuing constitutional instability, the weak party system, and the ethnic insurgence 
related to the Kurdish population. These structures divide the citizens along the lines of 
existing political cleavages as well. Coupled with the challenges of socio-economic 
modernization, uncertainties amount to some degree of paralysis on the citizens‟ side. 
This paralysis is reflected in civil society, which remains weak in Turkey. 
Although civil society is regarded as important for citizens‟ connectedness on the one 
                                                          
14 See for example Diana A. Mutz, “The Consequences of Cross-cutting Networks for 
Political Participation,” American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2002): 838-
855. Also James L. Gibson “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for 
Consolidating Russia‟s Democratic Transition,” American Journal of Political Science 
45, no.1 (2001): 51-68. 
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hand, and their account for the performance of the political actors and institutions on the 
other, only approximately ten people out of a hundred are involved in some type of civil 
society institutions in Turkey. These institutions are frequently professional 
organizations such as political parties and trade unions, but rights-based and self-
expressive organizations attract only marginal attention. 
This general picture of the state of democracy in Turkey partly explains why 
generalized trust is low in Turkey. The structural problems Turkey has faced since its 
inception in 1923 seem to deepen the existing cleavages and to create new ones, which 
act as the fault lines that keep citizens apart from each other. In such a political order, it 
is, at best, difficult for the citizens to relate to each other in a meaningful way. The state 
of the civil society in Turkey is a further indicator of this situation.  
The present dissertation aims to expand the structural analysis on Turkey and it 
focuses on individuals‟ discussion network structures. The designation of these 
networks will make Turkish citizens more visible within the boundaries of their daily 
relationships. Moreover, the focus on those relationships will allow us to determine 
whether social networks have any influence on generalized trust. This focus is important 
to test a series of hypotheses set forth by social capital literature on the one hand and to 
argue about bottom-up initiatives to build trust relations on the other. Besides the 
analysis on Turkey, the cross-country analysis will also be helpful to discuss the 
generalizability of findings about social network underpinnings of generalized trust.   
 
 
 
1.1. The Research Design: The Method, Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
 
 
The research relies on statistical analysis to discern the influence of social 
network on generalized trust. This type of analysis is suitable for large-N studies and it 
accounts for the influence of the variables of interest while controlling for rival 
variables and demographic properties. As noted in the previous section, two analyses 
will guide the dissertation, and both rely on individual level data collected about 
individuals‟ tie-based relationships. For the Turkish case, the important matters 
discussion networks are focused on in order to test the network influence on generalized 
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trust. In the cross-country analysis, network measures are based on tie relationships with 
a series of family members and friends. 
The first strength of the study is its account of the social network influence on 
democratic attitudes: generalized trust in this case. As has already been noted, social 
network accounts of political knowledge, opinions, and participation have increased in 
the last decade, although social network influence on civic participation has remained 
more limited. The present study is an attempt to discuss the relevance of individuals‟ 
daily relationships for generalized trust. This enquiry, in turn, is important to discern the 
potential for bottom-up initiatives for conceptual and behavioral connectedness among 
the fellow man, which may significantly relate to democratic institutionalization. 
The second strength of the study relates to its single study focus on one of the 
electoral democracies in which generalized trust is a scarce social resource. Turkey 
made the transition to democracy in 1946 and it has qualified as an electoral democracy 
since then, despite the fact that its democracy was suspended following three direct and 
two indirect military interventions. Though the military‟s role in Turkish politics has 
decreased in the last decade and this trend is likely to continue, obstacles to full 
institutionalization of basic political and civil liberties seem to be still in effect.  
Students of Turkish politics frequently mention the structural reasons likely to 
delay Turkey‟s quest for democratic institutionalization. The present dissertation takes a 
behavioral stance and it relates Turkey‟s under-institutional democracy to scarcity of 
generalized trust among the fellow men. Notwithstanding the role political institutions 
and the political elite have played in Turkey‟s democratization process, the study  raises 
the possibility that the lack of a common societal vision in Turkey based on the 
recognition of the unknown others as the fellow men may explain the country‟s 
unending trial with electoral democracy. 
The third strength of the study is its unique focus on social networks. As has been 
noted, social capital literature frequently gives reference to different types of networks. 
The present dissertation is novel among the studies which strive to test this literature‟s 
hypotheses about the social network influence because its account for social networks is 
informed by tie-based information rather than group-based relations. This 
methodological novelty is not only important in order to discuss the network influence 
within a larger framework, but it is also imperative to elicit features of social networks 
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in Turkey. Network research is new in Turkey at best, and the present research is among 
the pioneering studies on this topic.
15
 
Despite these strengths, a series of limitations of the study are also in order. The 
first limitation relates to the social network boundaries in multi-item surveys. These 
types of surveys focus on different items and they are under time-constraints; hence 
they do not allow collection of complete egocentric data, which asks for all types of ties 
individuals possess. Rather, the social relationships are designated through the analysis 
of either the important matters or the political discussion name generators, which, at 
minimum, asks three alters with whom important matters or political matters are 
discussed. The present dissertation employs one of the first series of surveys which 
applied important maters name generator/interpreter items in Turkey. The network 
module of this survey is limited to three discussants. In addition, another series of 
questions asked about the number of close friends from the workplace, neighborhood 
and other places. These questions cannot claim to elicit individuals‟ social relations 
exhaustively, but despite this shortcoming, they account for substantial information 
about individuals‟ relations with certain social associates, which are found significant 
for the purposes of the present dissertation. 
A second limitation concerns the comparison of the findings from Turkey with 
findings of the cross-country data. The dissertation relied on the International Social 
Survey Program‟s (ISSP) detailed study on social networks, which was conducted in 
2001. Unfortunately Turkey was not included in this data set. Hence the comparison 
will not be endogenous to the cross-country analysis. Nevertheless, Turkey is 
comparable to countries in the ISSP data in several respects. First of all, Turkey shares 
OECD membership with many of the countries and G-20 membership with a significant 
number which are included in ISSP survey. Also, it has been a candidate country for EU 
membership since 2005; hence it is also comparable with new EU member-states of  the 
ISSP data. Hence Turkey stands as a comparable case with countries that are included in 
the ISSP data.  
The last limitation also relates to the comparison between the Turkish and the 
ISSP data. Network measures in Turkish data rely on name generator/interpreter items; 
                                                          
15  See Ali Çarkoğlu and Cerem I. Cenker, “Learning from name generator/interpreters 
in mass surveys: findings from Turkey,” Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10, 
(2011): 160-171, accessed July, 18, 2010, 
 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/articl/pii/S1877042811000206 
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however, in the ISSP data, network measures are based on tie relationships with a series 
of family members and friends. Additionally, in the ISSP data, a series of exchange 
name generators are asked in order to elicit types of contacts in a series of social 
exchanges. Alternatively, the common network questions in both data sets concern the 
number of close friends one has from the workplace, neighborhood and other places. 
Notwithstanding the differences, the present study opted for the comparison based on 
the fact that both datasets accounted for individuals‟ relational ties. Since network 
measures are founded on tie level information, it proved possible to construct similar 
network measures, which are informed by the same conceptual tenets concerning the tie 
properties.  
Keeping these strengths and limitations in mind, the present dissertation is an 
attempt to unveil the social network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey, which 
is an under-institutionalized democracy and where generalized trust is a scarce 
commodity. 
 
 
 
1.2. Organization of the dissertation 
 
 
 
The dissertation is organized as follows: The following chapter initiates the 
discussion about generalized trust by focusing on the more general literature on 
democracy and democratization. It aims to explain why political culture studies in 
general, and generalized trust in particular, are significant for democratic 
institutionalization. This chapter also draws attention to the primacy of the social capital 
literature, which pioneered the emphasis on generalized trust. 
The third chapter focuses on the concept of social capital in detail and it 
disentangles social networks and generalized trust as two significant and inter-related 
indicators of social capital. A close examination of this literature reveals an individual‟s 
social networks as significant determinants of generalized trust. Although the social 
capital literature has not fully discussed the conceptual and empirical implications of 
this relationship, it has set forth a series of viable hypotheses about the relationship 
between social networks and generalized trust. 
The fourth chapter assumes a social network approach and it carefully discerns 
discussions about the strong, the weak and the bridging ties, and their importance for 
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different social network measures. The insights of social network studies and their 
applications in political science are used to revise the hypotheses designated in the third 
chapter.  
Once the hypotheses and the measurement tools are obtained, the following 
chapter focuses on Turkey. The objective of the fifth chapter is to situate Turkey in its 
political context. Possible macro level socio-political determinants which delay 
Turkey‟s democratic institutionalization are discussed. This discussion is crucial 
because it brings to light the main fault lines which set Turkish citizens apart, and hence 
contribute to conceptual and behavioral distance among the people as fellow citizens. 
The sixth and the seventh chapters present the empirical analyses. The sixth 
chapter relies on a nation-wide study conducted for the urban population in Turkey in 
2009. The social network module, which was incorporated into a survey on informal 
economic activity in Turkey, informed the network measures of the present dissertation. 
These measures allow for the detailed examination of core discussion networks in 
Turkey and their subsequent influence on generalized trust. The seventh chapter, then 
replicates a similar study for the cross-country dataset on social networks. As has been 
noted, the ISSP 2001 data is used for this purpose. The last chapter concludes the 
dissertation with a discussion about the general findings.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL CULTURE AND GENERALIZED TRUST 
 
 
 
 
Liberal democracy has gained prominence with the advent of the third wave of 
democratization. As one country after another was declared democratic, qualities of 
democratic regimes have come under closer scrutiny. These qualities focused on 
institutional set-up on the one hand, and cultural and attitudinal features on the other. 
Notions of the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness are discussed more 
rigorously within the former camp, whereas citizens‟ support for democratic regime, 
self-expressive values, civil society activism and civic attitudes have become concerns 
for the latter camp. 
Among the civic attitudes, generalized trust comes to the fore as one of the most 
important features of democratic quality and sustenance. The objective of this chapter is 
to discuss the importance of generalized trust within studies of democracy and 
democratization.  
 
 
 
2.1. From institutions to political culture 
 
 
 
Democratic transitions across Latin America throughout the eighties, and ex-
communist states throughout the nineties, resulted in worldwide euphoria about 
democracy. One of the major questions of the nineties was the extent to which 
democratization efforts would be sustained. Scholars discussed the possibility of a 
widened playground for democratic regimes on the one hand, and the possibility of a 
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reverse authoritarian wave on the other. Hence, whether democratic transitions would 
translate into institutionalized democratic orders became a crucial research question.
16
 
Closer examination of the new democracies revealed the variance in democratic 
experience across the countries. Accordingly, a differentiation was made between an 
electoral and a liberal democracy. Electoral democracy referred to the 
institutionalization of free and fair elections while, liberal democracy was concerned 
with the extent to which a plural democratic order a là Dahl was established.17   
Dahl formulated the institutional determinants of democratic rule as early as the 
seventies.
18
 According to Dahl, democratic rule was as much about free and fair 
elections as it was about a pluralistic society. The former provided citizens‟ direct 
participation in politics through their rights to get elected and to vote in elections; the 
latter accounted for institutions that provide an indirect, yet an on-going participation in 
politics. Citizens‟ involvement in interest groups and organizations and their access to 
alternative sources of information were cases in point. As a result, institutions which 
guarantee freedom of expression and freedom to form and join organizations were also 
regarded as significant.
19
  
                                                          
16 Huntington is among the first scholars to write extensively about worldwide 
democratization efforts. Please see Samuel Huntington, “Democracy‟s Third Wave,” 
Journal of Democracy 2, no.2 (1991): 12-34. In this article Huntington labeled thirty 
democratic transitions by 1990 -, which started with the fall of the dictatorship in 
Portugal in 1974 -, as the third wave of democratization. The author compared this 
wave to prior waves of democratizations and focused on prospects of democratic 
deepening across the then recent democratic transitions as well as on the possibility of a 
reverse authoritarian wave. Studies which focus on the third wave of democratization 
can be found in Larry Diamond et.al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: 
Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1997). 
 
17 Diamond, for instance, discussed electoral and liberal democracy in Larry Diamond, 
“Is the Third wave Over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no.3 (1996): 20-37. Electoral 
democracy is frequently associated with Schumpeter, whereas liberal democracy is 
associated with Dahl. A good discussion of both Schumpeter‟s and Dahl‟s conceptions 
of democratic rule is provided in David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge, 
Oxford: Polity Press, 1991). 
 
18
 Robert Dahl elaborated extensively on procedural criteria of democratic rule in 
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 1971), 2. 
 
19
 Ibid., 2,3. 
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At the time Dahl formulated the pluralistic conception of democratic rule, the 
number of democratic regimes was highly limited. Hence, Dahl‟s discussion rested 
mostly on the democratic experience of the US and Western Europe. As noted, the third 
wave of democratization resulted in a sharp increase in the number of democratic 
regimes, and one consequence of such an increase was a similar increase in the 
democratic experience.  
Table 2.1 for instance, employs the Freedom House data set and shows the 
number of electoral and liberal democracies for the 1989-2010 period.
20
 
Table 2.1. Number of democratic regimes, 1989-2010 
Time period 
Electoral 
democracy 
Liberal 
democracy 
Difference 
2010 116 89 27 
2009 119 89 30 
2008 121 90 31 
2007 123 90 33 
2006 123 89 34 
2005 119 89 30 
2004 117 88 29 
2003 121 89 32 
2001-2002 121 85 36 
2000-2001 120 86 34 
1995-1996 115 76 39 
1990-1991 76 65 11 
1989-1990 69 61 8 
 
A striking feature of Table 2.1 is the substantial increase -at around 65%- in the 
number of electoral democracies from 1989 to 1996. Yet, during the same period, the 
increase in the number of liberal democratic regimes was only about twenty-five 
                                                          
20 The author‟s compilation using Freedom House data. For information on electoral 
democracies see “Number and Percentages of Electoral Democracies FIW 1989-90-
2011”. For information on liberal democracies see “Freedom in the World, Country 
Ratings”. The number of countries indicated as “Free” are accepted as liberal 
democracies and are contrasted with electoral democracies, accessed July, 18, 2011, 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439,  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010  
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percent. Moreover by 1995-1996, the difference in number of electoral and liberal 
democracies was nearly five times more than the difference in 1989-1990.  
Variance in democratic experience by the mid-nineties resulted in more rigorous 
discussion about the qualities of democratic regimes. These discussions underscored 
electoral democracy as a distinct category of democratic rule. Alternatively, discussions 
about liberal democracy started with accepting Dahl‟s conception of democracy as the 
“minimum procedural criteria”. Yet new procedures were also added to those criteria to 
discuss what democracy is and what it is not.
21
 Focus on procedures, in turn, resulted in 
more emphasis given to democratic institutions than democratic culture. 
Schmitter and Karl, for instance, discussed two further criteria to draw a line 
between an electoral and a liberal democracy. The first criterion was about the necessity 
to ensure the independent and sovereign character of the state. The second one dealt 
with the right of the elected officials to rule without pressures from unelected state 
officials such as the military, the civil service and the like.
22
  
The influence of state officials, especially the military, was discussed frequently 
within the context of democratization in Latin America. Schmitter and Karl wrote that, 
until 1991, civilians were not in control of the military in a series of Central American 
states, although the US government treated them as democracies on the basis of the 
electoral criteria.
23
 Similarly, Collier and Levitsky mentioned Chile, El Salvador and 
Paraguay, which lacked effective power to rule due to “the persistence of „reserved 
domains‟ of military power.”24  
Likewise, O‟Donnell elaborated in more detail the meaning and mechanisms of 
democratic accountability. He drew attention to the lack of horizontal accountability 
especially between the executive and other branches of government. This problem was 
found to be more acute in the presidential democracies of many Latin American states. 
Chosen for a fixed term in office and burdened with difficulties of simultaneous 
                                                          
21 This expression refers directly to Schmitter and Karl‟s article with the same title. See 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…And Is Not,” in The 
Global Resurgence of Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 49-63.  
 
22
 Ibid., 55, 56. 
 
23
 Ibid.,, 55.  
 
24
 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual  
Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49, no.3 (1997): 443. 
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economic and political liberalization, many elected presidents in Latin America 
attempted to undermine both legislative and judiciary controls over the government, 
which resulted in authoritarian one-man-rule tendencies. As a result, horizontal 
accountability, along with its vertical counterpart, began to be acknowledged as another 
significant criterion of liberal democracy.
25
 
In his article, Is the Third Wave Over? Diamond acknowledged the importance of 
the analysis of any reserved domains and the institutionalization of both horizontal and 
vertical accountability in procedural definitions of liberal democracy. Besides these 
conditions, however, Diamond made the strongest argument for political and civil 
pluralism as a condition of liberal democracy.
26
 Although Dahl also discussed political 
and the civil rights, democratic practice across third wave democracies demanded a 
more detailed account. 
Diamond first mentioned a series of electoral institutions which barred smaller 
groups or parties from formal representation. The high threshold of ten percent in 
Turkey was given as an example. Also, the civil rights and liberties of the cultural, 
ethnic and/or religious minorities were emphasized. Diamond further argued that 
citizens should not fall victim to aggression by either state or anti-state forces for 
demanding or exercising their rights. The author designated the rule of law and an 
effective judiciary as the guarantee of political and civil rights as well as freedoms.
27
  
Focus on institutional and procedural determinants of democratic rule revealed the 
rule of law as a significant research area to evaluate the extent of democratization of a 
given polity. Rule of law was related to all institutions mentioned so far. It concerned 
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democratic constitutional design as well as the extent of law enforcement to preserve 
democratic order. Hence, electoral institutions, civil-military relations, horizontal 
relations among different branches of government, and the extent of political and civil 
rights and freedoms were associated with the rule of law. 
Rigorous discussions about democratic institutions and the rule of law of the mid-
nineties resulted in a renewed interest in political culture as well. Discussions of 
behavioral and attitudinal features of democracies became crucial because new 
democratic constitutions and ensuing institutions were, at best, slow to bring about a 
well-functioning democratic order. This discrepancy between the constitutional and the 
institutional design and their actual workings in practice, was the main reason why 
democratic consolidation became a serious research concern once many of democratic 
transitions were completed.   
Democratic consolidation was concerned with both the constitutional and the 
behavioral features of democratic regimes. Linz and Stepan gave the following detailed 
definition:  
   Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no 
significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic 
regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede 
from the state. Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town 
when, even in the face of severe political and economic crisis, the 
overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change 
must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures. 
Constitutionally, democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the 
actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict 
within the state will be resolved according to established norms, and the 
violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. In 
short, with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply 
internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in 
political calculations to achieve success.
28
 
 
It should be noted that Linz and Stepan strongly underlined the attitudinal and 
behavioral aspect of democracies. Even their constitutional criterion reflected this 
aspect through its emphasis on citizens‟ habituation to democratic processes. Citizen 
support for democracy and their involvement in the democratic order in a democratic 
manner, then, was found crucial for democratic sustenance. This emphasis, in turn, 
underscored a renewed interest in political culture. 
As early as the sixties, Almond and Verba defined political culture as citizens‟ 
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psychological orientations towards political objects.
29
 Political culture is therefore about 
individuals‟ attitudinal and behavioral dispositions towards the political regime and its 
constituent institutions; political elite; and each other as citizens.  
Democratic consolidation literature frequently discussed political culture as the 
runner-up to institutional reform.
30
 Linz and Stepan, for instance, sequenced 
institutional and behavioral determinants of democratic consolidation and the former 
was given prominence.
31
 This sequencing resulted in a linear and progressive regard of 
the democratization process, whereby transition to, and institutionalization of, liberal 
procedures were assumed to be followed by behavioral and attitudinal habituation to 
democratic processes. 
However, most third wave democracies underwent rapid changes, which 
demanded instantaneous behavioral and attitudinal adaptation on many fronts. Elections 
demanded a responsible and engaged citizenry; newly elected governments and 
legislatures were expected to be checked by active citizens; and economic liberalization 
reforms were assumed to quickly awaken the long dormant entrepreneurs. Discounting 
the exaggeration implicit in these statements, the point is that democratic transitions 
took place on many different levels simultaneously, hence sequencing of institutional 
and behavioral criteria was just too orderly to be observed in real life.
32
  
At around the same time, the democratic consolidation paradigm identified 
political culture as a significant, yet lesser determinant of democratic sustenance, a 
series of studies focused particularly on the citizens‟ side of democratic rule. The 
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increasing availability of public opinion surveys proved instructive for these studies; 
thanks to these surveys, citizens‟ support for democracy as well as democratic and civic 
attitudes came under closer scrutiny. As more extensive data became available, studies 
about the relevance of citizens‟ level mass attitudes towards democratic rule increased. 
The next section will examine these studies. 
 
 
 
2.2. From Political Culture to Generalized Trust and Social Capital 
 
 
 
The relationship between citizens‟ attitudes and behaviors and democratic 
sustenance were not unknown to political research before the third wave democracies.
33
 
On the contrary, the pioneering studies of Almond and Verba, Verba and Nie, and 
Barnes and Kaase among others, can well be claimed to have set the agenda for later 
studies, which were concerned with citizens‟ political participation and its implications 
for democratic rule. Notwithstanding their contributions, prior studies, however, 
focused mostly on Western societies due to difficulties associated with conducting 
survey research across authoritarian and/or military regimes. However, as has been 
noted, public opinion surveys have become more available in the last three decades, so 
the citizens‟ side of politics has been examined more in detail and three inter-related 
research agendas have emerged.  
The first research agenda focuses on citizens‟ democratic support, the second 
focuses on individual level pro-democratic self-expression values, and the third agenda 
concerns social capital and generalized trust as its most significant determinant. Among 
these research agendas, the last one proved to be both novel and interesting because it 
does not only consider individual level attitudes and behaviors, but is also concerned 
with the social environment in which individuals are embedded. Before getting into the 
details of the social capital literature, it is worth exploring the other two agendas as 
well. 
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Citizens‟ support for democracy is regarded as a significant variable of 
democratic sustenance.
34
 Recent studies show that citizens‟ support for democracy is 
generally high across the globe,
35
 a finding which may be promising for the widened 
scope of democratic rule. Yet there are two points of contention about the studies on 
democratic support: the first pertains to its conceptual clarity, and the second contention 
is related to the varying implications of this variable for both democratic and 
undemocratic regimes. 
In survey research, citizens are frequently asked the extent of their support for 
democracy. Yet, this question falls short of eliciting what individual respondents 
understand by demo cracy . Is democracy a general label for a certain political regime, 
or does it refer to specific democratic performance? In other words, is it possible that 
individuals refer to incumbents and/or their performance when they evaluate their 
support for democracy rather than democracy as an ideal regime type? These questions 
become more complicated once they are asked across undemocratic regimes, let alone 
the democratic ones. In the former cases, the democratic support variable is more about 
citizens‟ democratic aspirations than their actual knowledge and experience of 
democratic rule. Given this difference, how far can we argue for comparability of 
democratic support data across democratic and undemocratic countries? These 
questions make interpretations of the worldwide increase in citizens‟ democratic 
support all the more difficult.
36
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According to Welzel and Inglehart, for instance, citizens‟ individual level 
attitudes and behaviors are more relevant for democratic sustenance than their self-
reports of democratic support. They wrote: 
   Endorsement of democracy is not necessarily accompanied by the 
interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism that are 
the core components of self-expression values, and empirical analysis 
demonstrates that these are far more important to the emergence and 
survival of democratic institutions than is mere lip service.
37
 
 
From the seventies onwards, Inglehart has argued for the relevance of individual 
level attitudes, values, and behaviors for democratic regimes. His initial research rested 
on Western democracies, and value change across these countries from material needs 
such as economic security to post-material needs such as ascetic and intellectual 
fulfillment was explained by socio-economic modernization. These values, in turn, were 
associated with democratic rule.
38
 
According to Inglehart, pro-democratic values can generally be called the self-
expressive values. Tolerance, civic activism, liberty aspirations, generalized trust, and 
subjective well-being are prominent among these values as opposed to survival values, 
which reflected individuals‟ search for economic security accompanied by their 
submissive attitude towards the state authority. Inglehart related self-expressive values 
to socio-economic modernization because as societies become economically more 
affluent, individuals‟ security needs are fulfilled and they subsequently move away 
from state authority to individual autonomy.  
Besides socio-economic modernization, Inglehart also argued for the relevance of 
historical heritage for self-expressive values. In cross-country analyses, cultures based 
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on religion, ideology and/or colonial legacy were frequently used as the proxy variable 
of historical heritage. On the one hand, countries with predominantly Protestant cultures 
were argued to incline more strongly towards self-expressive values; on the other hand, 
countries with communist and colonial legacies were found negatively related to those 
values. More importantly, national level cultural differences proved stronger than 
different cultural zones to situate an individual along the survival-self-expression 
dimension.
39
  
The account of the relationship between individual level values and democratic 
sustenance posed a direct challenge to institutional and procedural accounts of 
democracy. The emphasis on values showed that even the most democratic constitutions 
would prove ineffective unless citizens possessed supporting values and attitudes 
towards the regime. This emphasis, in turn, strengthened the political culture approach:   
   The basic claim of the political culture school is that political institutions 
and mass values must be congruent in order to produce stable and effective 
regimes. Thus, an authoritarian regime is unlikely to function effectively if 
it is under strong pressure from social forces that seek to institutionalize 
human autonomy, choice, and self-expression…Similarly, liberal 
democracy is unlikely to be consolidated or to operate effectively if it exists 
in a culture dominated by survival values, which subordinate human 
freedom to social conformity and state authority. Under such conditions, 
charismatic leaders find it easy to foment threat perceptions among the 
public, to nourish social group pressures, and to foster compliance with 
authoritarian rule - even to the point that people support the abolition of 
their own liberties.
40
  
 
It should be noted that this perspective poses a direct challenge to democratic 
consolidation literature, which argues for a sequence of habituation into pro-democratic 
values once democratic institutions are introduced. Rather, the culturalist account 
acknowledges the fact that all types of institutional and/or economic reforms take place 
within a cultural milieu, which influences the prospects of those reforms. This cultural 
milieu, in turn, is instructed by prior levels of socio-economic modernization on the one 
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hand, and historical heritage on the other. According to the culturalist school, then, 
democratic institutionalization is likely to the extent to which a given polity has 
embraced a series of self-expressive values. Inglehart and Welzel gave the ex-Soviet 
states as cases in point: 
   Since  [most of the Soviet successor states‟] dramatic move toward 
democracy in 1991, the people of most of these societies have not become 
more trusting, more tolerant, happier, or post-materialist…Russia and the 
eastern group of ex-communist countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Ukraine) rank even lower on self-
expression values than any of the Islamic countries…and far lower than the 
more advanced Islamic societies such as Turkey or Iran.
41
 
 
The political culture approach is important because it underlines the filtering 
effect of culture. Yet, aggregating a series of different values together as the self-
expressive values and summarizing those values as the national averages also has a 
series of drawbacks.  
The first drawback concerns the separate items which make up the self-expressive 
values. As noted, the most prominent among self-expressive values are tolerance, civic 
activism, liberty aspirations, generalized trust, and subjective well-being. Yet in their 
analyses, Inglehart and colleagues accounted for more items which highly correlated 
with these values. Accordingly, the total number of items which corresponded to self-
expressive values, were multiple and all those values were considered as “a syndrome 
of political attitudes towards the world one lives in”.42 Notwithstanding the contribution 
of designating such a syndrome for democratic sustenance, this summary approach to a 
series of values undoes the differences among those values as well. For instance liberty 
aspirations and subjective well-being are about individual level attitudes, whereas 
generalized trust and civic activism also relate to individuals‟ social relationships. 
Accordingly, separate accounts of these values matter to understand, in more detail, 
how values and culture contribute to democratic rule. 
A second drawback concerns cultural determinism implicit in these accounts. 
From earlier studies onwards, Inglehart designated socio-cultural modernization and 
Protestant culture as two significant determinants of self-expressive values. Given this 
insight, one may well question what is left for the democratic prospects of the third 
                                                          
41
 Ibid., 159. 
 
42
 Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” 1215. 
 27 
wave democracies, which either lag behind in socio-economic modernization or which 
are not Protestant?  
This question loses its relevance once social engineering geared towards fitting 
societies into democratic rule is put aside and the focus is given to what the cross-
country data says about the relationship between values and democratic rule. The 
analyses do not say that countries cannot become democracies if they are not rational 
and modern or Protestant; rather, they say that democratic institutionalization becomes 
more likely with certain values and behaviors. Hence culturalist accounts ask about the 
problematization of certain cultural values, demanding an enquiry into their 
determinants and further analyses across cases where they are both in abundance and in 
scarcity. Seen from this perspective, focusing on separate self-expressive values and 
their determinants become more important.    
From earlier studies on political culture onwards, generalized trust is among the 
most important self-expression values. Its importance does not only relate to the fact 
that countries with high levels of generalized trust generally fare better in terms of 
democratic institutionalization, but, different from other self-expression values, 
generalized trust also has implications for one‟s relationship with his/her social 
environment. In other words, the focus on generalized trust makes the individual more 
visible within his/her social milieu. The individual‟s decision to invest or decline trust 
in the fellow man accounts for the link between the individual and his/her social 
relations as well as the larger society. This link makes generalized trust significant 
among the self-expression values.  
Generalized trust is studied in detail by social capital literature, which has gained 
prominence since Making Democracy Work was published. Although studies within the 
political culture camp which focus on democratic support and self-expression values are 
relevant for democracy studies, the emphasis on generalized trust is more interesting 
because it embeds the individual in his/her social milieu so that the influence of societal 
relationships on political systems is accounted for. Accordingly, the next section will 
enquire into the relationship between generalized trust, social capital and democracy 
more closely. 
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2.3. Generalized Trust, Social Capital and Democracy 
 
 
 
Generalized trust is about an individual‟s regard of the other as the fellow man, so 
that co-operation with those others outside one‟s primordial relations and close 
associates becomes more likely. This co-operative spirit, in turn, is expected to 
encourage citizens‟ participation in different social systems.  Hence, across trusting 
societies, citizens are expected to be better endowed with political and civic activism.  
Trust is widely defined as a risk-taking behavior concerning the actions of other 
people. The risk arises due to free human agency, hence the trustee may disappoint the 
trusting behavior. Luhmann writes: “Trust, then, is the generalized expectation that the 
other will handle his freedom, his disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping 
with his personality - or rather, in keeping with the personality which he has presented 
and made socially visible.”43 Along similar lines, Dunn defined trust as “a device for 
coping with the freedom of other persons
44” and Sztompka wrote “trust is a bet about 
future contingent actions of others.”45 
The relationship between trust and free human agency, in turn, makes trust more 
relevant with the advent of modernity. Besides the focus on free human agency, modern 
functional differentiation also demands more trust. In modern societies, individuals are 
enmeshed in multiple roles and they are subjects to ever more complex social 
organizations. Complex society overburdens individuals with more uncertainty at 
present and more possibilities about the future. To escape the paralysis of uncertainty 
and unpredictability, individuals make choices at their own risk. Trust, then, is an 
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inseparable feature of modern societies and it concerns individuals‟ relationships with 
each other as well as with different institutions.
46
  
Accordingly, trust may be about people we know, or those we do not know. 
Likewise, it may relate to institutions of different sorts. Among different types of trust, 
generalized trust corresponds to trust in people whom we do not know. We reveal such 
kind of trust to strangers because we regard them as the fellow men. Though they are 
strangers, we choose to extend trust because we find them familiar to ourselves. We 
regard them as not only harmless, but also worthy of association and co-operation. This 
positive attitude towards the fellow men lies at the heart of generalized trust. 
Accordingly, generalized trust is different from particularized trust, which refers to trust 
in people we know. It is also different from institutional trust, which pertains to 
confidence individuals have in a series of institutions.
47
  
Political science in general and democracy studies in particular focus on 
generalized trust because people‟s co-operation and association for common interests as 
well as public goods are necessary conditions for functioning democracies. Generalized 
trust provides an enabling social environment in which individuals easily connect with 
each other. This potential of instant connectivity is what lends generalized trust 
significance to underscore a good portion of democratic sustenance. Inglehart‟s 
empirical analyses were cases in point. Besides, in-depth case studies also showed how 
the absence of generalized trust fostered either individual isolation and social anomie, or 
the emergence of mafia-like organizations, which prove detrimental for democratic 
regimes.  
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One such study is Banfield‟s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.48 In this 
anthropological study Banfield examined a village in South Italy in the late fifties and 
one of his most prominent findings was the individual solitude and loneliness due to 
lack of generalized trust between the fellow men. Banfield‟s designation of the hard-
learned premise of the Montegranese about life is much quoted: “Maximize the 
material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family (interesse); assume all others will do 
likewise”.49 This state of mind was labeled the “amoral familism”, which pointed to a 
life of stagnation on all social, political, and economic fronts. Indeed, the problem for 
this remote village of the Italian South of 1955 was that they were living together 
without the feeling of belonging to a society. It was a life in solitude. It was a society 
where distrust of the fellow men reigned.  
Gambetta labeled life in Montegrano as “miserable”50. His study on the Sicilian 
Mafia showed that social anomie was one of the social disorders deep-rooted distrust 
could bring about, but it was not the only social disorder. According to Gambetta, the 
emergence of the Mafia in Sicily was also a direct consequence of distrust. Its social 
consequences were no better than the case in Montegrano: “…sky-high murder rates, 
higher transaction costs, lower incentives for technological innovation, migration of the 
best human capital, higher cheating rates, poorer quality of goods and services”51.  
 The cases of Montegrano and Sicilian Mafia showed how pervasive distrust re-
produced adverse social circumstances in societies. These studies focused on historical 
legacy as well as political order as significant determinants in the emergence of trust as 
well as distrust. Yet, they also showed how individual agency tied these structural 
factors together and worked through different social systems, at times to their detriment. 
The way this agency perceived the systemic properties as well as the other agents, thus 
proved imperative either in “virtuous circles” of trusting individuals, sophisticated 
cooperation and effective institutions or in “vicious circles” of distrusting individuals, 
retreat from cooperation and institutional decay. The point here is the relevance of trust 
                                                          
48 Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: The Free 
Press, 1958). 
 
49
 Ibid., 83. 
 
50 Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, 78. 
 
51
 Ibid., 173. 
 31 
for the political order and the persistence of the systemic properties as long as the 
attitudinal bases of these systems remain uninterrupted. 
Notwithstanding the contribution of these studies, the real breakthrough, which 
crystallized the relationship between generalized trust and democracy, came with the 
publication of Making Democracy Work. Similar to Banfield and Gambetta, Putnam and 
his collaborators also focused on Italy as the case study. Their research puzzle 
concerned the differences of democratic institutional performance between North and 
South Italian regions, which was found consistently better across the former.  
Once again, historical legacy emerged as a significant variable to explain the 
differences between North and South Italy. The vertical bonds of authority and 
submission across the South Italian regions were associated with long-lasting colonial 
legacy, and it was underscored as the reason for their under-development in comparison 
with the once Renaissance Republics of the North Italian regions. Yet, besides the 
weight of history, Putnam and his collaborators also underlined the persistency in 
individuals‟ attitudes towards each other for provision of public goods; in other words, 
the authors argued for the positive influence of individual civic behavior on institutional 
performance. In the analysis, differences between more civic and less civic regions were 
noteworthy. Accordingly, the authors underlined the impelling influence of social 
context on democratic institutional performance.
52
      
In their study, social context referred in particular to the extent of “ „civic 
community,‟ that is, patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity”.53 This 
emphasis on civic community was especially significant for democratic regimes, 
because the institutional discussions about citizens‟ political and civic activism rested, 
in essence, on the extent to which they were willing to come together to pursue their 
common interests, and/or to reflect political discontentment. When the behavioral and 
the relational foundations of civil society involvement are not discussed, the citizens in 
democratic regimes are treated only as the aggregates to be counted upon as the civil 
society. Alternatively, Inglehart‟s emphasis on self-expressive values underscored the 
behavioral and attitudinal aspect of the civic community, yet his analyses fell short in 
relating the individual‟s attitudes to the existing social milieu. Also, as has been noted, 
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Inglehart‟s lists of self-expression values were rather comprehensive; hence individual 
level civic attitudes were not the only focus of interest.  
Contrary to these different approaches, the emphasis on the civic community 
concerned individual attitudes in relation to their social environments. Putnam and his 
collaborators found citizens of North Italy more trusting and more active in the civil 
society than their counterparts across South Italian regions. On the basis of their 
findings, the authors conceptualized the civic community as one which “inherited a 
substantial stock of social capital”, which, in turn, was defined as “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions”.54 Hence the significance of trust was 
discussed within the larger conceptual framework of social capital.  
A series of drawbacks can be mentioned regarding this influential study. One 
drawback was the authors‟ elaboration of social capital only in the study‟s concluding 
section. Another drawback concerned the relationship between social capital, 
generalized trust and civicness. Though generalized trust was mentioned as a significant 
feature of social capital, the empirical part of the study rested on a composite measure 
of civicness rather than generalized trust.
55
 In addition, although civicness, generalized 
trust and networks of civic engagement were introduced as features of the so-called 
social capital, the relationships among these features were not specified.  
Indeed Putnam repeated this stance in his-follow up study, Bowling Alone, which 
concerned the decline of civic attitudes in the US.
56
 He noted in this study: 
   Other things being equal, people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer 
more often, contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics and 
community organizations, serve more readily on juries, give blood more 
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frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant 
of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue…In short, 
people who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged 
in community life are more trusting and more trustworthy. Conversely, the 
civically disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and 
feel less constrained to be honest themselves. The causal arrows among 
civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty and social trust are as tangled as 
well-tossed spaghetti.
57
      
 
What Putnam referred to as “well-tossed spaghetti” has become the soft 
underbelly of social capital since it referred to many different concepts at once; social 
capital has been criticized widely for its lack of conceptual clarity.
58
 Yet the concept 
was also found interesting for the link it established between the social relations, the 
society, the culture and the democratic order. Also, multiple social capital indicators 
invited a series of new hypotheses and their ensuing tests in order to discuss its 
relevance for democratic regimes more in detail. Accordingly, the next chapter will 
focus on disentangling the concept of social capital, which relates to the social network 
underpinnings of generalized trust. 
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 For the critics of the concept, see, for example Sidney Tarrow, “Making Social 
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Making Democracy Work,” American Political Science Review 90, no.2 (1996): 389-
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contemporaneous studies, which found social capital as a promising concept, see Partha 
Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin eds., Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective  
(Washington: The World Bank, 2000).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
DISENTANGLING SOCIAL CAPITAL: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND 
GENERALIZED TRUST 
 
 
 
 
Once political science literature developed an interest in social capital, social 
networks were also mentioned more frequently apart from the generalized trust. The 
reasons for this interest were threefold. First, Putnam and his collaborators included 
networks of civic engagement in the definition of social capital. These networks mostly 
implied horizontally organized civil society organizations such as community 
development, rights based, recreation and leisure groups. The second reason was related 
to sociological accounts of social capital, which pointed to the network underpinnings 
of the concept. This strand relied more heavily on informal rather than formal networks, 
such as friendship and kinship groups. The third reason was the comparison between the 
political science and the sociological definitions of social capital, which made the focus 
on social networks more explicit. 
Any study of political science which focuses on the influence of social capital on 
democratic sustenance, institutional performance and/or economic development 
frequently refers to the work of Coleman briefly, before discussing, in detail, the work 
of Putnam.
59
 Fewer references than these two studies are made to Bourdieu, and these 
are more of an acknowledgement since his work regarded cultural features as a form of 
capital for the first time along with the much accepted physical and human capital.
60
 
Coleman, however, is the first scholar to focus explicitly on the conceptualization of 
social capital by drawing attention to its foundation in relational networks on the one 
hand, and to features which make it another form of capital on the other.  
                                                          
59 Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” 13-40. Putnam, Nanetti 
and Leonardi, Making Democracy Work. 
 
60 Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” 241-261.  
 
 35 
According to Coleman, social capital was a relational concept whose value 
accrued within the relations of agents in a given social structure. Being so, Coleman‟s 
regard of social capital was contextual. In his work, social resources such as information 
and norms like trust and reciprocity, which resided in the relationships of agents, 
became capital only when these resources were mobilized for a certain purpose. Hence, 
social capital is defined in functionalist terms. In the words of Coleman:  
   Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a 
variety of entities in common: they all consist of some aspect of social 
structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether persons or 
corporate actors - within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that 
in its absence would not be possible. Like physical capital and human 
capital, social capital is not completely fungible but maybe specific to 
certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in 
facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others.
61
  
 
This definition was conceptually different from Putnam‟s definition. Coleman 
related social capital to those co-operative norms, attitudes and behaviors which were 
generated within the small and the closed networks. Hence in Coleman‟s definition, a 
given network constituted the structural boundary of the research.
62
 Alternatively, 
Putnam regarded the national level polity as the structural boundary; hence, social 
capital referred to different types of networks as well as the aggregate level co-operative 
norms generated within this larger structural boundary.  
Besides the concept‟s relational boundaries, the two definitions also differed in 
their regard of trust as a significant social resource.  In Coleman‟s definition, the 
concern was about particularized trust, because the focus was on small, familiar 
networks. In Putnam‟s definition, on the other hand, the emphasis fell on generalized 
trust, which was generated at the societal level through the workings of many different 
types of networks.  
In addition, in Coleman‟s definition, social capital benefited only the members of 
the given network. Accordingly there was the possibility that while facilitating certain 
actions for a given individual or a network of individuals, social capital may 
                                                          
61
 Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” 16. 
 
62 Ibid., 16-18. Coleman‟s analyses on social capital, for instance, focused on closed 
networks such as the diamond market in New York, South Korean radical activist 
students, Jewish mothers with children, and the market in Cairo.  
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simultaneously be harmful to those others outside of the network. However, Putnam 
expected social capital to benefit the whole society. No bad sides were assigned to 
social capital; all associations were deemed alike and expected to make democratic 
institutions as well as economies work.  
Interestingly, this difference regarding the expected benefits of social capital also 
pointed out a commonality which concerned with both authors‟ functionalist approach 
to the concept. For Coleman, social capital became relevant once it was used for a 
certain purpose of action. Likewise, Putnam regarded social capital relevant to the 
extent that it contributed to collective action. This functionalism was criticized on the 
basis that it conflated the foundation of social capital - which was the social networks - 
with social capital‟s assumed outcome of trust, or related co-operative norms.63 
Sabatini, for instance, argued: “Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an 
indicator of it will necessarily find it related to that outcome. Social capital becomes 
tautologically present whenever an outcome is observed”.64 Similarly, Lin criticized 
similar functional definitions because,  
   social capital is identified when and if it works; the potential causal 
explanation of social capital can be captured only by its effect, or whether it 
is an investment depends on the return for a specific individual in a specific 
action. Thus, the causal factor is defined by the effect.
65
  
 
Accordingly, Lin suggested conceptualising and measuring social capital “relative 
to its root”, which lay in social networks and social relations.66  
These criticisms called for separation between social networks and those social 
resources which resided within these networks. Yet, rather than focusing on the 
suggested relationship between social networks and the given social resource, many of 
the political science studies counted on these variables as multiple indicators of social 
capital.  
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Table 3.1 on pages 38-39, for instance, reports a series of well-known studies on 
social capital. Social capital was defined in terms of different types of social networks 
and associations as well as a series of civic norms. Generalized trust was recurrent 
among these norms. Table 3.1 shows that social capital concerned the informal relations 
with the family and friends, more formal civil society involvement and, lastly, with co-
operative norms such as trust and reciprocity as well as different civic and individual 
attitudes such as tolerance and optimism. Variance across definitions also pointed to 
selective use of the multiple indicators of social capital. One study, for instance, could 
define social capital as generalized trust levels and civil society involvement, whereas 
another study could focus on relations with family and friends.  
Table 3.1 shows that social capital is an overloaded concept. Notwithstanding this 
overload, the concept can well be argued to prove viable in political science because it 
draws attention to the social and cultural side of democratic rule, which relates to 
individuals‟ social networks as well as the civic norms of generalized trust and 
reciprocity. In particular, the criticisms of the functionalist definitions of trust set forth a 
hypothesis about the possible relationship between social networks and generalized 
trust. Additionally, the account of Coleman‟s elaboration on social capital shows the 
relevance of informal networks for the generation of trust besides Putnam‟s networks of 
civic engagement. The account of different types of networks, in turn, cautions us about 
Putnam‟s initial assumption pertaining to the benign contribution of all types of social 
networks to social systems and their institutions.  
Given these insights, the next section will examine the hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between social networks and generalized trust.  
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Table 3.1. Diverse conceptualization and operationalization of social capital in selected works after Coleman and Putnam 
Author Title of the study Conceptual definition Operational definition Research finding(s) 
Knack S.; 
Keefer P. 
(1997) 
Does Social 
Capital Have an 
Economic Payoff? 
A Cross-Country 
Investigation 
Trust, cooperative 
norms, and 
associations 
Generalized trust and 
civicness variables from 
WVS; density of 
associational activity 
Trust and norms of civic 
cooperation are associated with 
economic performance. These 
variables are stronger in countries 
which effectively protect property 
rights and have less fragmented 
societies. Associations do not 
correlate with economic 
development. 
Stolle, D; 
Rochon, T. 
(1998) 
Are All 
Associations 
Alike? Member 
Diversity, 
Associational 
Type and the 
Creation of Social 
Capital 
Networks and norms 
facilitating collective 
action 
Membership in 
voluntary organizations; 
political action; 
generalized trust; 
political trust; efficacy; 
optimism; tolerance; 
civicness; credit slips; 
political interest, 
community engagement 
Members of associations are more 
trusting, yet they are neither more 
tolerant nor optimistic. Cultural 
associations are found richer in 
social capital than rights groups and 
leisure and social associations. 
Narayan, D; 
Pritchett, L. 
(2000) 
Social Capital: 
Evidence and 
Implications 
Some aggregation of 
the relationships 
between the nodes, 
which represent 
abstract definition of 
society as either 
households or 
individuals. 
Associational activity Social capital is found instrumental 
in innovation diffusion and informal 
insurance 
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Table 3.1 Continued… 
Author Title of the study Conceptual definition Operational definition Research finding(s) 
Rose, R. (2000) Getting Things 
done in an Anti-
Modern Society: 
Social Capital 
Networks in Russia 
The stock of formal 
and informal social 
networks that 
individuals use to 
produce or allocate 
goods and services 
Informal networks or 
networks within formal 
organizations invoked 
to get things done in 
certain situations 
People employ both formal and 
informal networks to get things 
done. Associations and 
generalized trust are not found as 
good indicators of social capital. 
Knack, S. (2002) Social Capital and 
the Quality of 
Government: 
Evidence from 
States 
The social structures 
that provide resources 
to individuals: 
networks, cooperative 
norms and trust 
Generalized trust, 
volunteering, census 
response, activity in 
associations, informal 
socializing, attendance 
at club meetings, 
membership in 'good 
government' groups 
Generalized trust, volunteering 
and census response are 
significant for better government 
performance, yet civic activity-
associations and informal 
socializing- are unrelated to 
performance 
Tavits, M. (2006) Making 
Democracy Work 
More? Exploring 
the Linkage 
between Social 
Capital and 
Government 
Performance 
Trust, norms of 
reciprocity, and 
networks of civic 
engagement 
Generalized trust, 
formal and informal 
meetings, membership 
in associations, 
voluntary community 
work, confidence in 
local government 
Social capital is significant for 
policy activism, but not for 
administrative efficiency 
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3.1. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Hypotheses of Social Capital 
Literature  
 
 
 
Discussions within the social capital camp set forth a general hypothesis about the 
relationship between social networks and generalized trust. This general hypothesis can 
be written as: 
Social networks significantly influence generalized trust.  
This hypothesis, nevertheless, needs to be detailed further, in order to designate 
the type of influence social networks could exert on generalized trust. Before doing so, 
however, a conceptual recap would be helpful. The above hypothesis is relevant 
because generalized trust is about the overall optimism and faith of good will that we 
vest in the fellow men. Accordingly, it demands familiarity with the variable human 
condition. Individuals‟ involvements in different types of networks, in turn, are likely to 
provide that type of familiarity.  
Modern society is complex and it consists of many different systems, institutions 
as well as relationships. Further, in order to function properly, modern complex society 
demands people‟s participation, and this demand is higher in democracies because the 
system itself is defined by citizens‟ participation. Hence, the complexity of social 
systems, institutions and relationships is much more intricate and multi-layered in 
democratic regimes. Given this complexity, trust in the fellow men provides the link 
between the familiar and the complex. Individuals become more likely to extend trust to 
strangers because they expect the trustee‟s dispositions to be similar to their own.  
Yet, how is this link established? In other words, how and why would people 
extend trust to strangers? What are those structures which familiarize the complex, and 
hence make us comfortable even when we are with strangers of different social 
environments?  
Social networks are likely to provide a plausible answer to those questions. Since 
the time we are born, we are involved in many different types of networks. First come 
our primordial relations such as with family members, relatives, and/or our kin group. 
Then come our relations with our friends and neighbors. Education, workplace, 
marriage, civic activism and civil society involvement enlarge the pool of relationships 
 41 
beyond our primordial relations. These types of relationships can be multiplied, yet the 
point is that one of the ways to learn about the human condition is through our lifetime 
experiences with other people. This knowledge accrues in different types of social 
networks through relations with many others. Variability of social networks, then, may 
result in different dispositions towards the fellow men. Indeed, the acknowledgement of 
this probable variance of social network influence lies at the heart of the differentiation 
made between the bonding social capital and the bridging social capital.  
Different from his initial regard of social capital as necessarily benign, in his 
following work, Bowling Alone, Putnam made such a differentiation. Accordingly 
bonding social capital concerned primordial and close relations such as those with the 
family, relatives and close friends. This type of social capital was generally associated 
with negative externalities because individuals, constricted with their strong ties, were 
hypothesized to owe allegiance to their small networks rather than to the society at 
large. The alternative was the bridging social capital, which implied individuals‟ 
involvement in different types of networks besides their close and primordial relations. 
In general, people relied on their weak ties rather than strong ties to establish such types 
of relations. Bridging social capital was found imperative in linking to different others 
as well as reaching alternative sources of information.
67
 Based on this difference, 
Putnam wrote: “…bridging social capital can generate broader identities and 
reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves.”68  
Accordingly, bonding social capital is likely to inhibit generalized trust, whereas 
bridging social capital is likely to foster it. The general hypothesis on the relationship 
between social networks and generalized trust is thus refined as:  
Bonding social capital influences generalized trust negatively. 
Bridging social capital influences generalized trust positively. 
It should be noted that Putnam‟s elaboration of the differentiation between 
bonding and bridging social capital rested on the strength of relational ties.
69
 Despite 
this emphasis, however, political studies did not go as far as to discuss, in detail, the 
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 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 22-23.  
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 Ibid., 23. 
 
69 In Bowling Alone,  Putnam explicitly refers to Mark Granovetter, who differentiated 
for the first time between the weak and the strong ties in his seminal study The Strength 
of Weak Ties. The next chapter focuses on this study in more detail. See Putnam, 
Bowling Alone, 22, 23. Also Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1360-1380. 
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conceptual and operational definitions of social networks based on individual tie level 
relationships. This neglect was in part related to conceptual confusion about social 
capital. As has been noted, more often than not, social capital was conflated with social 
networks. This was also the case for the so-called bonding and bridging social capital. It 
should be made clear that both terms relied exclusively on the nature and the intensity 
of relational ties at the network level. Yet, still, they were accepted as types of social 
capital. Hence, once again, social networks and social capital were used as synonyms.  
In order to measure bonding and bridging social capital, scholars frequently relied 
on the extent of relationships with certain social groups rather than the relational 
foundations of social networks. More informal relations with groups such as the family, 
friends, and neighbors constituted the measure for the bonding social capital. Bridging 
social capital, in turn, was concerned more with relationships within more formal, 
institutional contexts such as relations with colleagues and/or co-activists of the civil 
society. 
Frequency of contact with different types of social groups was often used to 
measure both the bonding and bridging social capital. In their analysis, Farole and his 
collaborators, for instance, used the WVS question of the time spent with close friends 
as the variable for bonding relations and with work or professional colleagues as the 
variable for bridging relations.
70
  
A series of studies also focused on informal socialization, rather than bonding 
social capital. Alesina and Guiliano, for instance, focused on the influence of family 
relations. A series of questions from the WVS, regarding the importance individuals 
accorded to their families in general, were used for the measurement.
71
  Uslaner also 
examined the influence of informal socialization on trust. In his study, variables of 
informal relations were wide-ranging from going to bars and restaurants, playing cards 
to visiting friends and families, and talking to neighbors.
72
 Likewise, Dekker examined 
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the extent of informal socialization through questions of the frequency of neighbor 
visits, neighbors‟ help in cases of illness and need for transportation, and neighbors‟ 
perceived propensity to protest in case of an adverse local government plan.
73
  
It should be noted that none of these measures relied explicitly on relational ties 
measured at the individual tie-level. Rather they regarded the overall relationships with 
the given social groups such as the family, neighbors and colleagues as the network. 
Frequency of contact, importance of the given group or its use for instrumental and/or 
recreational purposes, in turn, instructed the strength of the relationship at the aggregate, 
group level. Accordingly, although the social capital research in political science makes 
references to social networks and their possible influence on generalized trust, those 
networks are not accounted for in detail.  
The most frequent type of relationship which is examined more in detail within 
this camp, is the civil society involvement. The focus of social capital studies on civil 
society involvement owed a great deal to Putnam‟s emphasis on the so-called networks 
of civic engagement. Civil society involvement has frequently been used as both, an 
indicator of social capital and a determinant of generalized trust. Once again, the 
conceptual link between civil society involvement and generalized trust lay in the 
former‟s influence in bringing people from different walks of life together for common 
purposes.
74
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Publications, 2004), 94-95. 
 
74 A series of scholars mention the possibility of reverse causality between civil society 
involvement and generalized trust. In her comparative study, Stolle underlines the 
possibility that people who already trust others tend to become members of civil society 
institutions. See Dietlind Stolle, “„Getting to trust‟: an analysis of the importance of 
institutions, families, personal experiences and group membership,” in Social Capital 
and Participation in Everyday Life, eds. Paul Dekker and Eric M. Uslaner (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001), 118-134. In Uslaner‟s analysis on generalized trust in the 
US, trust is found as a significant indicator of membership in secular institutions, 
whereas membership in these institutions were not found significant on trust. See 
Uslaner, Moral Foundations of Trust, 130. In her study, Paxton also acknowledges the 
possible reciprocal relationship between generalized trust and associational 
membership. However counting on a series of research conducted on the question, she 
underlines that the causality is more likely to run from associational membership to 
generalized trust. See Pamela Paxton, “Association Memberships and Generalized 
Trust: A Multi-level Model Across 31 Countries,” Social Forces 86, no.1 (2007): 54. 
 
 44 
In relation with this focus, social capital studies accounted for a third hypothesis 
dealing with the network underpinnings of generalized trust, which was concerned with 
the expectation of a significant and positive influence of the civil society involvement 
on generalized trust. This hypothesis was detailed further, on the basis that different 
types of civil society institutions could exert different influence on generalized trust.  
Earlier studies on civil society involvement frequently differentiated between 
institutions with political and non-political purposes. Studies by Almond and Verba and 
Verba and Nie are cases in point.
75
 This differentiation was informed by the research 
interest in political participation. They found participation in civil society institutions 
with political purposes the more relevant to explain political participation.
76
 
Social capital literature brought forth a novel differentiation. Knack and Keefer 
were the first authors to differentiate between the Olson and the Putnam type of 
institutions
77
 In his 1982 study, Olson wrote on collective action and argued that a series 
of civil society institutions such as professional organizations, trade unions, and 
political parties were more likely to display rent-seeking behavior.
78
 Knack and Keefer 
defined these types of hierarchically organized modern institutions as Olson type civil 
society institutions. They contrasted these with networks of civic engagement 
mentioned by Putnam. The latter were more horizontally organized and had post-
modern concerns such as the community work, recreational, and rights-based activism. 
Being so, the likelihood of Putnam type institutions entering into distributional 
coalitions was found low.
79
  
                                                          
75 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Verba and Nie, Participation in America. For 
contemporary examples for a similar differentiation, see Stephen Knack, “Social Capital 
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76 Almond and Verba, 249-265; Verba and Nie, 186-194. 
  
77 Stephan Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Pay-off? 
ACross-Country Investigation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no.4 (1997): 
1271-1274. 
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The differentiation made between Olson and Putnam type institutions was directly 
related to generalized trust. Due to their rent-seeking tendency, Olson type institutions 
were regarded as exclusionary. Hence, they were hypothesized to influence generalized 
trust negatively. Alternatively, Putnam type institutions were induced mostly by 
provision of public goods; hence they were argued to influence generalized trust 
positively. Thus, the relationship suggested between civil society involvement and 
generalized trust was detailed further as: 
Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively. 
Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.  
Despite the broad differentiation made between Olson and Putnam type 
institutions, it is difficult to argue for standardization especially for the measurement of 
Putnam type institutions. The Olson type institutions were frequently measured as 
membership in trade unions, political parties, and professional associations.
80
 
Alternatively, Knack and Keefer regarded religious institutions, cultural, music, 
education and arts institutions, and youth work institutions as the Putnam type 
institutions. In their analysis, Farole and his collaborators, spared religious groups from 
the Putnam type groups on the basis that motivation to take part in religious groups may 
be different than other Putnam type institutions.
81
 In addition, they included a wider 
group of institutions in the Putnam group, which were of social, local/community, 
arts/education, youth work, sports, the Third World, environment, women, peace and 
health organizations.
82
 Lastly, in his analysis, Knack examined institutions, which were 
active in issues such as poverty, employment, housing, racial equality, youth work, 
sports and recreational activities.
83
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It should be noted that Putnam type institutions covered a wide range of 
institutions, from those dealing with local recreational activities to those active on 
global issues such as the Third World and peace. Not all researchers found this wide 
range of institutions convincing. Uslaner, for instance, found it likely that institutions 
for recreational activities “may simply lead nowhere”.84 Rather, his conceptual 
differentiation rested on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of members.
85
 Alternatively, 
Paxton focused on the connections among civil society institutions through multiple 
memberships. Her research indicates a positive and significant influence of better-
connected institutions on generalized trust than the isolated ones.
86
 
Besides the types of civil society institutions, Uslaner also suggested a 
differentiation in the types of civil society involvement. This differentiation was 
reminiscent of the earlier studies in political science which differentiated between active 
and passive participation in civil society institutions.
87
 Accordingly, Uslaner argued that 
volunteering and giving to charity were more likely to contribute to generalized trust 
because these types of involvements were more demanding.
88
 Similar to Uslaner, Knack 
and Keefer also questioned types of involvement in civil society institutions. They 
argued that, though membership data was valuable, it fell short in providing information 
about the depth of involvement in those institutions.
89
 Given these studies, the influence 
of the civil society involvement on generalized trust can further be detailed:  
More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust 
positively.
90
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90 Civil society members who volunteer time, participate in meetings or making 
donations, can be accepted as active members. Though Uslaner argues for the relevance 
of charitable donations for generalized trust, participation only through donations may 
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The hypotheses mentioned thus far can be grouped together into two general 
categories of social networks. The first category concerns the bonding relations of 
informal settings, and the second category is about the bridging relations of formal, 
institutional settings. Table 3.2 shows the hypotheses generated on the basis of this 
differentiation: 
Table 3.2 Hypotheses suggested by social capital 
literature 
Bonding relations of 
informal settings 
Bonding social capital 
influences generalized trust 
negatively. 
Bridging relations 
of formal settings 
Bridging social capital 
influences generalized trust 
positively. 
Olson type institutions 
influence generalized trust 
negatively. 
Putnam type institutions 
influence generalized trust 
positively.  
More active types of civil 
society involvement influence 
generalized trust positively. 
 
It should be noted that social capital literature frequently refers to social 
networks and tie relationships in order to argue for the above-mentioned hypotheses. 
However, these hypotheses are either discussed only at the conceptual level, or they are 
under-tested. Most significantly, despite the lip service given, neither the accounts of 
the bonding and bridging social capital, nor the civil society involvement reflect a social 
network approach. The relationships are frequently measured at the group level rather 
than the individual tie-level. Despite these weaknesses, a series of studies examined the 
above-mentioned hypotheses. Accordingly, the next section will focus on the empirical 
findings of the social capital literature regarding the social network underpinnings of 
generalized trust.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fall short of fostering trust because it may imply a hands-off rather than hands-on 
approach to civil society participation. Accordingly, such donations would not bring 
different people together to facilitate a wider range of connections beyond one‟s 
communal relations. Hence, from a conceptual point of view, members who volunteer 
time and/or participate in meetings are more likely to build trusting relations, which go 
beyond the communal boundaries.  
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3.2. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Empirical Findings of Social Capital 
Literature 
 
 
 
3.2.a. The Empirical Measurement of Generalized Trust 
 
 
The standard generalized trust question in empirical research is: “Generally 
speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too careful in 
dealing with people?” According to Uslaner, trusting “most people” entails an 
acknowledgement of common bonds with the fellow men. These bonds, in turn, rest 
upon the assumption about the good will of free human agency.
91
 
An alternative measure of generalized trust is derived through three inter-related 
questions. Zmerli and Newton pose these questions as: 
 Generally speaking, would you say that most people are trusted, or that 
you can‟t be too careful in dealing with people? 
 Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got a chance or would they try to be fair? 
 Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they 
mostly looking out for themselves?
92
 
 
It should be noted that the standard generalized trust question and the first item of 
its alternative version are identical. The first version was used by Noelle-Neumann in 
1948. Rosenberg added two items to this original question in 1956-1957.
93
 It is possible 
to come across both versions of the generalized trust question. The WVS, for instance, 
uses the first simpler version. Alternatively, the European Social Survey (ESS), US 
Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy (CID) surveys, and the ISSP survey on social 
networks use the longer version.  
94
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In his book, Moral Foundations of Trust, Uslaner examined the stability of 
responses to the generalized trust question over time. Time-series data of the US case 
were used, and the analysis revealed generalized trust as an enduring value.
95
 Similar to 
Uslaner, Bjornskov also enquired into the stability of generalized trust, but rather than a 
single case, he focused on cross- country data of the WVS for 1981-2000 periods. His 
analysis showed that generalized trust scores at the national level “fluctuate around 
stable levels”.96 On the basis of this finding, the author argued “that apart from weak 
differences across the waves, generalized trust can indeed be treated as a time-invariant 
feature of national cultures”.97 
This feature of national cultures is found relevant for the effective functioning of 
democratic regimes. Accordingly, low trust countries are more likely to experience 
difficulties in democratic institutionalization than high trust countries. In the event that 
generalized trust is a public good that benefits democratic regimes as well as their 
citizens, then understanding its determinants is well advised. Using the WVS, Table 3.3 
shows the percentage of those respondents who said that most people can be trusted for 
periods between 1981 and 2007. The table is sorted in descending order based on the 
percentages for the periods between 2005 to 2007.
98
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Table 3.3 Generalized trust levels, World Values Survey, 1981-2007 
Country 1981-1984 1989-1993 1995-1998 1999-2003 2005-2007 
Norway 60,9 65,1 65,3   74,2 
Sweden 56,7 66,1 59,7 66,3 68,0 
Finland   62,7 48,8 58,0 58,9 
Switzerland   43,2 41,0   53,9 
China   60,3 52,3 54,5 52,3 
Vietnam       41,1 52,1 
New Zealand     49,1   51,2 
Australia 47,8 31,7 39,9   46,1 
Netherlands 43,6 53,1   59,8 45,0 
Canada 49,1 52,4   38,8 42,8 
Indonesia       51,6 42,5 
Thailand         41,5 
Hong Kong         41,1 
Iraq       47,6 40,8 
United States 40,5 51,5 35,6 35,8 39,3 
Japan 40,8 41,7 46,0 43,1 39,1 
Germany   31,8 33,3 37,7 36,8 
Jordan       43,1 30,9 
Great Britain 43,9 43,6 31,0 29,7 30,5 
Italy 25,4 34,2   32,6 29,2 
Uruguay     22,1   28,4 
South Korea 38,0 34,2 30,3 27,3 28,2 
Ukraine     31,0 27,2 27,5 
Russia   37,5 23,9 23,7 26,2 
Ethiopia         24,4 
Taiwan     38,2   24,3 
India   35,4 37,9 41,0 23,3 
Bulgaria   30,4 28,6 26,9 22,2 
Romania   16,1 18,7 10,1 20,3 
Andorra         20,1 
Spain 34,4 34,3 29,8 36,2 20,0 
Poland   31,8 17,9 18,9 19,0 
France 24,0 22,8   22,0 18,8 
South Africa   28,3 18,2 11,8 18,8 
Egypt       37,9 18,5 
Slovenia   17,4 15,5 21,7 18,1 
Georgia     18,7   18,1 
Moldova     22,2 14,7 17,9 
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Table 3.3 continued... 
Country 1981-1984 1989-1993 1995-1998 1999-2003 2005-2007 
Argentina 27,0 23,3 17,5 15,4 17,6 
Mali         17,5 
Guatemala         15,7 
Mexico   33,5 31,2 21,3 15,6 
Serbia       25,8 15,3 
Burkina Faso         14,7 
Columbia     10,8   14,5 
Morocco       23,5 13,0 
Chile   22,7 21,9 22,8 12,6 
Zambia         11,5 
Iran       65,3 10,6 
Cyprus         9,9 
Brazil   6,7 2,8   9,4 
Malaysia         8,8 
Ghana         8,5 
Peru     5,0 10,7 6,3 
Turkey   10,0 6,5 15,7 4,9 
Rwanda         4,9 
Trinidad Tobago         3,8 
Denmark 51,3 57,7   66,5   
Saudi Arabia       53,0   
Belarus   25,5 24,1 41,9   
Iceland 41,2 43,6   41,1   
Northern Ireland 45,4 43,6   39,5   
Ireland 41,6 47,4   35,8   
Austria       33,9   
Pakistan     20,6 30,8   
Belgium 28,7 33,2   30,7   
Luxemburg       26,0   
Nigeria   23,2 17,7 25,6   
Lithuania   30,8 21,9 24,9   
Albania     27,0 24,4   
Czech Republic   27,4 28,5 23,9   
Greece       23,7   
Bangladesh     20,9 23,5   
Israel       23,5   
Estonia   27,6 21,5 22,8   
Puerto Rico     6,0 22,6   
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Table 3.3 continued... 
Country 1981-1984 1989-1993 1995-1998 1999-2003 2005-2007 
Hungary 33,1 24,6 22,7 21,8   
Malta 10,0 24,0   20,7   
Croatia     25,1 18,4   
Latvia   19,0 24,7 17,1   
Singapore       16,9   
Kyrgyzstan       16,7   
Venezuela     13,7 15,9   
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
    28,3 15,8   
Slovakia   22,0 27,0 15,7   
Macedonia     8,2 13,5   
Zimbabwe       11,9   
Algeria       11,2   
Portugal   21,4   10,0   
Philippines     5,5 8,4   
Tanzania       8,1   
Uganda       7,6   
Azerbaijan     20,5     
Armenia     24,7     
Dominican 
Republic 
    26,4     
El Salvador     14,6     
Germany-West 30,7         
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
    30,2     
 
Table 3.3 shows that not all high trust countries are democracies. Based on 2005-
2007 figures, the percentages of individuals who indicated trust in the fellow men in 
China, Iraq and Vietnam were close to those in Norway, Sweden and Finland. It should 
be noted that the former group of countries are of authoritarian regimes; hence, across 
those countries, citizens live under the heavy-hand and thick shadow of the state. High 
trust among the citizenry may reflect a potential for collective action once the citizens 
are allowed to decide for themselves. Alternatively, it may reflect parochial inter-
dependence among the people against the state‟s constriction of citizens‟ participation. 
The point is that high trust citizens across undemocratic regimes need further enquiry. 
However, empirical research based on public opinion surveys is somewhat more 
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challenging across undemocratic regimes; hence the above-mentioned enquiry is not 
easy at best. 
Another interesting feature of Table 3.3 is the persistence of low trust across some 
of the long-standing electoral democracies, which have constantly fallen short of liberal 
democracies. The Philippines and Turkey are cases in point. Based on the relevance of 
generalized trust for functioning democratic institutions, the enquiry into the 
determinants of generalized trust may well prove instrumental, especially for those 
electoral democracies which aim at democratic institutionalization. 
As noted, social capital literature brought forth the social network underpinnings 
of generalized trust. In the event that the hypotheses introduced in the previous section 
are viable, then, individuals‟ investment in their social connections may result in the 
provision of a public good; that of generalized trust. The proposition is both simple and 
straightforward. All we need is to show the relevance of social networks for generalized 
trust. Yet this empirical part poses an important challenge because although political 
science mentions social networks in an increasing fashion, the social capital accounts 
shy away from an extensive conceptual and operational discussion about social 
networks. The previous section already underlined these problems; the next section will 
present the research results of this literature, which focused on the relationship between 
social networks and generalized trust.     
 
 
 
3.2.b. Social Networks and Generalized Trust: Empirical Findings 
 
 
As has been stated, much of the political science research of the social capital 
camp has focused on the civil society underpinnings of generalized trust. In these 
studies, civil society involvement has frequently been conceptualized as a type of 
individuals‟ formal, institutionalized relationships. Accordingly, the emphasis fell on 
the influence of the networks of civic engagement on generalized trust. The hypotheses 
that were generated related both to different types of the civil society institutions and of 
the civil society involvement.  
The results of this research are mixed at best. Knack and Keefer, for instance, 
found no influence of civil society participation on generalized trust. Their examination 
of civil society institutions in terms of Olson and Putnam types respectively yielded 
interesting results. Contrary to initial expectations, Olson type institutions were 
 54 
positively related to generalized trust and Putnam type institutions were found unrelated 
to trust.
99
 In his 2003 study, Knack replicated this analysis. This time Putnam type 
institutions were found as significant for generalized trust.
100
 Farole and collaborators 
reported different results as well. In their analysis, both Olson and Putnam type 
institutions proved positive and significant for generalized trust, whereas religious 
institutions were found to exert negative influence on trust.
101
 Different from variance in 
types of civil society institutions, in his analysis Uslaner also found that volunteering 
and charity were significant determinants of generalized trust; hence different types of 
involvement also mattered.
102
  
Among these studies, only Farole and collaborators accounted for the influence of 
bonding and the bridging social capital. Their analysis verified the hypotheses: bonding 
relations were found to exert negative and significant influence on generalized trust and 
bridging relations were found positive and significant determinants of generalized 
trust.
103
 Along similar lines, Alesina and Giuliano designated a negative and significant 
influence of strong family relations on generalized trust.
104
 Contrary to these findings, 
Dekker found no influence of informal socialization at the neighborhood level on 
generalized trust.
105
 Likewise, Uslaner argued that informal socialization was unrelated 
to generalized trust.
106
 
 All this research fell short in attempting to prove the viable influence of social 
networks on generalized trust. Yet, based on these examples, it is also difficult to argue 
the contrary case. Especially weak were those accounts of bonding and bridging 
relations because they were not only few in numbers, but they also lacked appropriate 
measures based on relational ties. Rather, these studies relied on social groups, which 
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potentially generate either bonding or bridging relations such as the family and 
neighbors, or colleagues and co-activists respectively.  
 In sum, although political studies which focus on social capital set forth a series 
of hypotheses as to the social network influence on generalized trust, these hypotheses 
fell short of viable tests due to the lack of conceptual and measurement clarity about 
social networks. 
 Despite the recent interest of political science in social networks, sociological 
research has had a longer interest in the subject. Its account can bring in conceptual and 
measurement clarity about social networks; hence, their potential link to generalized 
trust can be better established. The next chapter will examine the sociological accounts 
and will also present a series of political studies which are informed by this literature. 
On the basis of this examination, the hypotheses of the social capital literature will be 
re-considered.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Social Networks in Sociological Research: From Simmel to Granovetter 
 
 
 
Sociological studies have long developed an interest in social networks. Among 
the earlier sociologists, Simmel‟s Web of Group Affiliations proved particularly relevant 
for conceptualization of social networks in sociology.
107
 Yet, similar to studies of the 
social capital camp in political studies, this study also focused on social groups and 
associations rather than on social networks. The novelty of Simmel‟s study lay in his 
conceptualization of modernity as the change in individuals‟ relationships and their 
ensuing diversity.  
According to Simmel, the traditional and the modern society differed in the extent 
to which the latter was of the more diverse types of group memberships based on 
individuals‟ interests. These groups were regarded differently from primordially 
ascribed groups and identities such as the family, the local community and gender.  
Simmel argued that “society arises from the individual and that the individual 
arises out of association”.108 The availability of choice was what differentiated modern 
man from his predecessors and it determined one‟s individuality. This individuality, in 
turn, rested at great length on individuals‟ exposure to different interests and positions 
based upon membership in multiple social groups.  
It should be noted that Simmel‟s emphasis on the society as the association of the 
fellow men is reminiscent of Putnam‟s argumentation for the civic community. The 
interesting feature in Simmel‟s writing was that individuals were expected to distance 
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themselves from their primordial relations once social groups of the modern society 
multiplied beyond those earlier types of relations. Simmel wrote: 
   An advanced culture broadens more and more the social groups to which 
we belong with our whole personality; but at the same time the individual is 
made to rely on his own resources to a greater extent and he is deprived of 
many supports and advantages associated with the tightly-knit, primary 
group. Thus, the creation of groups and associations in which any number of 
people can come together on the basis of their interest in a common 
purpose, compensates for that isolation of the personality which develops 
out of breaking away from the narrow confines of earlier circumstances.
109
 
 
Indeed this differentiation between the primordial groups and modern associations 
comes close to the differentiation made between bonding and bridging social capital. 
They both suggest a straightforward and an easy relationship, which simply says that 
the modern world demands individuals to connect beyond their primordial relations. 
Social capital literature further says that the abundance of such kind of connectivity 
relates to generalized trust, which makes democratic institutions work. Yet, both 
differentiations are ideal types; hence, we do not know for sure to what extent people 
give up their primordial relations in order to actively take part in relationships of the 
modern structures.  Further, less often do we question why people would have to give 
up their primordial relationships once they involve themselves in multiple modern 
institutions and ensuing relationships. 
 The bulk of the anthropological and sociological research which laid the 
foundations of the formal social network analysis, did not regard primordial relations as 
significantly less important. On the contrary, the initial relational analyses were 
conducted on the small-scale community level interpersonal relations of the family, 
kinship and neighborhood. The term “network” first began to be used systematically by 
the so-called Manchester anthropologists of the 1950s in order to refer specifically to 
relational structures.
110
 
 In his book, Social Network Analysis, John Scott provided a detailed analysis of 
earlier sociological studies on social networks. Table 4.1 summarizes those studies.
111
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Table 4.1  An Overview of Earlier Sociological Research on Social Networks  
  Sociometric analysis Harvard researchers  
Manchester 
Anthropologists 
Time periods 1930s 1930s and 1940s 1950s and 1960s 
Researchers 
Jacob Moreno, Kurt Lewin, 
and Fritz Heider who were 
prominent gestalt theorists 
and who fled from Nazi 
Germany to the US. 
Lloyd Warner & Elton 
Mayo 
John Barnes, Clyde 
Mitchell, and Elizabeth Bott 
Main focus of research 
Influenced by "gestalt" 
psychology, the research 
focused on influence of group 
organizations on individual 
perceptions 
The research focused on 
the decomposition of 
large-scale social systems 
into cohesive sub-groups 
of informal relations 
Rather than integration and 
cohesion, the interest was on 
configuration of relations 
that result from the use of 
conflict and power 
Main questions of 
research 
Moreno: How "social 
configurations" relate to 
psychological well-being; 
How small-scale 
interpersonal configurations 
relate to large scale "social 
aggregates" such as the 
economy and the state. 
Lewin: How group 
perceptions construct the 
environment in which the 
group is embedded. Heider: 
How individuals' attitudes 
towards others are balanced. 
Warner & Mayo: How 
economic action is 
structured by non-rational 
elements such as group 
solidarity.  
Barnes: How interpersonal 
relations of kinship, 
friendship, and neighboring 
relate to larger "total 
network" of relations. Bott: 
What types of different 
networks are formed of the 
kinship relations? Mitchell: 
How can society be 
conceptualized as the "total 
network? 
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Table 4.1 Continued… 
  Sociometric analysis Harvard researchers  Manchester Anthropologists 
Time periods 1930s 1930s and 1940s 1950s and 1960s 
Research Method 
Sociometry.  Application of 
sociograms in 
anthropological 
fieldwork research. 
Sociometry and anthropological field 
work 
Findings/Contributions 
Moreno: Sociogram 
allowed for graphical 
representation of the 
flows of interest such as 
information and 
reciprocity. Also it 
allowed for the analysis of 
the more central as well as 
the more isolated 
individuals.  
Lewin: Mathematical 
models are used by later 
researchers. Heider: His 
emphasis on cognitive 
balance of attitudes was 
generalized to 
interpersonal balance in 
groups.  
Both Warner and Mayo 
labeled the term "clique" 
which refers to non-kin, 
informal groupings. 
Warner designated the 
cliques as the second 
important channel after 
the family which helps 
individuals' integration 
into larger society.  
Barnes & Bott conceptualized the 
social structure as the "total 
network"; hence social relationships 
and configurations are explicitly 
labeled as "networks".  
Mitchell: the study of the partial 
networks by focusing on the ego-
centered networks. According to 
Mitchell, this represented one way of 
exploring the "total network" since 
ego-centered networks account for all 
possible types of social relations of 
particular individuals. Mitchell also 
argued that partial networks can be 
examined by focusing on content of 
the relations such as political ties and 
work relations. 
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It should be noted that the focus of these earlier studies ranged from the social 
network influence on psychological wellbeing to individual and group level 
perceptions, as well as to the workings of macro-structures such as the economy and the 
state. In particular, the Manchester anthropologists of the 1950s and 1960s attempted to 
account for the society as the complete network; hence small-scale, primordial 
relationships were conceptualized as constitutive parts of that larger network.
112
 Scott 
also underlined the breakthrough in social network analysis with the work of 
Granovetter, which provided an analytical differentiation between the strong and the 
weak ties.
113
 In addition, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, Putnam‟s discussion 
about bonding and bridging social capital was also informed by this study.   
According to Granovetter, social network dynamics were crucial in order to 
“relate micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns”.114 The strength of inter-
personal ties, in turn, was deemed an important aspect of small-scale interaction, which 
was likely to have a significant bearing on macro phenomena such as “diffusion, social 
mobility, political organization and social cohesion in general”.115  
In his analysis, Granovetter recognized the fact that relations with the family and 
friends were more likely to display the strong ties. He also suggested the primacy of the 
workplace as well as the organizational membership as structures, which were likely to 
accrue the weak ties. Despite the importance given to certain role labels, however, tie 
properties determined the tie strength. Indeed, the examination of tie strength at the 
individual tie level is one significant difference between the sociological and the social 
capital accounts of social networks.  
The next section will discuss Granovetter‟s elaboration on tie strength. This 
discussion is important because the collection of social network data as well as a series 
of network variables rely on tie-level information, and tie strength provides significant 
information in the analyses.  
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4.2. Social Networks: An Enquiry at the Tie Level  
 
 
 
Granovetter‟s differentiation between the strong and the weak ties lay in his 
hypothesis, which argued: “Weak ties are more likely to link members of different small 
groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups.”116 
Elaboration of this hypothesis also brought a closer examination of yet another concept 
in network research; that of the bridge. A bridge was defined as the “line in a network 
which provides the only path between two points.”117  
Granovetter acknowledged the fact that in many large networks, there existed 
more than one link between any given two points. In these instances, ties which 
provided the shortest route between two given points, were defined as the local bridges 
and they were argued to be instrumental for information diffusion.
118
  
Two important points arose from the discussion of the bridges: The first point was 
the fact that not all weak ties were bridging ties, yet all bridging ties were of the weak 
ties.
119
 The second point was that “the significance of weak ties, then, would be that 
those which are local bridges create more, and shorter, paths…The contention here is 
that removal of the average weak tie would do more “damage” to transmission 
probabilities than would that of the average strong one.”120 Accordingly, weak ties were 
instrumental to the extent that they provided pools of bridging ties and more often 
information diffusion relies on these types of ties.  
Granovetter made a similar type of argument for social cohesion at the 
community level. The abundance of strong ties had the potential to break down the 
community into isolated cliques “unless each person was strongly tied to all others in 
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the community.”121 Moreover, in cases whence the community under question was 
“marked by geographic immobility and lifelong friendships”122, the weak ties would 
also fall short in connecting the cliques, unless they were bridges. In other words, in the 
absence of bridging ties, the weak ties were designated as equally likely to provide 
redundant ties like the strong ties. Hence, the friends of friends, in some instances, only 
enlarge the number of individuals of a given clique rather than acting as the bridges 
across cliques. “It is suggested, then, that for a community to have many weak ties 
which bridge, there must be several distinct ways or contexts in which people may form 
them.”123 According to Granovetter, the workplace and the organizational membership 
provided such contexts in which bridging ties are likely to be established.
124
  
Granovetter‟s emphasis on organizational membership as a potential structure of 
bridging relations is reminiscent of the social capital literature‟s emphasis on the civil 
society involvement. This literature also discusses workplace relations, yet its emphasis 
falls on relations with the colleagues. The difference in Granovetter‟s discussion is the 
designation of both the workplace and the organizational membership as the structures 
with potential bridging ties. These structures, then, can well be named the bridging 
structures and they are likely to enlarge one‟s social circles beyond relations with close 
circles of the family, relatives and best friends.  
The discussion on the differentiation among the network ties on the basis of tie 
strength is also related to its measurement: “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”125  
As already mentioned, Granovetter argued for the measurement of the tie strength 
at the tie level, which is different from the measurement of the social capital literature. 
In his empirical study on the information diffusion in the labor market, he used 
frequency of contact as the measurement of the tie strength. In this study, he found that 
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those who sought professional, technical, and managerial jobs in a Boston suburb had 
either occasional or rare contact with the person through which the job was found.
126
 
However, Granovetter‟s reliance on the frequency of contact did not mean that 
primordial relations were unimportant for the measurement of the strong ties. For 
instance, in his elaboration of the tie influence on community level cohesion, ties with 
the family circles and friends were regarded as the strong ties.
127
 Likewise, he 
designated the role labels of “friend” and “acquaintance” used in Milgram‟s well-
known study as the “strong” and the “weak” ties respectively.128 Lastly, in his own 
study, those occasional and rare contacts happened to be contacts “such as an old 
college friend or a former workmate or employer.”129 All these examples provide ample 
evidence for the viability of the social capital literature‟s regard of family relations as 
the strong ties and of the relations with the colleagues as the weak ties. As noted, one 
significant challenge to this literature is Granovetter‟s measurement at the tie level by 
also counting on other determinants of tie strength such as the frequency and duration of 
contact.  
In sum, from Simmel onwards, individuals‟ relations with primordial and 
secondary groups seem to raise curious questions. Social capital literature also counts 
on this differentiation in its discussion of bonding and bridging social capital and their 
respective measurements. Yet, different from social capital accounts, sociological 
studies which focus on social networks, count on individual tie properties in order to 
make inferences about the tie strength. Nevertheless, this literature also regards the 
family and close friends as structures with potential strong ties. Likewise, workplace 
and organizational membership are mentioned as the bridging structures with the 
potential for weak as well as bridging ties.  
Sociological accounts examine social networks as the structures of relational ties. 
As a result, the examination of social networks at the individual tie-level as well as the 
differentiations made about the tie strength are instructive for both data collection and 
analysis.  
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4.3. Social Networks:  Data Collection 
 
 
 
Marsden argued that surveys are used the most frequently to elicit network data 
followed by archival sources. Besides these, “diaries, electronic trace, observation, 
informants, and experiments” are also used.130 The type of network questions, in turn, is 
dependent on the research interest. If the emphasis is on the structural properties of a 
given small network, complete network data is collected, which requires eliciting of all 
possible ties of a given network; alternatively, the emphasis may be at the level of the 
individual actors, which is also suitable for probability sample surveys. 
   Here, analysts may seek to explain differences across actors in social 
position, or to link such differences to variations in outcomes (e.g. well-
being)...Variously known as egocentric, personal, or survey network data, 
this method samples individual units, or stars, and enumerates the local 
networks surrounding them...this approach gives representative samples of 
the social environments surrounding particular elements and is compatible 
with conventional statistical methods of generalization to large 
populations.
131
   
 
Marsden designated boundary specification as a problem common to the 
collection of both complete and egocentric network data because an arbitrary 
delimitation of a given network may distort the research results. For complete networks, 
a series of specifications were noted, such as the reliance on attribute properties like 
membership in formal organizations or on behavioral properties such as participation in 
various events like “publications in scientific journals or Congressional testimony”.132  
In the case of egocentric data, the researcher had to determine which alters would 
be included in the network. Barnes labeled the account of only the direct contacts of the 
ego as the first-order zone.
133
 Most of the egocentric research used this specification for 
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reasons related to data collection convenience.
134
 However, Granovetter argued that 
when the research concerned the ego‟s manipulation of his/her network, ties through 
intermediaries would prove significant as well. Indeed, the first-order contacts would be 
more likely to elicit the strong ties, whereas the contacts of the first-order contacts 
would more likely to include the weak and the bridging ties.
135
 Granovetter‟s suggestion 
seems viable for a narrower research focus. Yet it may prove quite challenging for 
probability sample surveys.  
In general, name generators are used to collect egocentric network data, which ask 
the respondents the names of his/her contacts of various social exchanges.
136
 These 
social exchanges are multiple, such as talking about family problems and weekend 
socialization, to borrowing money and finding a job.
137
 Yet, on the basis of individuals‟ 
purpose of action, they could also be classified under two broad categories of expressive 
and instrumental action respectively.
138
 Expressive actions, then, are for “preserving 
and maintaining resources”139 and they “have physical health, mental health, and life 
satisfaction as returns”.140 Alternatively, instrumental actions are for “searching for and 
obtaining resources”141 in order to increase one‟s “wealth, power and reputation”.142 
Based on the researcher‟s interest, name generator questions can be focused on the 
ego‟s contacts for items related either to expressive or instrumental action, or both.143  
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 Despite the detailed information name generators are able to elicit, the use of 
multiple name generators without an upper limit to the network size is not possible in 
multi-item surveys due to time restrictions. In his 1984 study, Burt suggested a 
condensed version of the name generators for multi-item surveys, which focused on 
important matters name generator.
144
 Accordingly, the respondent is only asked about 
the contacts with whom important matters are discussed. Besides the names, questions 
about the given tie strength as well as its attribute properties are used to elicit the 
structure of individuals‟ core discussion networks.145 This version of the name generator 
is widely known as the name generator/interpreter. It was first used in the 1985 US 
General Social Survey (GSS) and re-administered in the US in the 1987 and the 2004 
GSS.
146
 
For the purposes of the present dissertation, network data collected for probability 
sample surveys are more relevant. The brief enquiry thus far has revealed that different 
types of name generators are the most suitable for this type of research. When surveys 
focus primarily on social networks, a series of name generators for different social 
exchanges can be used. Cross-country surveys of the International Social Science 
Program (ISSP) of 1987 and 2001 respectively, are cases in point. In multi-item 
surveys, on the other hand, the name generator/interpreter module a lá Burt seems more 
convenient. One significant common feature of all types of network data collection 
methods is their focus on relational ties and networks associates‟ attribute and attitude 
properties. The consequence of this commonality is the shared interest over a series of 
network variables.  
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4.4. Social Network Variables 
 
 
 
One significant social network variable is the network size,  which concerns the 
extensity of a given network. Marsden wrote that network size is used to measure 
“integration, popularity, or range”.147 In network terminology, the range referred to “the 
extent to which a unit‟s network links it to diverse other units”.148 Accordingly, the 
possibility of diverse ties increases with the increase in the network size. Hence the 
network size and the range are directly proportional.
149
 
Figure 4.1 Operationalization of Network Size 
 
             Conceptual definition: 
The number of indicated ties 
 
Unit of measurement: each indicated tie 
 
The researcher may put an upper limit to the number of the network size, 
especially in cases of time restrictions. Limits in multi-item surveys are stricter. One 
exception is the 1985 GSS, in which no limitations were introduced for the important 
matters name generator. However, name interpreter questions were asked only to the 
first five alters mentioned. 
150
 Burt suggested three alters as the minimum to be asked in 
order to reveal variation in inter-alter relations.
151
 
 Another frequently used network variable is the network density, which concerns 
the weight of the indicated ties. Density can be measured in two ways: the first density 
measure is for the dichotomous data, which is based on whether or not a tie exists 
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between the indicated alters. It is calculated by dividing the sum of the existing ties by 
those possible.
152
  
 An alternative measure of network density is calculated when data about tie 
strength are collected. Marsden stated that closeness, frequency, and duration of the 
contact were among the most frequently used measures of the tie strength. Yet duration 
was argued to overstate the relations of kinship, and frequency was stated to emphasize 
the relations with co-workers and neighbors.
153
 A second measure of network density, 
then, can be calculated as the mean strength of the indicated relationships. 
Figure 4.2 Operationalization of Network Density 
 
Conceptual definition: 
1) The proportion of links present relative to those possible 
       OR, 
2) The mean strength of connections among units in a network 
         
Unit of Measurement: 
1) Dichotomous measure of whether or not a tie exists between alters 
OR, 
2) Strength of each tie between alters 
 
Variables of Tie Strength: 
Closeness of the relationship 
Frequency of contact 
Length of acquaintance 
 
 According to Burt, the network density was inversely proportional to the 
network range, since denser networks were expected to display less diversity. Burt‟s 
discussion of the network range also relates to the third frequently used network 
variable, which is the network diversity.
154
 
 Network diversity can only be calculated when data about alters‟ attributes and 
attitudes are collected. Hence network diversity concerns the attribute/attitude 
similarity/difference at the network level. The attribute variables are multiple such as 
sex, age, education level, role relationship, and the like.  
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Attitude variables, on the other hand, are subject to research interest. In the 1987 
GSS, political affiliations were asked for.
155
 A series of political research also enquired 
into the frequency of political discussion, besides the political affiliation.
156
 There are 
also studies which focused on respondents‟ trust in their alters157 and the closeness of 
views in certain topics.
158
 Variance of a given attribute and/or the extent of 
similarity/difference of a given attribute/attitude at the network level inform the 
calculation of network diversity. 
Figure 4.3 Operationalization of Network Diversity 
 
Conceptual definition: 
The extent of similarity/difference of the given attribute/attitude at the network level 
 
Unit of measurement: Each indicated attribute/attitude 
 
Variables of Network Diversity 
                                        
Attribute variables                         Attitude variables 
            Sex                               Any attitudes of interest such as: 
Race                                       Particularized trust 
Gender                                   Political affiliation 
           Religion                             Closeness of the worldview 
                      Education                      Frequency of political discussion, etc. 
                        
Different from the social capital literature, a series of recent research in political 
science employs the sociological framework in order to account for the social network 
influence on political information and political and civic attitudes. These studies are 
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significant in order to understand the relevance of the network variables, which rely on 
tie-level information.  
 
 
 
          4.5. Relevance of Social Network Variables in Political Research:  Examples 
from Recent Studies 
 
 
 
As explained in detail in the previous chapter, the interest in social networks has 
arisen in political research with the studies on social capital.
159
 One earlier study in 
political science - which was an exception, however - was Lazarfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet‟s People’s Choice.160 This study investigated the determinants of the 
individuals‟ voting behavior. It was conducted in a small US county, Erie County, 
during the US presidential elections campaign in 1940.
161
  
Social network influence on vote choice was designated as an unexpected finding 
of the study. This influence surfaced during the research whence the respondents 
mentioned particular individuals who provided short cut political information about the 
candidates as well as their issue positions. These individuals were labeled as the opinion 
leaders, who were keenly interested in politics and who professed a good deal of 
political knowledge. They were more exposed to media influence as well.
162
 
 Besides the opinion leaders, People’s Choice also mentioned another type of 
network influence, which concerned the information the ego received from his/her 
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network alters. Accordingly, the increase in the variety of political opinions was found 
to expose individuals to cross-pressures, which delayed their vote choice.
163
  
Lazarfeld and his collaborators conceptualized cross-pressures both at the level of 
different social groups/categories and of interpersonal relations. The conflict between 
one‟s religious identification and socio-economic status; one‟s occupation and his/her 
self-identification of class were examples of the former. The discrepancy of opinion 
between the individual and his/her family members and/or close associates were 
examples of the latter. Among these different types of network influence, the lack of 
complete agreement within the family was found as the strongest of cross-pressures.
164
  
 Lazarfeld and his collaborators‟ cross-pressure thesis was both significant and 
novel. Although the study was published as early as 1944, however, the cross-pressures 
thesis has been explored more vigorously only in the last two decades. The 
systematization of the measurement of individuals‟ social networks through the name 
generator/interpreter can well be given credit for the re-vitalization of this rather 
dormant research area. Prior analyses relied on membership of different social 
categories as the proxy of cross-pressures, because these types of memberships were 
assumed to be potentially conflictual. Mutz informs us that the research in this strand 
vanished by the 1970s, because substantial evidence contra Lazarfeld was 
accumulated.
165
 Once the surveys become better equipped to account for individuals‟ 
social networks however, the cross-pressures thesis regained importance. The network 
diversity variable, which is derived from the name generator/interpreter, proved 
particularly relevant in this regard.  
In her study, Mutz, for instance, enquired into whether or not cross-pressures 
hindered participation in election campaigns as well as voting decision. The author 
operationalized cross-pressures as the extent of one‟s exposure to dissonant political 
views within one‟s discussion networks.166 Besides the exposure to the dissonant views 
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166 Two nation-level representative surveys were used in the study. The first survey 
used political discussion name generator/interpreter as the network module, and the 
second survey employed important matters name generator/interpreter.  Also in the first 
survey, the following five items were used to discern the extent of individuals‟ exposure 
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variable, another network diversity variable was also used which measured the 
frequency of political discussion indicated for the network alters.
167
 Lastly, network size 
variable was computed as the total number of indicated discussants.  
Mutz‟s analysis provided evidence for the relevance of Lazarfeld‟s cross-
pressures thesis. Individuals‟ exposure to dissonant political views was found to 
decrease participation in the election campaign and it influenced the decision to vote. 
Alternatively, networks of more frequent political discussion were found to influence 
both dependent variables positively.
168
 In a subsequent analysis, Mutz further showed 
that crosscutting networks were also significant in explaining individual ambivalence 
towards the running candidates.
169
  
Along Mutz‟s lines, Nir also tested Lazarfeld‟s cross-pressures thesis.170 
According to Nir, there were both external and internal sources of cross-pressures. 
Social networks were related to external sources, whereas individual level ambivalence 
was designated as the internal source of cross-pressures.
171
 In line with this framework, 
in her analysis, Nir computed the relative influences of the individual and the network 
level of ambivalence. Once again, the network ambivalence was a network diversity 
variable which accounted for the extent and the intensity of different political views at 
the network level.
172
 Network size was also included in the analysis.
173
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to dissonant political views: (1) the extent to which the political views of the respondent 
and the discussant resemble each other, (2) whether or not the alter favors Democrats, 
Republicans, both, or neither, (3) the favorite presidential candidate of each alter, (4) 
the extent to which each alter share most of the respondent‟s political views, (5) the 
extent of disagreement with each alter during a political discussion. In the second 
survey, an item which measured the extent of disagreement about the presidential 
candidate, was used to measure cross-pressures at the network level. See ibid., 841-843. 
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172 Accordingly, both Mutz and Nir operationalized cross-pressures differently. Mutz 
was interested in the extent of dissonant political views in comparison with the 
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In Nir‟s analysis, network level ambivalence was not found significant for either 
the campaign participation or voting. However, it proved significant for the vote 
decision time once it was entered into the analysis as the interaction variable with 
individual level ambivalence.
174
 The interaction pattern revealed that network 
ambivalence delayed voting decision time for ambivalent individuals, whereas, non-
ambivalent individuals were likely to decide their votes earlier.
175
 
A recent study by Baker, Ames and Renno which was conducted in Brazil, also 
utilized similar questions.
176
 The authors argued that notwithstanding valuable research 
done on social network influence on political participation across stable democracies, 
network influence may be more pronounced across new democracies, because political 
preferences were more volatile due to unstable party systems and weak political 
attachments. Brazil was considered an under-institutionalized democracy with only 
approximately thirty or forty percent of the electorate with partisan attachment.
177
  
The authors posed the research question as follows: “What factors can help 
explain why some Brazilians were more likely to change their minds than others during 
                                                                                                                                                                          
respondent, whereas Nir focused on the extent and intensity of dissonant views at the 
network level. She named this variable the network ambivalence. 
 
173
 The study was based on two-wave panel data set of the 2000 American National 
Election Study. A political discussion name generator up to four people instructed the 
network data. The network level ambivalence variable was derived from the post-
election survey and it was computed as follows: First, dummies were formed to reflect 
the dyads of agreement and disagreement between the respondent and the discussant 
about the respondent‟s preferred candidate. From these dummies, the summative scales 
of agreement and disagreement were computed. The balance of agreement and 
disagreement, then, was calculated by applying the modified version of Griffin‟s 
individual ambivalence index to the network-level ambivalence variable. For other 
variables used in the study, see ibid., 428-431. 
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the 2002 campaign? And how, if at all, did networks and neighborhoods exert an 
influence over preference volatility?”178 Similar to Mutz and Nir, network diversity 
variables, which were informed by the political preferences of the network discussants, 
were instructive in Baker and his collaborators‟ analysis. Two such variables were used. 
Network disagreement referred to aggregate disagreement of discussants‟ vote 
preferences from the respondent‟s preference. Network heterogeneity, alternatively, was 
the number of different presidential candidates present in a given respondent‟s 
network.
179
 The authors also went for a similar differentiation at the neighborhood 
level.
180
  
The analysis found that disagreement at both the network and the neighborhood 
levels increased the likelihood of vote switching, whereas vote switching became less 
likely with increase in network heterogeneity. According to the authors, this finding 
indicated that while network heterogeneity exposes a given respondent to alternative 
views, it also falls short of persuading the respondent to change his/her vote preference 
in one certain direction.
181
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who disagreed with the respondent. Alternatively, neighborhood heterogeneity referred 
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analysis, see ibid., 389-393 
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Further examples of studies which focus on social network influence on political 
participation can be provided. 
182
 These studies share a series of common features. First, 
the analyses focus on the relational data to discern the social network influence. Second, 
largely due to the research interest in political information, much of this research uses 
political discussion name generators in their analyses. The third common feature relates 
to the network variables. The network size and the network diversity variables are 
frequently used, and network diversity variables prove particularly relevant for this 
strand. As the examples also showed, the researchers have come up with novel 
measures in order to account for the influence of network diversity on political 
outcomes.  
 Are there any studies which relate these social network measures to civic 
attitudes? The answer to this question is an affirmative, although their numbers are 
fewer. Mutz, for instance, enquired into the social network influence on tolerance; Price 
and collaborators focused on social network influence on civility, and Gibson wrote on 
the relationship between social networks and generalized trust as well as democratic 
support.
183
 
In her study, Mutz questioned whether the extent of one‟s exposure to different 
opinions contributes to his/her awareness of the oppositional views as well as tolerance. 
This question was related to democratic institutionalization because citizens‟ tolerance 
towards competing views acted as the guarantee of the individual rights and 
freedoms.
184
 Mutz used the same datasets and similar network diversity variables as her 
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prior study on political participation. The variable which measured the extent of one‟s 
exposure to dissonant views, was identical in this study. In addition, Mutz also explored 
one‟s exposure to consonant views based on the extent of the similarity of network 
discussants‟ political views with the respondent.185     
Besides the network diversity variables, Mutz also included network size and 
network density variables in her analysis. Network size was measured by the number of 
discussants. The network density variable, alternatively, was measured by asking the 
respondent the closeness of the relationship: whether the discussant was an 
acquaintance, friend, a close friend, or spouse/family member. By using the network 
diversity question that counted on the extent to which each alter shared the respondent‟s 
political views, Mutz further sorted network density variable into three separate 
variables of closeness within politically dissonant, consonant, and neutral dyads.
186
 
Mutz‟s analysis showed that exposure to dissonant views played a significant role 
both in one‟s awareness of rationales for oppositional views and political tolerance. 
Closeness within dissonant dyads proved also significant for the latter dependent 
variable.
187
 Counting on this last premise, Mutz argued for the primacy of the affective 
and close ties for funneling possibilities of contentions into tolerant behavior.
188
  
Along Mutz‟s lines, Price and collaborators enquired into the influence of 
political disagreement on civility.
189
 The authors defined civility as the capability 
associated with others‟ understandings of some public matter.190 Civility, in turn, was 
                                                          
185
 Ibid., 114-116. 
 
186
 Ibid., 117, 123, 124. 
 
187
 Ibid., 116-120. In all analyses, Mutz employed political interest, political knowledge, 
extremity of opinions, issue-specific awareness, and partisanship as controls along with 
the network measures.  
 
188 Ibid., 119, 122, 123. 
 
189 Price, Cappella, and Nir, “Does Disagreement Contribute to More Deliberative 
Opinion,” 95-112. 
 
190
 Ibid., 97. Civility was operationalized through respondents‟ “argument repertoire” 
which was defined as “the range of arguments people hold both in support of and 
against their favored position on a particular political issue or toward some political 
object” (p.97). The sample was the February and March 2000 survey of a year long 
panel study, which was conducted before the 2000 US presidential elections. The 
respondents were asked how favorable or unfavorable they were towards the 
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deemed significant for democracies because it allowed for more active citizenry and 
better-informed civic deliberations.
191
  
The political conversation variable was derived from a modified version of 
political discussion name generator/interpreter. In this version, the authors asked up to 
two political discussants of close friends or family members and up to two people of 
acquaintances with whom politics was discussed.
192
 Hence the authors structured the 
discussion networks based on the respondents‟ role relationships with the discussants. 
This differentiation also instructed the network diversity variables.  
Four network diversity variables were used: frequency of discussion with family 
and close friends; frequency of discussion with acquaintances; disagreement with 
family and close friends and disagreement with acquaintances.
193
  
Price and collaborators‟ analysis revealed that disagreement with acquaintances in 
political conversation, rather than family/friends, influenced individuals‟ awareness of 
their own opinions.
194
 Positive and significant influence of political disagreement on 
awareness about given opinions was in line with Mutz‟s findings of the similar research 
concern. 
Gibson‟s analysis also dealt with the social network influence on civic attitudes. It 
enquired into the extent of political discussion and particularized trust across Russian 
social networks. Gibson regarded this inquiry as significant because he regarded 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Democratic and Republican parties. Once this information was collected, four open-
ended questions followed as to the reasons why they were favorable or unfavorable 
towards the indicated parties. Two variables were derived from these questions which 
made up the two dependent variables of the study: the number of reasons for one‟s own 
opinion index and the number of reasons for why others might disagree index. 
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extensive weak ties of politically relevant social networks which also displayed high 
particularized trust levels, as solid foundations for a future vibrant society as well as the 
ascendancy of generalized trust. Hence social networks were argued to be a possible 
remedy for the Russian democratic deficit of weak civil society as well as low 
generalized trust.
195
 
Gibson‟s study employed important matters name generator/interpreter to discern 
the network information. Name interpreter questions focused on the role relationship 
between the respondent and the discussants, the frequency of political discussion with 
each discussant, respondents‟ particularized trust in discussants, and the extent of 
political agreement between the respondent and the discussant.
196
 The descriptive 
analyses of these variables showed that “Russians have extensive social networks that 
are highly politicized and that often transcend the family unit”.197 
Gibson used the role relationships to differentiate between the strong and weak 
ties. Accordingly, the indicated family ties were regarded as the strong ties, and all non-
family ties were accepted as weak ties. By using this information as well as the 
frequency of political discussion variable, Gibson came up with a network variable, 
which reflected the political capacity of a given network: 
   Capacity is the ability of the social network to transmit political 
information and to provide experience at politics through political 
discussion. Networks with high capacity are broad (including many 
members), are politicized (in the sense of talking about politics being 
common), and are “weak” (network ties transcend family boundaries).198  
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Gibson showed the significant influence of network political capability on 
democratic support; hence networks were designated as significant structures for 
learning about politics and political processes.
199
  
In his analysis, Gibson also enquired into the relationship between particularized 
and generalized trust. Accordingly, network trust and generalized trust were found to be 
unrelated.
200
 However, a relationship was discerned between trust in acquaintances and 
generalized trust. Gibson regarded this finding as important on the basis that political 
discussion hardly took place with total strangers. Since the Russians‟ networks were 
more of the weak ties, high trust in acquaintances was argued as strategic for Russian 
democracy to the extent that Russians were good at converting strangers into 
acquaintances. Notwithstanding the novelty of this hypothesis, Gibson relied on 
correlation analysis to test the relationship between trust in acquaintances and 
generalized trust.
201
 Hence the suggested causal relationship demanded further research.  
As noted, the number of studies focusing on social network determinants of 
civic attitudes are fewer in number than studies on determinants of political 
participation. Yet, all of these studies relied on name generator/interpreter items, which 
generally focus on up to three network discussants. Despite the limitation imposed on 
the network size, variations in discussants‟ features yield significant and interesting 
findings. Similar to the case for studies on political participation, the network diversity 
variable of individuals‟ exposure to dissonant views surfaced as a significant variable 
for studies on civic attitudes as well. Accordingly, having discussants of different views 
in one‟s networks seem to aid in understanding opposing ideas. This capability, in turn, 
increases tolerance. Frequency of discussion proved another common and significant 
                                                          
199
 Support for the democracy variable was an index derived from the factor analysis of 
the following items: “1) the relative value of social order and individual liberty; 2) 
support for a free and pluralistic media; 3) support for competitive elections and a 
multi-party system; 4) support for dissent; 5) rights consciousness,” ibid., 63. Gibson 
also argued that in order for a politically capable network to influence democratic 
support decisively, democratic ideals should flow within the network as well. Hence 
high political capacity at the network level was argued to be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for dissemination of democratic ideals. After all, what type of 
political information flowed within Russian discussion networks was not known, ibid., 
64.  
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network variable in studies conducted both on political participation and on civic 
attitudes.  
Different from the studies on political participation, studies on civic attitudes also 
underlined the importance of the role relationships as a measure of intimacy and 
closeness. Mutz showed how more intimate ties such as with a family member or a 
close friend eased the tension created by dissonant views, which, in turn influenced 
tolerance positively. On the other hand, Price and collaborators showed the primacy of 
disagreement with acquaintances to provide reasons for one‟s own ideas as well as 
others‟ criticisms of his/her ideas. Acquaintance relationships were also found strategic 
for Gibson, who hypothesized trust in acquaintances to influence both generalized trust 
and civil society participation positively. 
All these studies show the relevance of treating social network influence at the 
individual tie-level. This approach seems viable to differentiate between individuals‟ 
immediate, close and familiar environments from their more varied relationships 
established through participation in bridging structures such as the workplace and the 
civil society. 
On the basis of the insights the sociological approach and the following political 
research present about the social network data collection and analyses, the next section 
will revise the social capital literature‟s hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
social networks and generalized trust.  
 
 
 
4.6. Revision of Social Capital Literature’s Hypotheses about Social Networks and 
Generalized Trust 
 
 
 
As has been noted, social capital literature frequently uses social capital and social 
networks as synonyms. Also, although bonding and bridging social capital are defined 
on the basis of the tie strength, this information is inferred from the group level 
properties rather than the individual tie-level information. Accordingly, the following 
two hypotheses of the social capital literature have not yet been tested with a social 
network approach: 
Bonding social capital influences generalized trust negatively. 
Bridging social capital influences generalized trust positively. 
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Bonding and bridging relations are concerned with individuals‟ social 
interactions. Bonding relations are those with close associates such as the family and 
relatives. Alternatively, bridging relations are more likely to relate individuals to 
different others; hence, they accrue in modern structures such as schools, the workplace 
and civil society institutions. These assertions focus on relations with different social 
groups such as the family, relatives and friends.  
However, the social network approach is not as comfortable as the social capital 
literature about group-based relationships. Rather, it deals with the influence of 
individuals‟ social relations by relying on three variables, which are informed by tie-
level data. These variables are network density, network size and network diversity. 
How are they related to generalized trust? 
Network density reflects the mean tie strength at the network level. Strong ties are 
argued to close individuals off from alternative sources of information. Since 
generalized trust is about familiarity with the variable human condition, then the 
increase in the weight of the strong ties is likely to influence generalized trust 
negatively. Hence the first hypothesis is: 
H1: Higher network density influences generalized trust negatively. 
Burt argued for a negative relationship between the network density and the 
network size. It is likely that the tie strength would loosen as the network expands 
because each newly added tie would demand time to sustain the given relationships. 
Also additional ties are more likely to make people more familiar with different others. 
Besides, the extensive network ties would be expected to provide safety nets for people 
on which they could rely in order to take more risks about others. Hence generalized 
trust is as much about the awareness of the variable human condition as it is about the 
readiness to take risks about the possibility of disappointment by the trustee. The second 
hypothesis, then, relates to the network size: 
H2: Larger network size influences generalized trust positively. 
The hypotheses so far have not dealt with the content of the relationships. For 
instance, in general, the tie strength relates to the role label: relations with family and 
relatives are more likely to be stronger than friendship relations. Only the network data 
can tell us the extent to which this assertion proves viable. Also, even if we show that 
relations with family and relatives are stronger, we still need to account for the extent to 
which individuals possess these types of relations compared with friendship relations. 
Not least, we further need to test whether these different types of relations exert 
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different influence on generalized trust. These considerations bring us to yet another 
measure, which is the network diversity.  
Network diversity deals with the similarity/difference at the network level. This 
similarity/difference may concern the role labels, worldviews, age or education groups. 
The point is to explore individuals‟ diverse relationships, which are more likely to 
expose individuals to different life-worlds and experiences. Indeed, the diverse 
relationships are what the social capital literature regarded as the bridging social capital 
and this diversity is likely to influence generalized trust positively. The third hypothesis 
can then be stated as follows: 
H3: Higher network diversity influences generalized trust positively.  
Besides the network variables, another insight of the social network approach is 
related to the differentiation it made between ties for expressive action and those for 
instrumental action. Individuals, in general, rely on the former for individual well-being 
and support, whereas, the latter are frequently mobilized for power and reputation 
purposes. It is logical, therefore, to expect opposite influences from the social networks 
in which ties for both the expressive action and the instrumental action rely either on the 
strong family ties or the weak friendship ties. The fourth and the fifth hypothesis, then, 
can be written as follows: 
H4: Reliance mostly on family ties for both expressive and instrumental action 
influence generalized trust negatively. 
H5: Reliance mostly on friendship ties for both expressive and instrumental action 
influence generalized trust positively. 
It should be noted that the fourth and fifth hypotheses are related to the three prior 
hypotheses. A social network which relies mostly on ties with family and relatives, is 
likely to be dense. The size of such a network would also be limited to one‟s primordial 
relations; hence it would be rather constricted both in size and diversity. Delimitation 
within primordial relationships, in turn, would make people suspicious, at best, about 
those others whose lives are known only from a distance. 
A contrary case is a social network which is diverse in terms of friendship ties. 
Besides their expected diversity, these types of networks are likely to be less dense and 
more extensive. Once people start relying on relations of their own making for both 
expressive and the instrumental action, they will be more aware of the variable human 
condition. 
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Besides the direct influence of the familiar and close ties on generalized trust, 
Granovetter also underlined the instrumentality of modern structures in which 
individuals are more likely to forge bridging relations. These structures are labeled the 
bridging structures. Granovetter postulated the workplace and the civil society 
institutions as two viable examples of these structures. Education can also be added to 
this list. Accordingly, individuals‟ participation in these structures is expected to 
diversify their weak ties and some of these weak ties are likely to act as bridges across 
different social networks. Hence they are hypothesized to influence generalized trust 
positively. 
H6: Higher education influences generalized trust positively. 
H7: Having a job influences generalized trust positively. 
H8: Civil society participation influences generalized trust positively. 
 It should be remembered that social capital literature has already discussed civil 
society participation. Accordingly H8 can be replaced by more detailed hypotheses 
generated by this literature regarding the influence of civil society participation. These 
hypotheses are: 
H8a: Olson type institutions influence generalized trust negatively. 
H8b: Putnam type institutions influence generalized trust positively.  
H8c: More active types of civil society involvement influence generalized trust 
positively. 
Table 4.2 on the next page shows the revised hypotheses regarding the social 
network underpinnings of generalized trust. Once the hypotheses are generated, the 
analysis will focus on the case study, Turkey, in the following two chapters. The fifth 
chapter will provide socio-political contextual information on Turkey, which is to 
account for the fault lines which structure the way the citizens in Turkey relate to each 
other. The sixth chapter will focus in particular on the tests of the above hypotheses for 
the Turkish case.  
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Table 4.2 Revised hypotheses as to social network influence on 
generalized trust 
Tie based relationships 
 
Structure based relationships 
 
H1: Higher network density 
influences generalized trust 
negatively  
H6: Higher education influences 
generalized trust positively. 
H2: Larger network size 
influences generalized trust 
positively 
H7: Having a job influences 
generalized trust positively. 
H3: Higher network diversity 
influences generalized trust 
positively 
H8a: Olson type institutions 
influence generalized trust 
negatively. 
 H4: Reliance mostly on family 
ties for both expressive and 
instrumental action influence 
generalized trust negatively 
H8b: Putnam type institutions 
influence generalized trust 
positively.  
 H5: Reliance mostly on 
friendship ties for both 
expressive and instrumental 
action influence generalized 
trust positively 
H8c: More active types of civil 
society involvement influence 
generalized trust positively 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
TURKEY: THE CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
Starting from the founding fathers of the Republic in 1923, the governments in 
Turkey have attached great importance to socio-economic development. However, the 
pace of this development has changed tremendously since the market liberalization 
reforms of the early 1980s. It took two decades for Turkey to adjust to the liberal 
economy. The country struggled with high inflation and the recurrent financial crises 
especially throughout the 1990s, and it underwent a series of IMF sponsored 
stabilization packages and the World Bank directed structural adjustment programs. 
Many scholars attribute the present stability of the Turkish economy to sweeping 
institutional reforms, which were implemented after the 2001 financial crisis.
202
  
Turkey is a dynamic economy today. According to the 2011 World Development 
Indicators, the Turkish economy is the seventeenth largest in the world.
203
 It is a 
member of G-20 together with other emerging markets such as China, Russia, India, 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa.
204
  
The economic structure of the country has changed tremendously from the 1950s 
to today. The percentage of agriculture in economic production fell from 49% in 1950 
                                                          
202 Two significant books on Turkish economy are Alpay Filiztekin and Sumru Altuğ 
eds., The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate Governance and Reform 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006) and Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses eds., Turkey 
and the Global Economy: Neo-liberal Restructuring and Integration in the Post-crisis 
Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).  
 
203 The World Bank, 2011 World Development Indicators (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank), 12, accessed July, 17, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators  
 
204 For information on G-20 and its members, see http://www.g20.org/index.aspx, 
accessed July, 17, 2011. 
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to 9% in 2009. This trend has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the 
share of industry from 15% to 26% and of services from 36% to 65%.
205
 The change in 
economic activities is also reflected in the urbanization and literacy levels. In 1950, 
only 14.5% of the population lived in urban centers.
206
 This figure rose to 69% in 
2009.
207
 McLaren reported 43.5% illiteracy as late as 1970.
208
 Primary school 
enrollment rose to 99% in 2009
209
 and illiteracy fell to 9% for the 2005-2009 period.
210
 
Turkey seems successful in economic terms, although it is less ambitious in 
democratic terms.
211
 Competitive politics started in Turkey as early as 1946, however it 
still falls short of qualifying as a liberal democracy. In 2011, the Freedom House 
qualified Turkey as a “Partly Free” country on the basis of a series of deficiencies in the 
                                                          
205 1950 figures are from Lauren McLaren, Constructing Democracy in Southern 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain, and Turkey (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 87. 2009 figures are from The World Bank, 2011 World 
Development Indicators, 200.  
 
206 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York: 
Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005), 80 
 
207  The World Bank, 2011 World Development Indicators,  168. 
 
208 McLaren, Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe, 39. 
 
209 The World Bank, 2011 World Development Indicators, 82. 
 
210 Ibid., 90. The World Bank reported the literacy level as 91%. Illiteracy is inferred 
from the difference of the literacy level from a hundred. 
 
211 This statement does not imply that the Turkish economy is without structural 
problems. According to the 2009 figures, female participation in the labor force, for 
instance, was only 24%, whereas the male employment amounted to 70%. Also the 
percentage of women in non-agricultural wage employment is 22%, which indicates 
high female employment in the agricultural sector. The labor market rigidities against 
female participation become clearer with the high female unemployment rate (14.3%). 
However, unemployment is not a problem unique to females. Between 2006 and2009, 
unemployment in Turkey was recorded as 14%.  Within this figure primary school 
graduates were the most disadvantaged, which made up 52.3% of the unemployed. 
Lastly, in 2009, 18.1% of the population lived below the national poverty line. This 
figure rose up to 38.7% for the rural population. As a result, it seems that the gender, 
education and settlement type are among the structures of uneven socio-economic 
development in Turkey. See The World Bank, 2011 World Development Indicators, 26-
61. 
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institutionalization of both political and civil liberties.
212
 Freedom House‟s longitudinal 
data on Turkey indicate even worse performance in those liberties prior to 2003.
213
 The 
relative betterment since 2003 is related to a series of constitutional reforms enacted in 
Turkey during the 2002-2004 periods.
214
  
 Freedom House designated the influence of the military in Turkish politics as an 
impediment to full democratization, although its influence has decreased substantially 
in the recent decade. In addition, the national electoral threshold of 10%, which was 
instituted by the 1980 constitution, was considered to effectively deprive significant 
amounts of voters of representation in the Assembly. Party closures, which generally 
punish the Kurdish parties, were also found to be interpreted too broadly; hence, they 
are frequent.
215
  
Freedom House also mentioned problems about civil liberties. Despite the 
betterment in the last decade, Article 301 of the 2004 revised penal code and an anti-
terrorism law enacted in 2006 were mentioned as impediments to freedom of 
expression. Another law, which came into force in 2007, and which gave the state the 
right to block certain websites was also found worrying for freedom of the press and 
                                                          
212 Freedom House ratings range between 1 and 7. Higher rates indicate poor 
performance. The ratings measure the extent of both political and liberties. Political 
liberties concern freedoms related to participation in political processes and civil 
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214 For the overview of constitutional reforms in the last two decades, see Ergun 
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expression. Along similar lines, intimidation of Kurdish newspapers despite the 2009 
law - which allowed broadcasting and publication in Kurdish - was noted as another 
infringement of basic individual rights. The status of women was also mentioned with 
reference to the 2009 Global Gender Gap Index. According to this index, Turkey ranked 
129 out of 134 countries. Impediments against women with headscarf in education and 
public employment were also found contrary to rights of expression. Lastly, Turkey did 
not fare well either, in terms of its compliance with international labor standards. 
Although labor unions are allowed, union activism remained low.
216
 
Turkey‟s full democratic institutionalization is possible to the extent that it 
handles the above-mentioned problems of political and the civil liberties. Yet, one 
peculiarity remains: Turkey is among the few countries with a “Partly Free” Freedom 
House ratings among comparable cases in terms of its socio-economic development 
levels and/or experience in democratic politics. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in which 
the military was once influential in politics, qualified as “Free” countries at least 
throughout the 2000s. These countries are comparable to Turkey in socio-economic 
terms as well along with Central and Eastern European countries, South Korea, and 
South Africa. Similar to the Latin American cases, all these latter countries are free 
democracies too. In terms of its Freedom House rating, Turkey is comparable to Russia, 
Mexico and the Philippines.
217
 Seen from a comparative perspective Turkey‟s position 
becomes all the more curious: why does Turkey constantly lag behind in terms of the 
institutionalization of political and civil rights?  
The present dissertation argues that low generalized trust in Turkey - which 
indicates the lack in individuals‟ worthy regard of each other as the fellow men - stands 
as a viable explanation for the delay in Turkey‟s quest for full democratization. In other 
words, citizens in Turkey do not seem interested in the question, “Why have we, as a 
society, consistently failed in our democratization effort?” This question is relevant 
when citizens regard themselves as significant constituent elements of the society in 
which they live. Hence they share the feeling of a society. In the absence of this feeling, 
the citizens at large would only be interested in their own business and would refrain 
from collective provision of the public goods. Indeed political and civil liberties are 
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among those public goods which are particularly sensitive to citizens‟ ability to stand up 
for those liberties and not for individual gain alone, but also for their own worth.   
A closer look at Turkish society seems necessary in order to have a better 
understanding of the socio-political environment in which people at large relate to each 
other. The focus on the structural and the cultural fault lines of Turkish society, in turn, 
is likely to unravel the extent to which the social cleavages situate people away from 
each other. Once Turkish citizens become more visible, the questions about their low 
regard of each other as the fellow men, and hence low generalized trust in Turkey, can 
be better attended. More importantly, a detailed account of the influence of the social 
networks on generalized trust is possible only when the larger societal structures are 
clearly delimited.  
 
 
 
5.1. Historical Roots of Political Modernization and Cultural Cleavages 
 
 
 
The establishment of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923 was a new 
beginning for the people who inhabited the last remaining territories of the once 
glorious Ottoman Empire. Although the inauguration of the Republic marked the 
official end for the Empire, its legacy has been enduring. First of all, Turkish 
modernization had its roots in the late Ottoman period of the nineteenth century.
218
 
Second, the uncontested authority of the Ottoman ruling classes was translated into the 
strong state tradition of the Republican era, which has proven suspicious, at best, 
towards any interest group and civic activism that diverted from the official line.
219
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Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 82-106; and 
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Yayınları, 2002), 107-124. 
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Third, the social and the cultural cleavage between the Ottoman center - the Ottoman 
modernizing bureaucratic and the military elite - and the Ottoman periphery -  the 
provincial notables and the bureaucrats who opposed the positivist weight of the 
modernizing reforms - has proven a long lasting socio-cultural structure with serious 
implications for Turkey‟s political regime and its institutions.220 
Ottoman political modernization aimed at increasing the control and domination 
of the central state over its territories, institutions, and subjects. For this purpose, 
starting with Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) a series of military, administrative, legal, 
economic and educational reforms were put into place.
221
 The initial piecemeal reforms 
became systematized during the so-called Tanzimat reforms (1839-1871). These 
reforms opened the way for the first, short-lived, constitutional period (1876-1878) and 
the succeeding second constitutional period (1908-1914).
222
 Given the initial Ottoman 
trial with the constitutional state, the inauguration of the Turkish Republic on 23 April 
1920 can well be claimed to be a continuation of the reformist spirit that had taken hold 
in the Empire.   
The Ottoman modernizing reforms were far reaching, from the legal and 
administrative arenas to the military and economic ones. Recognition of the Muslim and 
the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire as equals, granting protection to all Ottoman 
subjects‟ life and property223, and the proportionality sought between crime and 
punishment
224
 were ground breaking reforms in the legal arena. These changes put an 
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end to the Sultan‟s arbitrary power. Reforms on the military and administrative fronts 
were no less important. On the military front, the objective was to institute a new army 
under central state control, and to equip this army with weapons of the latest 
technology. Likewise, the administrative reforms were geared towards the creation of a 
centralized and rational bureaucratic hierarchy. The secular schools became the medium 
for the military and the administrative cadres of the modernized Ottoman state, which 
placed emphasis on faculties related to rational thinking and the mastery of foreign 
languages.
225
  
As the Ottoman state apparatus was centralized, bureaucratized, rationalized - 
hence modernized - the once patrimonial Ottoman state was challenged for good. 
According to Mardin, before the modernizing reforms, the Ottoman realm consisted of 
two entities: the ruling elites and the masses. Slave administrative and military cadres 
were among the ruling elites. They were regarded as the forces of the center and the 
Sultan, who wielded uncontested power, headed them. Alternatively, the rest of the 
society constituted the peripheral forces, and despite their heterogeneity in terms of 
religious, ethnic and regional differences, they displayed similarity in terms of their 
distance to the Ottoman ruling circles.
226
 
Modernization reforms and the ensuing ideational currents challenged this so-
called center-periphery structure and the vertical relationship between the ruling elite 
and the masses underwent a major transformation. Rationalization of the bureaucracy 
and the military, the demand for a constitutional order, and the increased emphasis on 
secular and positivist ideas brought about a split within the elite circles, which contested 
the direction of the modernizing reforms as well as their influence on the larger society 
and culture. 
Besides the changes at the elite level, the once well-protected distance between 
the center and the periphery was shortened due to central state‟s more assertive 
penetration into the periphery. In this process, the notables became the center‟s first tier 
contacts in the provinces.
227
 The shortened distance between the center and the 
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provincial notables, however, did not necessarily imply closeness in objectives and 
ensuing action and behavior. In the Ottoman parliament, the notables “stood for more 
administrative decentralization and for a continuation of local control over culture.”228 
Their first objective ran against the centralizing impulse of the modernizing elite. 
Alternatively, the second objective was related to the peripheral reaction towards 
increased secularization in daily life.  
Mardin has written that the modern educational institutions benefited only a small 
group of students, whose fathers were also among the reformist elite and, hence, the 
men of the center. In other words, these modern institutions were slow to penetrate into 
the periphery. The result was the lack of cultural integration, which showed itself with 
the rise of Islam as a strong reference used especially by the notables of the provinces to 
criticize the secular contents of the enacted reforms.
229
 
More dramatic change than the relations with the notables was observed in the 
center‟s relations with different millets.230 By the nineteenth century, the rising tides of 
nationalism were at shores of the Ottoman Balkans. Though modernizing reforms 
shattered the millet system, the Ottomans‟ centuries-old reliance on religion as the 
strongest source of identity resulted in a religio-ethnic nationalism across Balkans.
231
 As 
a reaction to separatist demands, the Ottoman elite initially resorted to Ottomanism, and 
later Pan-Islamism.
232
 Yet, the dual processes of territorial dissolution and 
modernization forced the Ottoman reformist elite to search for their own national 
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identity as well. The result was the emergence of Turkish nationalism, which became an 
influential policy imperative by the early twentieth century.
233
  
In sum, the Ottoman Empire underwent significant changes once the modernizing 
reforms started to be put in place. These reforms altered the centuries-old structure 
between the center and the periphery. During the modernization period, the intra-elite 
unity was broken and the modernist elite gained the upper hand in the government. In 
response, the central religious bureaucracy entered into an alliance with the peripheral 
forces of the notables and the lower ranking religious bureaucracy in the provinces. 
Opposition to the secular content of the modernizing reforms under the pretext of Islam 
constituted a common denominator for this group. Indeed this cultural cleavage became 
the main political fault line of the Turkish Republic as well.  
Another cultural cleavage with long-term implications was the modernizing elite‟s 
adoption of Turkish nationalism as a unifying identity. As has been noted, before the 
narrower ethnic identity, the elite resorted to more general sources of identity such as 
Islamism and Ottomanism. However the emphases on the latter were to no avail in the 
face of growing tensions within the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. Indeed it 
would not be wrong to suggest that the elite adopted and promoted Turkish nationalism 
as a reaction to separatist movements based on the nationalist tide of the nineteenth 
century.
234
 Whatever the reason for its foundation, once Turkish nationalism was 
crafted, it remained as the integral element in the nation-building program of the young 
Republic.
235
 The official emphasis on one people and one nation - which is officially 
defined as the Turkish nation - has become a significant arena of contention especially 
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in the last twenty-five years, when the Kurdish population‟s demand for recognition has 
become both more assertive and visible.
236
  
 
 
 
5.2. The Turkish Republic: The Political Regime and The Culture 
 
 
 
5.2.a. The Political Regime  
 
 
The Ottoman Empire was among the Central Powers during the First World War. 
The Empire was defeated and it signed the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918 with 
the Entente Powers. Sultan Mehmed VI signed the final peace treaty, the Sevres Treaty, 
on 10 August 1920. However, in those two brief years between Mudros and Sevres, the 
national resistance movement had already started in Anatolia.  
 The opening of the Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920 in Ankara 
preceded the Sevres Treaty by only few months. It brought the central and peripheral 
forces together under one over-arching objective: Independence. Despite the temporary 
coalition between these two rival groups, the modernizing elite of the center led the 
Turkish national liberation movement. Mustafa Kemal Pasha emerged as the leader of 
this movement.
237
  
The interim 1921 Constitution was already indicative of the challenge ahead of 
the crumbling Ottoman imperial system. This constitution was different from the prior 
Ottoman constitution because “for the first time it proclaimed the principle of national 
sovereignty, calling itself the “only and true representative of the nation”.238 The 
reference to the national sovereignty provided the pretext for abolishing the Ottoman 
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Sultanate on 1 November 1922, and the declaration of a republican form of government 
instead on 29 October 1923, once the Independence War ended in victory.
239
  
Since its inception until the present day, the Republic has had three constitutions, 
which have never been based on broad consensus. As Özbudun has written: 
   None of the three republican constitutions (those of 1924, 1961, and 1982) 
or the Ottoman constitution of 1876 were written by a Constituent or a 
Legislative Assembly broadly representative of social forces or through a 
process of negotiations, bargaining, and compromise. Consequently, they all 
had weak political legitimacy.
240
 
 
The lack of consensus and compromise relates at great length to the sustained 
divide between the forces of the center and the periphery on the one hand, and their 
suspicions towards each other on the other.  
The 1924 Constitution was found “democratic in both letter and spirit”.241 
However, it put strong emphasis on the legislative imperative and it lacked effective 
systems to check and balance the legislative power. In this sense, the 1924 Constitution 
was similar to the 1921 Constitution; the difference concerned the members of the 
Assembly between two time periods. The Assembly between 1920-1923 was composed 
of more diverse groups. Peripheral forces were present along with the central forces. 
However in the 1923 elections, the modernist elite of the center, led by Mustafa Kemal, 
dominated the Assembly through the Republican People‟s Party (RPP), which was the 
first political party of the Republic.
242
  
Having secured the parliamentary majority, the RPP government accelerated the 
reformist spirit, which targeted in particular, the cultivation of a modern society based 
on ties of common citizenship, nationality, rights and responsibilities. Old ties based on 
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primordial religious, ethnic, and regional identities were regarded as the anti-thesis of 
the modernizing reforms.
243
 
Between 1923 and 1946, Turkey was ruled by single-party governments despite 
two attempts at multi-party politics.
244
 The 1924 Constitution‟s emphasis on legislative 
supremacy eased the RPP‟s one-sided reform implementation. However, it also 
deepened the Ottoman tradition of the strong state which, in turn, postponed the center‟s 
encounter with the peripheral forces on equal footing under the roof of the Assembly. 
Transition to multi-party politics in 1946 further showed that the lack of 
consensus and compromise was not unique to the central political establishment. On the 
contrary, shutting the competing forces out of the political arena, or - in cases when 
such closure was out of question - limiting the playing ground of the opposing groups 
proved to be a deep rooted mind-set of the Turkish ruling elite, irrespective of whether 
they represented the center or the periphery. 
The Democratic Party (DP) emerged as the opposition party in 1946 and it 
assumed power in 1950. Mardin has suggested that the DP secured eighty-one percent 
of the seats in the Assembly by cultivating a political ideology which appealed to the 
disaffected rural masses and their patrons. Hence the DP was associated with the 
peripheral forces.
245
  
Similar to the RPP, once the DP assumed the majority, it took advantage of the 
1924 Constitution and became increasingly intolerant towards the RPP, which became 
the opposition party. According to Özbudun, the lack of constitutional checks and 
balances prepared the way for the first breakdown of Turkish democracy in 1960: 
   In the absence of effective legal guarantees of basic rights and judicial 
review of the constitutionality of laws, the DP government passed a series 
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of laws that severely restricted the rights of the opposition, which, in turn, 
caused the opposition to develop a harsh attitude towards the government.
246
 
 
Whether the military would have intervened in Turkey‟s first trial with 
competitive politics if the RPP rather than the DP was the ruling party is a hypothetical 
question with no definitive answer. Yet the question is relevant and it underlines the 
relationship between the military and the RPP. 
The RPP ruled the country single-handedly between 1923 and 1946. Hence, it was 
among the state elite for a long time. The military was also among the state elite, which 
regarded itself as the guardian of the Republican regime due to its allegiance to Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, who was the celebrated commander-in-chief during the Independence 
War and the founder of both the Republic and the RPP. Hence the military and the RPP 
had a common descent and represented the modernizing elite of the center. On the other 
hand, the DP represented the concerns of the periphery, such as the hardships peasants 
experienced, the emphasis on traditional rural values, a concern for religion, and the 
demand for less bureaucracy and more private enterprise.
247
 Being its structural rival, it 
is likely that the military was especially concerned about growing authoritarianism of 
the DP, in particular, rather than authoritarianism per se.  
The 1960 coup was short-lived. A new constitution was enacted and 
parliamentary elections resumed in 1961. The 1961 Constitution undid the legislative 
supremacy of the 1924 Constitution. Yet the institutions to check and balance the 
legislative power were motivated by the military‟s suspicion towards elected politicians. 
The 1960 coup legitimized the military‟s presence in Turkish politics, but once again, 
the constitution was far from being a result of broad societal coalition. The DP, which 
secured the support of nearly half of the electorate, for instance, had no representation 
in the Constituent Assembly of the 1961 Constitution.
248
 
The military‟s presence in Turkish politics continued thereafter. The military gave 
a memorandum to the ruling Justice Party (JP), which was the successor of the DP, on 
12 March 1971. This was followed by a more fundamental coup on 12 September 1980. 
Polarization among the parties and the eruption of political violence provided the 
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pretext for the intervention.
249
 The consequence was once again the military‟s self-
inflicted role in shaping and re-shaping the Turkish political landscape through writing 
and re-writing the rules of the political game. 
The 1982 Constitution is military‟s last brainchild. This time around, the 
Constitutional Assembly was much less representative than the 1961 Assembly. It had 
no representatives from political parties and the National Security Council (NSC), 
which was composed of the high-ranking military officers, had the final say on the 
constitutional draft. Also, different from the 1961 Constitution, it was quite intolerant 
towards civil liberties.
250
 
Different from the 1960 coup and the 1971 memorandum, the military stayed in 
power for a more lengthy three years after the 1980 coup. The reason was their 
objective of a wholesale transformation of the political system.
251
 By 1980, the military 
had lost confidence both in the RPP and the civil bureaucracy, both of which were once 
its close allies of the center.
252
  
According to Heper, socioeconomic differentiation and ideological polarization of 
the period from 1961 to 1980 were two significant reasons which challenged the unity 
of the central modernizing elite;
253
 Kalaycıoğlu added the change in the electoral system 
by the 1961 Constitution from multi-member majority rule to proportional 
representation, which allowed for the entry of the smaller parties into the Assembly.
254
 
                                                          
249 Kalaycıoğlu, “From Parliamentary uni-partyism to fragmented multi-partysim,” 17. 
 
250
 Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish  Politics, 57-58. 
 
251
 Ibid., 57. 
 
252 For military-civil bureaucracy relations see Metin Heper, “Bureaucrats, Politicians, 
and Officers in Turkey: Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm,” in Modern Turkey: 
Continuity and Change,  ed. Ahmet Evin (Leverkusen, Germany: Opladen 1984), 64-
83. For military-RPP relations see Kemal H. Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-
Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980,” in State, Democracy, and the 
Military in Turkey in the 1980s,  eds. M. Heper and A.Evin (Berlin, New York: Wlater 
de Gruyter, 1988), 137-158.  
 
253 Heper, “Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Officers in Turkey,” 69,70. 
 
254 For number of parties in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) between 
1961-1980 period see William Hale, “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey,” in 
Turkish Transformation: New Century-New Challenges, ed. Brian W. Beeley 
(Huntington, Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 2002), 165-197. 
 99 
This meant more vocal representation for the minority positions and ideologies. 
Between 1961 and 1980, the communists and socialists, the nationalists, and the 
Islamist conservatives found themselves a place in the Assembly.
255
  
The increase in the number of political parties meant fragmentation of the 
political party system and the politicization of the civil bureaucracy. It is true that the 
1961 Constitution made the political game fairer, yet the fairness came at the expense of 
governability.
256
 After the politicization of the civil bureaucracy, the tension among the 
political elite also spilled over into the streets. Towards the end of the seventies, 
political violence reached its climax. 
Between 1960 and 1980, socio-economic and ideological divisions became more 
explicit and these divisions also found representation in both mainstream and minority 
parties. A fragmented party system was frequently blamed for increased tension within 
both the political elite and the masses. Yet with a culture of compromise rather than 
conflict, a much fairer representative system provided by the 1961 Constitution 
accompanied with extensive civil liberties could have molded the center-periphery 
dichotomy into a democratic culture of trust and tolerance towards competing political 
ideas and positions. However, the cultural divide that this dichotomy was rooted in 
proved the more influential. By the 1990s, this dichotomy re-asserted itself in Turkish 
politics under the renewed label of the seculars versus the Islamists. 
In contrast to the desire of the military to smooth the ideological polarization and 
party fragmentation in Turkey through, first, banning the pre-1980 parties from active 
politics and, second, re-writing the rules of the electoral game with a relatively high 
10% national threshold, the numbers of parties mushroomed throughout the 1990s.  
After the 1980 coup, the first elections were held in 1983. The military allowed 
only three parties to run for the elections. The Motherland Party (MP), led by Turgut 
Özal and which was the only party not supported by the military government, won the 
majority of votes in the elections. Once the ban on the leaders of the pre-1980 political 
parties was lifted in 1987, the number of parties running for the elections increased to 
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seven. Three of these parties entered the Assembly. In the 1991 elections, this number 
had increased to five. 
257
  
None of the elections held throughout the nineties resulted in a majority 
government. On the contrary, the Turkish party system of the 1990s was defined by 
high fragmentation and volatility. 
258
 The MP and the True Path Party (TPP) competed 
for the center-right, and the Democratic Left Party (DLP) and the RPP competed for the 
center-left votes. Besides the fragmentation of the center, largely due to the lack of 
effective rule by any of these parties, the aggregate support for parties of the center fell 
gradually. Rather, the extremist parties started to appeal to the masses.
259
 The pro-
Islamist Welfare Party (WP) secured the majority of votes in the 1995 elections. The 
nationalist NAP became the second party in the 1999 elections. The pro-Kurdish 
People‟s Democracy Party (PDP) received the highest amount of votes in a series of 
eastern and southeastern regions in both the 1995 and 1999 elections, although it could 
not achieve the ten percent threshold to enter the Assembly.
260
 
Sayarı underscored the change in the Turkish party system throughout the nineties 
from one that was defined along the left-right ideological spectrum to one surfacing the 
conflict between the seculars and the Islamists.
261
 Similar to Sayarı, Hale also accounted 
for the secularist-Islamist divide as a new dimension in Turkish politics. Further, he 
acknowledged this new divide as the reflection of the old center-periphery dichotomy 
with certain limitations.
262
 
The limitation Hale pointed out related to relatively bridged differences between 
the urban and the rural masses after decades of modernization and the ensuing 
rapprochement through education, communications and infrastructural development as 
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well as the more widespread use of the mass media.
263
 Similar to Hale, in his analysis of 
the center-periphery divide in Turkish politics, Kahraman focuses on the transforming 
influence of the socio-economic modernization from the seventies onwards.
264
 
Notwithstanding the influence of this modernization, after the electoral victory of the 
WP in the 1995 elections, the cultural divide between the so-called seculars and the 
Islamists has proven the more assertive. The heightened mutual suspicion between the 
so-called secular elite and its followers on the one hand, and the Islamist elite and its 
followers on the other, revealed the remarkable continuation and mass dissemination of 
the cultural divide between the modernizing elite and their revisionist conservative 
adversary since the late Ottoman period onwards. Kalaycıoğlu aptly summarized this 
divide as follows: 
   …What looked like a neat division between a compact and coherent 
coalition of various elites versus the heterogeneous amalgam of values and 
lifestyles of periphery has now evolved into a cultural cleavage that widely 
separates people who experience different lifestyles throughout the country. 
The rapid social mobilization and democratization, seemed to have 
contributed to a confrontation of the disparate and parochial lifestyles, 
values and beliefs. Those who used to live separate lives in different 
locations in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace have now found themselves as 
sharing the same streets and resources of the metropolitan areas. They also 
seem to regularly interact in the same political and administrative contexts 
provided by the institutions and agencies of the state and local government. 
When lifestyles and values differ, conflicts often emerge as people start to 
confront each other to elicit respect for their different styles of life. The 
bureaucratic norms often come to clash with such demands emanating from 
the socio-cultural differences of the employees. Consequently, the previous 
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cultural division of the center and the periphery has become much more 
pervasive, perceptible, and constantly present in every nook and cranny of 
the Turkish polity and society of the 1990s.
265
 
 
The cultural divide that the center-periphery represented was heightened 
throughout 2000s. With the end of the Cold War, politics resting on ideologies based on 
economic production and consumption relations lost their appeal. Rather, identity 
politics gained ground. In the Turkish political scene, parties which argued for the 
Islamic and the Kurdish identities respectively, have become more visible. Hence, once 
marginal parties have become influential and dominant during the 2000s. Among the 
old establishment parties, only the RPP and the NAP are able to attract significant votes.  
 The Justice and Development party (JDP) was a moderate disciple of the Islamist 
parties.
266
 Despite the JDP‟s assurance that it supports the secular nature of the Turkish 
state, its link to Islamist parties has made it suspect in the eyes of both the secular elite 
and the masses.
267
 This suspicion, in turn, had fed the centuries old division between the 
center and the periphery. However, the electoral victory of the JDP in the 2002, 2007 
and 2011 elections started a period of weakening of the state elites to the extent of their 
replacement by the peripheral forces. 
First, after the 2007 elections, the former foreign minister in JDP government, 
Abdullah Gül, became the President of the Turkish Republic. Between 2002 and 2007, 
both President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Constitutional Court acted as “institutional 
sources of counter-majoritarianism in Turkish politics”.268 The forces of the center, 
namely the military, the RPP, and the Constitutional Court objected staunchly against 
Abdullah Gül‟s candidacy for the presidency. People of the few metropolitan centers, 
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who came together in “Republican rallies”, also supported them.269 This event proved to 
be the last concerted effort of the central forces to re-design Turkish politics. The 
following 2007 national elections ended with the JDP‟s landslide victory, with nearly 
47% of the votes. The party increased its vote share in all seven regions in Turkey
270
, 
which also revealed the limited popular appeal of the Republican rallies.
271
 Abdullah 
Gül became the President after the elections; hence, what the secular state elites 
considered as the “last citadel” was lost.272 
Another blow fell on military only a year after in 2008 when the Istanbul 
Prosecutor‟s Office opened a court case against the so-called Ergenekon criminal 
network - which included retired army officers as well - on the grounds of “attempting 
to overthrow the government and to undermine its operations by use of violent 
means.”273 This was the first time the military was held accountable for its actions. The 
investigations have been widened since 2008. The European Commission‟s 2010 
Progress Report on Turkey indicated that 270 people were charged with being members 
of Ergenekon, of whom 116 were military officers.
274
  
The coalition of the central forces was challenged further when the composition 
of the Constitutional Court and of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors were 
changed after the JDP initiated constitutional amendments were accepted in the 
referendum of September 2010.
275
 Indeed, the forces of the center led by the military 
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lost their relevance just before the June 2011 elections. Further, the JDP secured 49.9% 
of the popular vote in this election and emerged as victorious for the third consecutive 
time.
276
 
Another winner of the June 2011 elections was the Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party (PDP). For the central establishment, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which 
started the Kurdish insurgence across southeastern cities in late 1970s, constitute a 
direct threat to the Turkish state. The military has been involved actively in the combat 
against the PKK for nearly three decades.
277
 Once Kurds resorted to the legitimate 
political arena by forming their own parties since the mid-nineties, the ten percent 
national threshold became the first impediment against their demands for 
representation.
278
 A second impediment was posed by the Constitutional Court, which 
joined the military in its suspicion of Kurdish intentions. The Constitutional Court 
closed every Kurdish party which entered the elections since 1995 onwards.
279
 As a 
result, the Kurds entered the elections in 2007 as independents and won 20 seats in the 
Assembly.
280
 In the 2011 elections, they repeated the same strategy and increased the 
number of their seats to 36.
281
  
The 2011 elections championed Islamists and the Kurds, which were once 
regarded as the peripheral forces by the central establishment. In the meantime, the 
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central establishment has been dissolved. As of 2011, the military, which proved 
influential in Turkish politics since the first coup in 1960 onwards, has been forced out 
of the political arena.  
In the last decade, these institutions, which were designated as the forces of the 
center, have lost substantial power. However, this change has not yet translated into a 
change in the policy-making style of the Turkish political elite. Conflict and 
polarization rather than deliberation and consensus underscore Turkish policy making 
culture. Also, as the lengthy quote of Kalaycıoğlu pointed out, the cultural divide - the 
center-periphery dichotomy - rooted in society seems to continue; this last feature, in 
particular, is important because it shows the citizens‟ side of the story. The next section 
will focus on mass political culture in Turkey and deals with the ways Turkish political 
structure has influenced the citizens‟ orientations towards the political actors and 
institutions on the one hand, and each other as fellow citizens on the other. 
   
 
 
5.2.b. Mass Political Culture 
 
 
Data concerning Turkish citizens‟ attitudes and behaviors have substantially 
increased in the last three decades. Though the data were less systematic before, it can 
well be claimed that Turkish citizens‟ support for democracy and multi-party 
competition has proven continuous.
282
 Two studies which relied on 1974 nation-wide 
data, for instance, documented such support at a time when political violence - hence 
potential political disaffection with democracy as a consequence - was at its height. 
Further, these studies attested to the divisive policymaking style of the political elite as 
the reason for regime instability rather than citizens‟ attitudes.283 
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 Things do not seem to have changed much in nearly four decades. Turkish 
democracy still struggles with hurdles of the long lasting center-periphery dichotomy 
the political elite has nurtured over decades. The previous section drew attention to the 
continuous mutual suspicion between the forces of the center and the periphery. The 
contending forces situated themselves against the other because they claimed 
unbridgeable differences between what they envisioned as the Good Society.
284
 Perhaps 
ironically, however, those forces were structurally equivalent in the manner they 
projected their ideas despite their claimed differences in the content. 
 As early as 1975, Frey designated the elite political culture in Turkey as follows: 
   Possibly the most striking and important characteristic of elite political 
culture in Turkey is a pronounced tendency to view the world in in-group 
versus out-group terms…The main impact of this slant on political life has 
been the chronic degeneration of all attempts at open and legitimate political 
competition into outright, no-holds-barred political war.
285
    
 
The previous section is a case in point for the continuation of this culture until 
today, which has bearings for the mass political culture as well. First, a conflict-ridden 
elite political culture influences the masses‟ view of democracy negatively. In Esmer‟s 
study on mass political culture which relied on 1997 World Values Survey data, the 
majority of the respondents accorded support for democracy (92%). However, they also 
designated indecisiveness as an undesired feature of democratic regimes in general. 
Also, alternatives to democracy such as the rule by a strong leader (41%); technocrats 
(55%); and even the military (33%) garnered support. According to Esmer, the 
simultaneous support for both democracy and its authoritarian alternatives begged for 
explanation, which was given as the citizens‟ disaffection with the state of democracy in 
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Turkey despite its theoretical appeal. The disaffection, in turn, was associated with the 
lack of a culture of consensus and compromise at the elite level.
286
  
Another implication of the conflict-based elite political culture on mass level 
attitudes and behaviors was the imprisonment of the micro-level, bottom-up citizens‟ 
demands, especially for the individual rights and expressions, into macro-level divisions 
along cultural and ideological lines. It should be noted that the history of Turkish 
democracy neatly fits into the narrative of the divide between the center and the 
periphery. The political elite of all walks should be given credit for the salience of this 
simple, yet instructive divide. This salience has been achieved despite tremendous 
socio-economic development and its mobilizing capacity since the inception of the 
Republic in 1923, which accelerated especially after the economic and political 
liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s respectively. Only between 1960 and 1980, was 
the ideological divide along the left-right continuum able to challenge the center-
periphery divide. Yet, it re-asserted itself during the 1990s with the new division 
between the seculars and the Islamists. 
Is it not interesting that the history of Turkish democracy relies just too heavily on 
elite level concerns and discussions? Where do the citizen level demands and 
expressions enter the political picture? More often than not, Turkish citizens reproduce 
the elite level divisions at the mass level by aligning themselves along the divisions 
guarded and deepened by the political elite. However, this situation does not necessarily 
indicate a passive attitude on the citizens‟ side. On the contrary, there have been periods 
of heightened citizens activism in modern Turkish history which have been silenced 
with the curious alliances among the most unexpected elite forces once such activism 
started to crosscut the constructed divisions.  
The military‟s curtailment of the individuals‟ rights of expression and freedom of 
association with the 1971 memorandum in line with the position of the JP, which was 
the representative of the peripheral forces in the Assembly between 1961 and 1980, was 
a case in point.
287
 The alliance between the military, the nationalists and the Islamists in 
crafting the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an antidote for left-wing ideologies and parties 
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after the 1980 coup is another example.
288
 More recently, during its first tenure between 
2002 and 2007, the JDP aligned itself with the military, the RPP and the nationalists, 
which represented the center, in response to Kurdish demands for cultural rights.
289
 The 
same alliance also silenced the demands for the reform of the Article 301 of the Turkish 
Penal Code, which was found contrary to individual freedom of expression.
290
  
All these examples show that the unbridgeable differences between the forces of 
the center and the periphery vanish against the citizens‟ activism for enhanced 
individual rights and freedoms. The consequence of the poor political regard for 
citizens‟ activism, which couples with the political elites‟ zealous defense of the 
cultural and ideological divisions, has been the delimitation of the political space that is 
available for the masses. Present day implications of this situation for mass level 
political culture are twofold. The first implication is the rising tide of conservatism in 
Turkey.
291
 The second implication, which also relates to the first one, is the weak civil 
society involvement. Both implications, in turn, are related to low levels of generalized 
trust in Turkey. 
In their 2009 study, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu designated conservatism as a 
widespread behavioral and attitudinal code of Turkish citizens. The study is important 
because it does not limit conservatism to religiosity alone due to rise of political Islam 
in Turkey since 1990s onwards.
292
 Though religiosity proves to be a significant 
determinant of conservatism, different facets of conservatism such as authoritarianism, 
dogmatism, anomie, and lack of tolerance are also accounted for.
293
 The multi-faceted 
approach to conservatism, in turn, showed that Turkish citizens at large are under its 
                                                          
288 Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey 
(New York, N.Y: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009): 8-10. 
 
289 Çiçek, “Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish Parties,” 22, 23. Also see Nora 
Onar, “Kemalists, Islamists and Liberals: Shifting patterns of Confrontation and 
Consensus, 2002-06,” Turkish Studies 8, no.2  (2007): 284, 285.  
 
290
 Ibid., 280-284. 
 
291 The expression is a direct reference to Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu‟s book with the 
same title.  
 
292 Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, Rising Tide of Conservatism, 141. 
 
293
 Ibid., 27-63. 
 
 109 
spell irrespective of party preferences and ideological positions. Though the RPP 
constituency was found religiously more liberal than the JDP and NAP constituencies, 
for instance, no meaningful difference was observed across different party 
constituencies in terms of dogmatism. Further, the RPP constituency scored higher-
than-average anomic tendencies than the JDP constituency, though the latter proved 
more politically intolerant along with the NAP constituency.
294
 
 Widespread authoritarian and dogmatic attitudes coupled with anomie and 
political intolerance is no good news to any democracy striving for liberal democracy; 
on the contrary, such a conservative behavioral code is likely to impede some of the 
demands for further individual rights such as the Kurdish demand for education in one‟s 
native language; to ignore others like the demands for the reform of Article 301 of the 
Penal Code; and to consider only those relevant to its own operational code such as the 
controversy between the seculars and the Islamists about women‟ headscarves in 
universities and public employment. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu noted: 
   The rise of conservatism not only resulted in the systematic shift of voter 
choice to the right, but also changed the major political issues, and the very 
contours of public debate in Turkey from class issues, left-right conflict, 
distribution of land, mineral resources, property rights, economic growth 
and development to the role of religions in public space, the meaning and 
role of secularism in the Republican era, ethnic identity of the Turkish 
population, and the ethnic conflict between those who purport to know that 
they are Kurds and all the rest who they designated as Turks.
295
  
 
The superimposition of a deeply divided political elite - which sporadically come 
together only to smash citizens‟ activism for enhanced rights and freedoms - onto a 
highly conservative populace leaves a very constrained space for civic initiatives and 
civil society activism as well.  
Studies on civil society in Turkey have drawn attention to an increase in numbers 
of associations especially since 1990s.
296
 Kalaycıoğlu has pointed out the likely 
relationship between accelerated urbanization during the time period and the increase in 
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numbers of associations by counting on the higher intensity of the mushrooming 
associations in metropolitan centers.
297
 Despite the increase, however, the nation-wide 
representative data show low levels of overall membership in voluntary associations, 
which amounts to no more than seven percent.
298
 The likely influence of such low 
levels of civic activism remains suspect at best, once the weight of the different types of 
associations is considered separately.  
In their 2011 study, Çarkoğlu and Cenker reported that the highest membership 
was in political parties, followed by sports clubs and chambers of commerce.
299
  This 
situation changes when civil society involvement other than membership, such as 
voluntary activity, meeting attendance, and giving donations is considered. The 
participation levels through these alternative types are around approximately 6%, 4%, 
and 18% respectively.
300
 This means that Turkish citizens‟ most preferred type of civil 
society involvement is through giving donations. The dominant association type also 
changes across these alternative types of civil society involvement. Religious 
organizations like mosque building associations outnumber political parties across all 
non-membership type of civil society involvement.
301
  
Çarkoğlu and Cenker also group associations as the Olson type associations if 
they display potential rent-seeking potential such as political parties, chambers of 
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commerce and trade unions, or as the Putnam type associations when they are of the 
more community and rights based, self-expressive associations such as religious 
associations and human or women‟ rights groups. Not surprisingly, political parties 
dominate the former Olson type group (30%) and religious associations dominate the 
latter Putnam type group (43%).
302
 The authors related citizens‟ participation in Olson 
type associations to clientelistic relations because the political space is too narrowly 
defined to meet demands for autonomous initiatives.
303
 The relatively marginal position 
of associations related to the youth, environment, arts, human or women‟ rights within 
the Putnam type group also supports this commentary.
304
 All these different associations 
constitute only 6% of Putnam associations, which is found worrisome for the potential 
contribution of Turkish civil society to further liberalization and democratization.
305
  
The weakness of civil society in Turkey is also accounted for by Toros, whose 
study focused on civil society associations. A sample of different types of such 
associations was examined along four dimensions, which were the formational, the 
legal, the value-based and the impact-related dimensions.
306
 These dimensions 
attempted to reveal the perceptions of the associational members about the institutional 
depth and breadth, legal rights and freedoms, organizational culture, and institutional 
capability and the impact potential of civil society associations in Turkey.
307
 The 
objective of the study was to evaluate the aggregate likely influence of civil society in 
Turkey on democratic institutionalization.
308
 
The majority of respondents found associations in Turkey poor on all dimensions. 
The study showed that associational members are well aware of the limited breadth of 
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civil society associations in terms of the membership levels as well as the issue 
coverage.
309
  Especially noteworthy was the majority of the respondents‟ (66%) 
designation of the under-representation of such groups like ethnic minorities and 
women in the Turkish civic landscape.
310
 The perceived limitations on individual 
liberties are a likely cause of such under-representation: 
   …more than 77 percent of the respondents think that, in practice, freedom 
of the press is not established in Turkey, and around 60 percent of the 
respondents think that civil society organizations cannot freely criticize the 
government. Furthermore, 72 percent of the respondents think that there are 
obstacles to the enjoyment of basic political rights in Turkey, and around 60 
percent of the respondents think that the actions of international civil society 
organizations are hampered in Turkey.
311
  
 
Despite the respondents‟ poor evaluation of the civil society associations in 
Turkey, Toros remains optimistic about the potential contribution of civil society to 
democratic institutionalization. This optimism owes a great deal to increased civic 
initiatives in the last few decades, which, according to the author, are likely to 
continue.
312
 Although not mentioned explicitly, however, a cautious tone is felt between 
the lines, which provided explanations for citizens‟ poor evaluations of the civil society 
associations in Turkey.
313
 Indeed Toros‟s caution can well be generalized to the 
students of Turkish politics at large, who underline the role of the state in the under-
development of civil society in Turkey.
314
  
The present study also acknowledges the role of the state in the ills of the civil 
society activism in Turkey. The point it departs from similar studies is its focus on all 
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political elites, and not solely the state elite and the strong state tradition, as acting in 
detriment to civic activism.  
As noted in the previous section, in its third uninterrupted tenure in government, 
the JDP has proven effective in neutralizing the once dominant state elite. However, 
issues pertaining to individual rights and freedoms have not yet found an enlarged space 
for expression. Sunni Muslims may not feel under the threat of the state anymore, yet 
the state, let alone the elected political elite, is not particularly attentive towards the 
demands of the Alewis, Kurds, students, and workers either. Indeed the latter issues 
have no place in the political agenda, which is too pre-occupied with discussions of 
secularism and Islam. The continuity of the center-periphery dichotomy subsequently 
seems to be nurtured by the elected political elite, which restricts the political arena to 
issues of the respective parties‟ liking, and which are thus rendered controllable. 
Despite their increase in the last few decades, civil society institutions remain only 
anecdotal to Turkish democracy, especially on issues of individual rights and freedoms. 
In that capacity, their influence on democratic institutionalization is marginal at best.  
A closer look at the Turkish political context in terms of its historical legacy, the 
political regime, as well as the culture shows that politics in Turkey has left quite a 
constricted space for citizens‟ activism. The sustenance of the historically relevant 
cleavages until today seems to inflict the public space with uncompromising 
partisanship and increasing doses of conservatism. The political system in Turkey 
seems to restrain the citizens‟ attempts to be involved in issues such as political and 
civil liberties, which crosscut the existing cleavages, the consequence being the 
impaired ties among the citizens, which is likely to have significant negative bearings 
for generalized trust.  
Given this socio-political state of the Turkish citizens, what is the influence of 
societal relationships on generalized trust? The present dissertation aims to uncover the 
bottom-up structures which may contribute to bridging the existing fault lines among 
fellow citizens. In this regard, a closer look at the social network underpinnings of 
generalized trust in Turkey is crucial. The next chapter will undertake this enquiry. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 TURKEY: THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter showed that the socio-political structure in Turkey is 
divisive and conflictual, and this structure is also likely to influence civic activism 
negatively. The Turkish historical, political and the societal contexts seem to situate the 
fellow citizens at a distance from each other; hence, more often than not, collective 
goods, especially individual and civil liberties, lack due attention.  
What about societal relationships?  What are the influences of bottom-up 
relational structures on generalized trust? What role do primordial relations play in an 
individual‟s decisions to trust the fellow men? What about the role of friendship 
relations? Or, can we talk of the social isolation of Turkish citizens, which leaves too 
little room to discuss the social network underpinnings of trust?  
A nation-wide survey will be used in order to show the relational potential for the 
creation of generalized trust in Turkey. This survey is representative of Turkey‟s urban 
population.
315
 It was focused in particular on informal economic activities in Turkey 
and it counted on different items related to this general theme. The World Bank funded 
the survey and the fieldwork lasted from November 2008 to February 2009. For 
simplicity, the survey will be referred to as INFORMALITY in the rest of the analysis.  
INFORMALITY is among a series of surveys, which employed name 
generator/interpreter items in Turkey for the first time. The author helped in the design 
of the network modules in those surveys and she took an active role in 
INFORMALITY. Because the surveys covered a range of items, core discussion 
networks rather than more comprehensive ego-networks were investigated. The 
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respondents were first asked the initials of the name of the discussant with whom 
important matters were discussed. Up to three names were collected in this way and this 
information elicited the tie-based relationships. It was supplemented further with a 
series of questions about the nature of the relationship between the respondent and the 
discussants as well as the discussants‟ demographic features, which were related to 
network diversity.  
In general, name generator/interpreter elicits close and intimate relationships. 
Being so, they are more likely to account for the strong rather than weak ties. However, 
both the social capital and the social network literatures argued for the differences 
between the primordial and secondary relations; in addition, the fourth chapter 
introduced a series of studies in political science, which used  role relationships as an 
indicator of tie strength. In INFORMALITY, the discussants‟ role relationships with the 
respondent as well as with each other were asked. They are categorized as the family, 
the relatives, the friends, and the acquaintances.  
Besides the role relationships, a series of further questions were introduced to 
further understand the nature of the relationship between the discussant and the 
respondent. These questions were the respondents‟ level of trust in his/her discussants, 
the extent of the similarity in worldviews, and the availability of financial help in times 
of need. These questions were used as the network diversity measures. The discussants‟ 
education and age groups were also asked for as the alternative network diversity 
measures.  
Although the opportunity of involvement in the research design allowed for a 
series of detailed questions on networks, there were also restrictions because social 
networks were only one among many items investigated in the survey. For instance, the 
survey did not include questions to differentiate ties on the basis of purpose of action; 
hence, the analysis on Turkey does not test the hypotheses related to tie purpose. A 
second restriction concerned the civil society involvement. The present analysis 
regarded the civil society as one of the bridging structures; however, questions related 
to civil society involvement were not posed in INFORMALITY. Yet, other bridging 
structures of the education and the workplace were accounted for.  
In short, INFORMALITY elicited detailed information about core discussion 
networks in Turkey, which allowed for testing the majority of the revised hypotheses 
introduced in the fourth chapter. Besides the core discussion networks, 
INFORMALITY asked about the extensity of close friends from the neighborhood, the 
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workplace/the school and the other place, which were  important to test the relationship 
between network size and generalized trust. Table 6.1. below presents the hypotheses, 
which were tested for the Turkish case.  
Table 6.1 Revised hypotheses for Turkey 
Tie based relationships 
 
Structure based relationships 
 
H1: Higher network density 
influences generalized trust 
negatively  
H4: Higher education influences 
generalized trust positively. 
H2: Larger network size 
influences generalized trust 
positively 
H5: Having a job influences 
generalized trust positively. 
H3: Higher network diversity 
influences generalized trust 
positively 
 
 
Nine questions of the INFORMALITY were used to test these hypotheses. Table 
6.2 on page 117 presents the questions asked for the core discussion networks in 
Turkey. Alternatively, Table 6.3 on the following page accounts for the question about 
the network extensity of close friends. Once the hypotheses and the relevant survey 
questions to test these hypotheses have been introduced, the following section will 
present the descriptive statistics for both the generalized trust, which is the dependent 
variable, and the network variables, which are the independent variables of the present 
analysis. 
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Table 6.2 INFORMALITY Questions for Core Discussion Networks
316
 
 1) People sometimes talk about 
important matters with others. 
Thinking about the last six 
months, who are the people with 
whom you talk about important 
matters? 
(Only the first names or initials) 
 2) What is the relationship of each 
person to you? 
Family 
Relative 
Friend 
Acquaintance 
 3) Would you tell us how much 
you trust each of these people 
along 1-10 scale? “1” means you 
do not trust this person at all, 
and “10” means complete trust.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 4) In case your household income 
is cut for some reason, and you 
need help after a while, would 
you ask for help from this 
person? 
                                          Yes, I can ask for help 
No, I would not ask for help 
 5) Ok, can you tell us how close 
your worldview is to each 
person you mentioned? 
   Very close 
Close 
Not very close 
Not close at all 
 6) Can you also tell us the 
approximate ages of each person 
you mentioned?  
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and above 
 7) Can you also tell us the 
education of each person you 
mentioned? 
Not literate 
Literate 
Primary school 
Secondary school 
High school 
University and higher 
 8) (IF MORE THAN ONE 
PERSON IS NAMED) 
Can you also tell us the 
relationship- if any- between 
these people?  
 
Family 
Relatives 
Friends 
Acquaintance 
Do not know each other 
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Table 6.3 INFORMALITY Question for Close Friends Network Extensity  
 9) Apart from family members and 
relatives, how many people 
would you regard as close friends 
in the following places I will 
cite?   
IF WORKING At the workplace: 
 
IF A STUDENT At the school: 
 
Neighborhood: 
 
Other places: 
 
 
 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics of Generalized Trust and Social Networks in Turkey 
 
 
 
 INFORMALITY surveyed 1004 respondents. The present analysis is based on 
1002 respondents because two respondents, whose ages were below 18, were not 
included in the dataset. INFORMALITY posed the following question to decipher 
generalized trust: 
   In every society, some people trust each other, while some do not. Now I 
will ask you questions about trust and co-operation. Generally speaking, do 
you think most people can be trusted? Or, should one be careful in dealing 
with people? 
 
The respondents who indicated that most people can be trusted were coded as “1”. 
Alternatively, the respondents who said that one should be careful in dealing with 
people were coded as “0”. Table 6.4 below shows the frequency table of generalized 
trust. 
Table 6.4 INFORMALITY Generalized trust variable 
Generalized trust Frequency  Percentage  
Most people can be trusted=1  69 6,9 
One should be careful=0 933 93,1 
Total  1002 100,0 
 
 INFORMALITY verified once again the low generalized trust levels in Turkey. 
Only approximately seven people out of a hundred indicated trust in the fellow man. 
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asked for all indicated discussants.  
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Table 6.5 shows the Chi-squared significance of the demographic variables for 
generalized trust.  
Table 6.5 Chi-squared significance of 
demographic variables on generalized trust 
Generalized trust 
Sex 0,93 
Education 0,04 
Work status 0,72 
Turkey's cities 0,00 
 
According to Table 6.5, the tendency to extend trust to the fellow men seems to 
change across different demographic values. Level of education and the city where one 
resides are likely to significantly influence the decision to trust. This finding is in line 
with the assumption that education is indeed among the bridging structures which 
influence individuals’ attitudes through exposing them to different others as well as 
providing them novel opportunities. However, a similar assumption was also made for 
the workplace, although work status does not seem to make a difference in terms of 
generalized trust. Notwithstanding these insights, multivariate analysis is needed to 
elaborate more in detail on whether the variables of Table 6.5 are significant 
determinants of generalized trust.  
 Once the descriptive statistics about generalized trust were introduced, the 
analysis focused on the network variables. The first of these variables is the network 
size, which is the number of discussants each respondent indicated. Because 
INFORMALITY focused on core discussion networks in a multi-item survey, the 
maximum numbers of discussants were limited to three. Figure 6.1 shows the 
distribution of respondents over the network size variable. According to this figure, the 
frequency of respondents with three discussants is the highest for INFORMALITY. The 
total number of indicated discussants amounted to 1822.  
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of INFORMALITY network size 
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A second network variable of interest is the network density. Though there are 
different measures of network density which are introduced in the fourth chapter, the 
present analysis will follow the footsteps of the political research on social networks 
and will count on the role relationships in order to differentiate among the tie strengths. 
This approach assigns the stronger ties to relations with the family and relatives rather 
than friends and acquaintances. The values of this variable changes between “1 
(acquaintance)” and “4 (family)”.   
 Out of 1822 discussants, the respondents did not indicate the closeness of only 
six discussants. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage distribution of the closeness variable. 
According to this figure, friends were indicated as the most frequent core discussants 
(51,7%) followed by the family members (31,7%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121 
 
Figure 6.2 Distribution of INFORMALITY closeness between the respondent and 
the discussant 
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Table 6.6 below shows that only for the one discussant networks, the percentage 
of ties to family members (41,5%) comes close to the percentage of ties to friends 
(43,3%). In both two and three discussants networks, the percentages of ties to friends 
well surpass ties to family members. This information tells us that the core discussion 
networks in Turkey are not necessarily confined to family circles; on the contrary, it 
seems like friends rather than family members are preferred when discussing important 
matters. 
Table 6.6 Percentage distribution of closeness between the 
respondent and the discussant over the values of network size 
  
One 
Discussant 
Two 
Discussants 
Three 
Discussants 
Family 41,5 34,7 28,7 
Relative 12,5 11,0 14,5 
Friend 43,3 52,0 53,3 
Acquaintance 2,7 2,3 3,4 
Total % 100 100 100 
Total # 224 429 1163 
 
 Besides the closeness between the respondent and the indicated discussant, 
INFORMALITY also accounted for closeness between the discussants. The same 
sequence of values was assigned together with the additional value of “do not know 
each other”. The values of the closeness between discussants, then, change between “0 
(do not know each other)” and “4 (family)”. This variable is relevant only for the two 
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and the three discussants networks. Table 6.7 shows column percentage distribution of 
closeness between discussants. 
Table 6.7 Column percentage distribution of closeness between discussants 
for two and three discussants networks 
  
Two 
discussants  Three discussants 
   1&2   1&2 
  
1&3 2&3 
Family 24,2 21,9 19,8 20,31 
Relative 8,4 12,3 13,1 12,60 
Friend 34,0 37,5 33,9 33,93 
Acquaintance 15,8 16,2 17,5 18,77 
Do not know each other 17,7 12,1 15,7 14,40 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
Total # 215 389 389 389 
 
Similar to the closeness between the respondent and the discussants, the closeness 
between the discussants is also dominated by friendship ties. Table 6.7 is also 
interesting in terms of the relative increase in the percentage of acquaintance ties. It 
should be noted that friends and acquaintances ties make up at least fifty percent or 
more of all ties for both the two and the three discussants networks. This finding reveals 
the difference between the structures of the one discussant networks on the one hand, 
and the two and the three discussants networks on the other. In the one discussant 
networks, family ties rival friendship ties. However in the two and the three discussants 
networks, the network ties are diversified not least because the friendship ties between 
the respondent and the discussants are more frequent for those networks, but also 
because the discussants themselves are likely to be linked through friendship as well as 
the acquaintances ties. This situation is indicative of the likelihood that the two and the 
three discussants networks are less dense than the one discussant networks. Also, more 
ties to friends and acquaintances gives rise to the potential for bridges outside of the 
primordial circles.  
Once the closeness variables are discussed in detail, the network density can be 
computed. Figure 4.2 of the fourth chapter introduced one of the definitions of network 
density as “the mean strength of connections among units in a network”. In other words, 
INFORMALITY network density corresponds to the mean closeness for the given 
network. The formula is: 
Network density  =   [ Σj xij ] / N   where N is the total  number of indicated ties (Eq. 6.1) 
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Network density is a continuous variable and its values change between 0 and 4. 
Those respondents who did not indicate any discussants, take the value of zero. 
Alternatively, those who indicated only the family members as the core discussants take 
the highest value of the closeness variables, which is four. The mean network density is 
2,2. 20,2% of the discussion networks are of the highest density (See Table A.1 in 
Appendix A). The cross-tabulation of this variable with the network size verifies the 
above preliminary finding regarding the inverse relationship between these two 
variables. Indeed, Burt mentioned this relationship as a logical consequence of the 
increase in the network size. 
Table 6.8 Mean estimation of the network density by closeness 
over the values of the network size
317
 
  Mean Std. Error [%95 Conf. Interval] 
Network size=1 2,92 0,07 2,79  -  3,05 
Network size=2 2,67 0,06 2,56  -  2,79 
Network size=3 2,54 0,04 2,45 -  2,62 
 
The third network variable of interest is the network diversity. As noted, 
INFORMALITY posed a series of questions about the nature of the relationship 
between the respondent and the discussants as well as the questions about the 
discussants‟ demographic features. The former questions were: the respondents‟ trust in 
their discussants; the extent of similarity in their worldviews; and the availability of 
financial help in times of need.  
The first network diversity variable is the respondents‟ trust in their discussants. 
Since it concerns trust in people we know, this variable is the particularized trust 
variable. It is measured along the 1-10 scale. On this scale, “1” corresponds to “no trust 
at all” and “10” corresponds to “complete trust”. Respondents did not indicate any trust 
levels for only five discussants; hence trust levels are provided for 1817 discussants. 
Figure 6.3 below shows the percentage distribution of particularized trust. In general, 
respondents display high levels of trust in their network discussants. According to the 
figure, 73,2% of the respondents indicated complete trust in their discussants and only 
3,4% indicated trust at point five or lower. 
 
                                                          
317 The mean score for the network size changes between 2,5 and 2,9. However the 
mean network density is reported as 2,2. This difference is due to the respondents who 
did not indicate any discussants. Their network size as well as network density is zero, 
which is not shown in Table 6.8.  
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Figure 6.3 Distribution of particularized trust 
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 Who are those discussants that were assigned complete trust? Are they more 
likely the family and relatives rather than friends and acquaintances? Does the 
distribution of particularized trust over values of the network size display a similar trend 
to the case of the network density? If so, is it likely that the respondents indicate less 
trust as their discussion networks get larger? These questions demand cross-tabulation 
of the particularized trust variable both with the closeness and the network size 
variables. 
Table 6.9 Column percentage of particularized trust 
across closeness by role labels 
  Acquaintance Friend Relative Family 
Trust=1 to 7 14,3 12,3 7,8 3,7 
Trust=8 12,5 14,2 9,0 1,4 
Trust=9 1,8 12,7 6,1 3,0 
Trust=10 71,4 60,9 77,0 92,0 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
Total # 56 938 244 574 
 
 Table 6.9 shows that complete trust accorded to family members (92%) well 
surpasses the rest of the relationships. Particularized trust proves more dispersed for 
friendship relations: only 60,9% indicated complete trust in their discussants. This 
finding is in line with the prior assumption that family relations are stronger. However 
our interest in particularized trust is not limited to this check alone. On the contrary, this 
variable was included in the survey in order to understand the extent of the diversity of 
relationships at the core discussion networks level. Table 6.9 shows us that different 
role labels influence this diversity. However the extent of the influence should not be 
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exaggerated either. After all, more than ninety percent of the respondents indicated 
particularized trust in their discussants between the 8-10 range, which is quite high. 
What about the network size? Is it likely that the respondents assigned lower 
particularized trust scores as their networks got larger? 
Table 6.10 Column percentage of particularized trust across 
network size 
  Network size=1 Network size= 2 Network size=3 
Trust=1 to 7 12,5 9,9 8,0 
Trust=8 7,6 12,2 8,7 
Trust=9 9,4 6,8 8,9 
Trust=10 70,5 71,1 74,5 
Total % 100 100 100 
Total # 224 426 1167 
 
 Different from the network density, particularized trust does not seem to 
decrease with an increase in the network size; in fact, the percentage of complete trust is 
the highest in three discussant networks. We already know that friendship ties become 
more frequent as the network size increases. This brings us to the possibility that the 
respondents assigned higher particularized trust scores to their friends when they are in 
larger networks. In order to test this assertion, the probability of naming only friends 
with complete trust was calculated for all network sizes. From the one discussant to the 
three discussants networks, these probabilities were found to be 0,281; 0,285; and 0,333 
respectively.  
 The enquiry into particularized trust showed that respondents, in general, 
displayed high trust in their discussants. They extended complete trust more readily to 
family members than to other types of relationships. However, friends also received 
complete trust especially in three discussant networks. In sum, core discussion networks 
in Turkey are rich in terms of particularized trust. 
 A similar descriptive enquiry was conducted for the other two network diversity 
variables, which also concerned the nature of the relationship between the respondent 
and the discussants. The first of these measures was the similarity of worldviews 
between the respondent and the discussant. The values of this variable change between 
1 and 4, where “1” stands for the worldviews which are “not close at all” and “4” stands 
for “very close” worldviews. Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of this variable. 
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Figure 6.4 Distribution of the similarity of worldviews 
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 Figure 6.4 is not very surprising. Nearly eighty-five percent of the respondents 
indicated at least close worldviews with their respondents. Did they accord the very 
close worldviews to the family and relatives? Who were assigned not very similar 
worldviews? Does the similarity of worldviews loosen with larger network size? 
Table 6.11 Column percentage of similarity of worldviews 
across closeness by role labels 
  Acquaintance Friend Relative Family 
Not close at all 5,4 3,8 5,1 4,6 
Not very close 16,1 11,8 8,5 13,6 
Close 42,9 49,9 52,1 44,9 
Very close 35,7 34,5 34,3 36,9 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
Total # 56 925 236 566 
 
 For all types of relationships, close worldviews are found to be the most 
frequent. Table 6.11 shows that the relations with the family and the relatives do not 
necessarily mean more congruence in worldviews. As a matter of fact, approximately 
eighteen percent of the family discussants were mentioned to hold worldviews which 
are either not very close or not close at all to the respondent‟s worldviews. 
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Table 6.12 Column percentage of similarity of worldviews across 
network size 
  Network size=1 Network size= 2 Network size=3 
Not close at all 2,7 8,2 3,1 
Not very close 7,3 16,5 11,4 
Close 46,6 39,2 52,2 
Very close 43,4 36,1 33,3 
Total % 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Total # 219 413 1156 
 
 Table 6.12 shows that close worldviews are also the most frequent across all 
network sizes. Less than ten percent indicated not close relationships for the one 
discussant networks. This percentage increases to nearly twenty-five for the two 
discussants networks and falls down to fifteen percent for the three discussants 
networks. Hence, although the worldviews are more similar than dissimilar for the one 
discussant networks, we cannot claim a progressive increase in dissimilar views as the 
network size increases.  
 Similar to the case of particularized trust, the commentary on the similarity of 
worldviews should take into account the relatively greater presence of friendship ties for 
all network sizes. Table 6.11 further shows that the respondents indicated close 
worldviews the most frequent for the friendship relations. Those two features together 
explain the relatively higher frequency of close worldviews for all network sizes. 
However, the frequency of the close worldviews is the highest for the three discussants 
networks. What may explain this figure?  
 This question can be answered once the probabilities of naming only friends 
with close worldviews are calculated for all network sizes. They are 0,2; 0,230; 0,279 
respectively. This means that respondents who indicated three friends are more likely to 
accord close worldviews to their discussants. This situation not only results in higher 
frequency of close worldviews for friendship relations, but it increases the close 
worldviews frequency for the three discussants networks as well.  
 INFORMALITY also enquired about the extent to which the respondents could 
ask for financial help from their discussants in times of need. This question had a binary 
“Yes (1)” and “No (2)” answer. 91% of the respondents said that they could ask for 
such help from their discussants. The distributions of this variable across closeness and 
network size variables are provided in the following Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 
respectively.  
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Table 6.13 Column percentage of availability of 
financial help across closeness by role labels 
  Acquaintance Friend Relative Family 
Yes 80,4 88,9 92,9 95,4 
No 19,6 11,1 7,1 4,6 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
Total # 56 928 241 566 
 
Similar to the case of particularized trust, Table 6.13 shows a difference between 
the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. It 
seems as though the respondents approach their family and relatives more comfortably 
for financial help than their friends and acquaintances.  
Table 6.14 Column percentage of availability of financial help 
across network size 
  Network size=1 Network size= 2 Network size=3 
Yes  90,4 87,2 92,6 
No 9,6 12,8 7,4 
Total % 100 100 100 
Total # 219 423 1155 
 
 Table 6.14 shows that the availability of financial help does not decrease with 
the increase in the network size. On the contrary, financial help seems more available in 
three discussants networks. Once again it is likely that this figure relates to three 
discussants networks of friendship relations. The probability of naming a friend from 
whom financial help could be asked is 0,399 for the one discussant networks. It 
increases to 0,436 for two discussants networks and to 0,481 for three discussants 
networks. 
 Close examination of the INFORMALITY network diversity questions showed 
that the core discussion networks in Turkey are mostly populated with the friendship 
ties. Also, the respondents reveal high trust in their friends; they are more likely to share 
close worldviews with them and, more often, they could ask for financial help in times 
of need. Moreover, the probability of complete trust, close worldview, and the 
availability of financial help of friendship relations increase in three discussants friends‟ 
networks. This means that the extensity of the friendship networks results in closer 
relationships with the network associates. Although friendship ties proved the stronger 
in three discussant networks, the family and the relatives‟ ties surfaced as strong, 
irrespective of the network size. 
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 Descriptive analyses have so far designated family relations as the strongest in 
terms of particularized trust as well as the availability of financial help. Relations with 
the relatives were the runner-up in both variables. This trend did not fit neatly to the 
similarity of the worldviews variable. Respondents mentioned neither the family‟s nor 
the relatives‟ ties as sharing very close worldviews with them; rather they indicated 
sharing close worldviews with both types of relationships. Interestingly, the frequency 
of not close worldviews was higher for family‟s ties than the relatives‟ ties. This means 
that although the respondents had the strongest ties to the family members, they did not 
necessarily share very similar worldviews with them. However, it is likely that they 
chose those relatives with whom they shared closer worldviews as their discussants. 
Respondents mentioned highest frequency of not close worldviews for the 
acquaintances. Nearly twenty percent of the acquaintances were also indicated as not 
suitable to ask for financial help.       
 Detailed examination of the network diversity measures of particularized trust, 
similarity of worldviews, and availability of financial help revealed differences between 
the relationships with the family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and 
acquaintances on the other. Relations with the former emerged as the stronger. This 
finding supports the account of the network density based on the closeness by role 
labels.  
 Among these network diversity measures, the extent of similar worldviews is 
used to generate the network heterogeneity of worldviews variable.
318
 The presence of 
alternative worldviews in one‟s network is likely to familiarize the person into variable 
human condition. This familiarity, in turn, is expected to influence generalized trust 
positively.  
 To generate the variable, the similarity of worldviews was re-coded in the 
reverse order so that the higher values indicated more dissimilarity. Each of these values 
was squared to underscore the distance between worldviews. The last step was to 
average all those values at the network level. This variable measures the average 
                                                          
318 In more than ninety percent of the cases, the discussants in Turkey were accorded 
high levels of trust and they were relied on for financial help. Hence, network level 
variables generated on the basis of these variables are closely associated to the network 
size variable. As a result, the multivariate analysis only relies on one network diversity 
measure, which is the similarity of worldviews variable.   
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worldview difference in comparison with the discussant. The formula for the network 
worldview heterogeneity variable can be written as: 
Worldview heterogeneity   = [ Σj (xij)
2
 ] / N  where N is the network size.
319
 (Eq. 6.2) 
 The values of this variable change between 0-16 and its mean is 3.26. Eighty 
percent of its distribution lies between 0-4, which shows rather close worldviews at the 
network level (See Table A.2 in Appendix A).                                                                                                                                 
There are two alternative network diversity measures which deal with discussants‟ 
demographic features. The first measure concerns the age groups and the second the 
education levels of the discussants. Since network diversity is positively related to 
generalized trust, discussants with both different ages and education levels are 
hypothesized to influence generalized trust. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is the 
assumption that people become more familiar with diverse others through their daily, 
face-to-face interactions. This familiarity, in turn, is assumed to orient people towards 
the variable human conditions and hence, the fellow men becomes more 
comprehensible. Subsequently, the account of individuals‟ exposure to different age and 
education groups tests whether or not the diversity of relationships has any bearing on 
generalized trust.   
 Before getting into details of the age and the education differences at the 
network level, the distributions of the discussants‟ tie-level age and education would be 
useful. Figure 6.5 on the next page gives the distribution of the discussants‟ age groups 
together with the distribution of the respondents‟ age groups. The former information is 
given for 1816 discussants; hence the respondents did not report the age groups of six 
discussants. 
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 Thirty-four respondents did not indicate similarity of worldviews for their 
discussants. Hence network size in this formula corresponds to sum of ties for which 
respondents indicated worldview similarity.  
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Figure 6.5 Distribution of age groups of the respondents and the discussants 
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 Figure 6.5 shows that the respondents‟ most frequent age group is 25-34 
(25,9%), whereas the discussants‟ most populated age group is 35-44 (26,8%). Also, 
approximately seventy percent of both the respondents and the discussants cluster 
between the ages of 25-54. Figure 6.5 presents the age groups of the respondents and 
the discussants together, yet it does not account for the extent of similarity between the 
age groups of these respective groups: How do the role relationships influence the 
discussants‟ age groups? Are discussants of the family and relatives more likely to be 
older than the respondents? What about friends? Are they more likely to be at the same 
age as the respondent? 
 
 
 132 
 
 
Table 6.15 The extent of similarity of age groups between the respondent and the discussants according to role labels 
  Discussant > Respondent Discussant = Respondent  Discussant < Respondent 
Respondents’ age groups Friends & Acqu. Family & Rel. Friends & Acqu. Family & Rel. Friends & Acqu. Family & Rel. 
18-24 6,8 10,9 12,1 2,6 ------- ------- 
25-34 15,3 24,9 21,8 8,8 3,9 3,9 
35-44 8,3 14,3 16,9 8,6 7,3 11,2 
45-54 5,7 6,8 9,8 6,8 11,8 17,3 
55-64 4,7 2,3 5,9 3,3 12,7 13,9 
65 and above ------- ------- 1,8 1,7 6,9 11,2 
Total % within groups 40,8 59,2 68,2 31,8 42,6 57,4 
Total % across groups 21,4 49,8 28,8 
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 Table 6.15 shows that the respondents are more likely to name discussants with 
identical age groups (49,8%) rather than naming either older (21,4%) or younger 
(28,8%) discussants. Also, within the identical age group, the percentage of friends and 
acquaintances (68,2%) well surpasses the percentage of the family and relatives 
(31,8%). A reverse situation is in order for both the younger and the older discussants 
than the respondents. For these groups, the percentages of the family and relatives are 
found to be higher than the percentages of friends and acquaintances.  
 A similar analysis can also be conducted for education levels. Figure 6.6 below 
depicts the distribution of the education levels of both the respondents and the 
discussants. According to this figure, the frequency of primary school graduates is the 
highest for both the respondents and the discussants. This is followed by high school 
graduates. 
Figure 6.6 Distribution of education levels of the respondents and the discussants 
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Table 6.16 The extent of similarity of education levels between the respondent and the discussants according to role labels  
   Discussant > Respondent  Discussant = Respondent Discussant < Respondent 
Respondents' education 
level 
Friends & 
Acqu. 
Family & 
Rel. 
Friends & 
Acqu. 
Family & 
Rel. 
Friends & 
Acqu. 
Family & 
Rel. 
Not literate 4,1 6,9 0,8 0,6 ------- ------- 
Literate 2,2 4,1 0,2 0,4 0,9 0,9 
Primary school 22,9 26,8 23,4 24 3,9 7,1 
Secondary school 10 11 3,5 2 8,6 12,8 
High school 8,2 3,7 18,2 7,9 16,6 20,8 
University or above ------- ------- 16,6 2,4 12,8 15,7 
Total % within groups 47,4 52,6 62,7 37,3 42,7 57,3 
Total % across groups 26 55 19 
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Similar to the descriptive analysis of the age groups, the respondents name 
discussants with identical education levels for more than fifty percent of all discussants 
(55%). Once again the friendship and acquaintanceship relations are more frequent 
within this group (62,7%) than the family and relatives‟ relations (37,3%). This group 
also reveals the tendency to name an identical education level in cases when the 
respondent is either a high school or university graduate; hence he/she is well-educated. 
The least populated among the three groups is the one that shows the discussants 
with lower education levels than the respondent (19%). This part of Table 6.16 shows 
that as the respondent‟s education level increases, the tendency to name a discussant 
with a lower education level also increases. Moreover, the indicated discussant is more 
likely to be either a family member or a relative, since this group is dominated by 
relations with the family or relatives (57,3%). 
The group, which shows better-educated discussants than the respondent, makes 
up 26% of all respondent-discussant education relationships. The percentage difference 
between different role labels is the smallest for this group. As the respondent‟s 
education level decreases, he/she tends to name discussants with better education levels. 
This is especially pronounced for the respondents who are: not literate; literate; and 
secondary school graduates.     
 Substantial variability emerged from the analyses of the relationship between the 
respondents and the discussants‟ age groups and education levels. As noted before, the 
extent of this variability is expected to influence generalized trust.  
In order to test this expectation, two network diversity variables are generated. 
The first one is the heterogeneity of age variable and the second, the heterogeneity of 
education variable. The same formula was used to compute both variables:  
Age/education heterogeneity   = [ Σj (xij-M)
2
 ] / N  where M is the mean age/education  
                                                                                 group including the respondent 
                                                                                 N is the network size plus the  
                                                                                 respondent    (Eq. 6.3)                                                              
The first part of the above formula reveals the extent of the differences in 
age/education groups from the mean age/education group. It also includes the 
respondent‟s age/education in this calculation, because the aim is to account for the 
extent of age/education variance among the respondents and the indicated discussants. 
The second part of the formula rests on standardization for the network size, which is 
obtained by adding the respondent to the network size of the discussants. Both age 
heterogeneity and education heterogeneity are continuous variables. The values of age 
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heterogeneity range  between 0 and 6,25 and the values of the education heterogeneity 
range  between 0 and 5,5 (See Table A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A). 
As mentioned before, INFORMALITY posed two categories of network 
questions. Thus far, the data obtained from the name generator/interpreter questions 
have been examined. Another category concerned the extensity of the respondents‟ 
close friends networks. The respondents were asked to name the approximate number of 
close friends from the workplace or the school, from the neighborhood and from other 
places. The extensity of network size is expected to influence generalized trust 
positively. As a result, the last network measure is the extensity of the close friends‟ 
network and it is computed through the simple summation of respondents‟ friends from 
the workplace/school, neighborhood and other places. The value of this variable 
changes between 0 and 210. Although 210 seems quite an exaggerated figure for the 
numbers of close friends, the survey did not have any opportunity to verify this. 
However, the frequency of likely inflated figures is also low. 95% of this variable lies 
between 0 and 30. 
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6.2. Other Variables of Interest 
 
 
 
Besides the network variables which were derived from the tie level data, the 
present analysis also mentioned the bridging structures that may prove significant for 
generalized trust. These structures were the school, the workplace, and the civil society 
where the potential for alternative ties other than kinship relations was high. 
INFORMALITY did not account for the civil society relations, but it asked about 
individuals‟ working status and education levels. This information is used to 
operationalize the bridging structures. 
 The working status variable is a binary variable which takes the value of “1” in 
case the respondent has a permanent or a part-time job or self-employed. This variable 
is labeled as employment. The education variable is also a binary variable and it is 
coded as “1” for university graduates. This variable is labeled as university. 
 Another variable of interest is subjective happiness, which is found to be a 
significant individual level variable for generalized trust. In INFORMALITY, this 
variable was measured along the 1-10 scale, where “1” stood for “not happy at all” and 
“10” stood for “very happy”. It is included in the analysis because happier people are, 
on the whole, found to be optimistic towards life in general, and other people in 
particular. The latter, in turn, is likely to positively influence individuals‟ regard of the 
fellow men. Since our interest focuses on Turkey, the place of residence also emerges 
as a significant variable. As noted, INFORMALITY counted on a representative urban 
population in Turkey. Despite the survey‟s representativeness, however, in some of the 
cities, only a few respondents were surveyed due to lower population density in 
comparison with the bigger cities included in the survey. Table 6.17 on the following 
page shows the distribution of the respondents across Turkey‟s cities.
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Table 6.17 Cities in INFORMALITY 
City  Frequency Percent 
Istanbul 428 42,7 
Ankara 163 16,3 
İzmir  132 13,2 
Bursa  78 7,8 
Konya 46 4,6 
Mersin  40 4,0 
Gaziantep 32 3,2 
Kocaeli  28 2,8 
Denizli 20 2,0 
Malatya 17 1,7 
Adıyaman 9 0,9 
Trabzon 9 0,9 
Total 1002 100,0 
 
 The three biggest cities in the sample are included in the multivariate analysis as 
the dummy variables. In this way, the influence of living in bigger and more populated 
cities in Turkey on generalized trust will be computed.  
 The respondent‟s sex, age, and the household size are included in the analysis as 
the usual demographic background variables. Table 6.18 below presents the descriptive 
statistics of all variables, which will be utilized in the multivariate analyses.  Table 6.19 
on pages 139-140 presents the correlation analysis between these variables. The bold 
figures in this table indicate statistical significance at the five percent threshold or 
lower.  
Table 6.18 Summary statistics of INFORMALITY independent variables 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Network size 1002 1,8 1,1 0 3 
Network density 1002 2,2 1,3 0 4 
Worldview heterogeneity 1002 3,3 3,3 0 16 
Age heterogeneity 997 0,4 0,8 0 6,3 
Education heterogeneity 993 0,4 0,6 0 5,6 
Extensity of close friends 1002 9,3 16,6 0 210 
Employed 1002 0,4 0,5 0 1 
University 993 0,1 0,3 0 1 
Subjective happiness 1000 6,1 2,5 1 10 
Sex (man=1) 1002 0,5 0,5 0 1 
Age  997 42,2 14,9 18 87 
Household size 1002 3,7 1,6 1 14 
ISTANBUL 1002 0,4 0,5 0 1 
ANKARA 1002 0,2 0,4 0 1 
IZMIR 1002 0,1 0,3 0 1 
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Table 6.19 Correlation table of INFORMALITY variables 
  
Generalized 
trust 
Network 
size 
Network 
density 
Worldview 
heterogeneity 
Education 
heterogeneity 
Age 
heterogeneity 
Extent of 
close 
friends 
Generalized trust 1,00             
Network size 0,02 1,00           
Network density 0,02 0,50 1,00         
Worldview heterogeneity -0,03 0,37 0,32 1,00       
Education heterogeneity -0,03 0,26 0,32 0,16 1,00     
Age heterogeneity 0,04 0,27 0,45 0,20 0,36 1,00   
Extent of close friends 0,04 0,18 0,03 0,06 0,06 0,00 1,00 
 
Table 6.19 continued… 
  
Generalized 
trust 
Network 
size 
Network 
density 
Worldview 
heterogeneity 
Education 
heterogeneity 
Age 
heterogeneity 
Extent of 
close 
friends 
Employed 0,01 0,08 -0,04 0,07 -0,09 -0,17 0,11 
University 0,09 0,12 -0,02 0,02 -0,02 -0,04 0,08 
Subjective happiness 0,07 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,06 0,07 
Sex 0,00 0,04 -0,08 0,06 -0,08 -0,13 0,15 
Age 0,02 -0,08 0,03 -0,07 0,07 0,14 -0,01 
Household size 0,00 0,01 -0,05 -0,03 0,01 -0,08 0,03 
Istanbul -0,06 0,14 -0,01 -0,03 0,01 0,01 0,04 
Ankara -0,06 -0,05 -0,09 -0,06 -0,04 -0,06 -0,10 
Izmir -0,04 0,15 0,19 0,18 0,09 0,18 0,01 
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Table 6.19 continued…. 
  Employed University 
Subjective 
happiness Sex Age 
Household    
size Istanbul  Ankara  Izmir 
Employed 1,00                
University 0,20 1,00               
Subjective happiness 0,00 0,09 1,00             
Sex 0,49 0,15 0,03 1,00           
Age -0,33 -0,06 -0,03 0,04 1,00         
Household size 0,05 -0,19 -0,09 0,00 -0,24 1,00       
Istanbul 0,05 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,05 0,11 1,00     
Ankara -0,01 0,15 0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,10 -0,38 1,00   
Izmir -0,05 0,05 -0,10 0,00 0,08 -0,09 -0,34 -0,17 1,00 
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6.3. The Multivariate Analyses 
 
 
 
 Logistic regression is better suited to dependent variables with binary outcomes, 
and in INFORMALITY, generalized trust is investigated as a binary variable with rare 
event outcome. In other words, the number of respondents who said they would rather 
be careful in dealing with people - hence, who were coded as “0” on generalized trust - 
well surpassed the number of trusting respondents. King and his collaborators suggested 
the employment of the rare events logistic regression for cases when one value of a 
binary variable dominates the other.
320
 In line with this suggestion, this method is used 
to test the hypotheses which were introduced in Table 6.1 of this chapter. 
Table 6.20 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses: Model I 
  Model I 
  
Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| 
Network variables   
Network size 0,17 0,15 0,25 
Closeness density 0,07 0,14 0,60 
Extent of close friends 0,01 0,01 0,41 
Worldview heterogeneity -0,05 0,05 0,32 
Age heterogeneity 0,21 0,15 0,05 
Education heterogeneity -0,38 0,25 0,12 
Bridging structures   
Employed 0,15 0,33 0,65 
University 1,09 0,36 0,00 
Individual level features   
Subjective happiness 0,10 0,06 0,07 
Control variables   
Sex (Man=1) -0,22 0,33 0,51 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,32 
Household size 0,10 0,08 0,24 
Istanbul -1,10 0,30 0,00 
Ankara -1,55 0,43 0,00 
Izmir -1,25 0,47 0,01 
Constant -3,69 0,82 0,00 
Number of observations 987 
                                                          
320
 Micheal Tomz, Gary King and Langche Zeng, RELOGIT: Rare Events Logistic 
Regression, Version 1.1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999) 
http://gking.harvard.edu/. Also Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Logistic Regression in 
Rare Events Data,” Political Analysis 9 (Spring, 2001): 137-163.  
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According to Table 6.20, neither the network size nor the network density 
measures are significant determinants of generalized trust. Also, although the network 
density was hypothesized to influence generalized trust negatively, it seems to exert 
positive influence in the Turkish context.  
 The interesting finding of Table 6.20 relates to the network diversity variables. 
Both worldview heterogeneity and education heterogeneity are found to be 
insignificant; however, age heterogeneity surfaced as a positive and significant 
determinant of generalized trust. Initially, the experience with people of different views, 
education and age groups was hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively. 
Yet Model I displays variable influence of the network diversity measures. Especially 
curious among the findings is the positive influence of age heterogeneity on the one 
hand, and the negative influence of education heterogeneity on the other. How can we 
explain these two findings? 
Closer examination of Table 6.15, regarding the distribution of the discussants‟ 
age groups with respect to the respondents‟ age groups and role labels, shows that 
respondents whose ages varied between 25 and 34 tended to name discussants with 
older ages. Also, respondents between 45 and 64 were more likely to name younger 
discussants. The percentage of discussants younger than the respondent (28,8%) was 
also found greater than the percentage of the older discussants (21,4%). Hence age 
heterogeneity at the network level is likely to reflect relations of seniority and 
hierarchical respect. These features are likely to ease tensions which may arise due to 
disagreements. Hence deliberations within such networks would not only be 
informative about different opinions due to different life experiences, but possible 
conflict and ensuing cognitive dissonance would also be smoothed out with the familiar 
code of behavior in the hierarchical relationship between the younger and the older 
individuals. 
While the societal morals about role relationship across generations are likely to 
moderate the tension exerted on the respondent due to exposure to different ideas and 
opinions, different education levels seem to aggravate similar tensions. Table 6.16 
shows that those respondents who were secondary school graduates or less educated 
tended to name discussants who were better educated. The education heterogeneity 
variable was also populated with the respondents who were either high school or 
university graduates and who named discussants with lower education levels. Although 
the percentage of the former group among all discussants (22,9%) is higher than the 
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latter group (12,4%), the education heterogeneity variable accounts for both groups of 
relationships. Divergence of education groups at the network level in Turkey does not 
seem to ease possible differences in opinions towards a general understanding about the 
human condition at large; on the contrary, such diversity tends to underscore the 
differences between people. An explanation for the possible impermeability of opinions 
within educationally heterogeneous networks may be the unbridgeable differences in 
people‟ life styles due to educational differences, which are also reflected in the way 
people relate to each other at the societal level. 
 In their study on economic inequality, Duygan and Güner, for instance, pointed 
to education as a significant determinant of income differentials as well as income 
inequality. According to 2002 data, seventy percent of the household heads - in other 
words  the man - at the bottom of the per capita income distribution had at most a 
primary school education, whereas, this percentage rose to ninety-five percent for the 
mothers - or the women. These poor households were also the more crowded ones; 
hence both education and income disadvantages are found likely to persist over 
generations.
321
 This study is significant because it shows the link between education and 
social status. Educational differentials have implications not only for the well-being of 
the current generations, but also for the future generations. The present analysis brought 
forth education as an important fault line for discussion networks in Turkey. However, 
the influence of this variable on generalized trust is found insignificant. 
 Contrary to education heterogeneity, university education proved a positive and 
highly significant determinant of generalized trust. The present study accepted 
education as one of the bridging structures, and high education was hypothesized to 
influence generalized trust positively. Table 6.20 shows that university education in 
Turkey makes people more likely to extend trust to the fellow man.  
University education is expected to socialize people into environments different 
from the ones with which they are familiar. In other words, bridging ties would become 
more available with higher education. These ties, in turn, are likely to make people 
more aware of the others, reason more about variable human conditions, and deliberate 
more with different others. In this sense, the positive and significant influence of a 
university education is not unexpected. However, Model I also says that even university 
                                                          
321 Burcu Duygan and Nezih Güner, “Income and Consumption Inequality in Turkey,” 
in The Turkish Economy, eds. Sumru Altuğ and Alpay Filiztekin (London and New 
York, Routledge, 2006), 70-86. 
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graduates are vulnerable to educational differences at the network level. Those two 
findings together underscore education as a significant fault line in Turkish society. 
Education may provide us a viable structure to forge bridging relationships, yet, in 
cases when education remains a scarce resource, the bridges within this structure may 
turn into strategic strongholds which buttress the existing power asymmetries. This 
seems to be the case for Turkey and this situation becomes all the clearer when the 
analysis focuses on all education levels. 
Table 6.21 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses: Model II 
  Model II 
  
Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| 
Network variables   
Network size 0,18 0,15 0,22 
Closeness density 0,07 0,14 0,62 
Extent of close friends 0,01 0,01 0,37 
Worldview heterogeneity -0,05 0,05 0,32 
Age heterogeneity 0,32 0,15 0,04 
Education heterogeneity -0,43 0,24 0,08 
Bridging structures   
Employed 0,13 0,22 0,70 
Primary school -0,89 0,48 0,06 
Secondary school -1,02 0,60 0,09 
High school -0,72 0,53 0,18 
University 0,26 0,60 0,66 
Individual level features   
Subjective happiness 0,11 0,05 0,06 
Control variables   
Sex (Man=1) -0,17 0,33 0,60 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,49 
Household size 0,10 0,08 0,23 
Istanbul -1,13 0,30 0,00 
Ankara -1,58 0,43 0,00 
Izmir -1,24 0,47 0,01 
Constant -2,81 0,98 0,00 
Number of observations 987 
 
In Model II of Table 6.21, the base education category is respondents with less 
than primary school education. The analysis shows that the influence of education is not 
progressive; in fact, those primary, secondary and high school graduates, who are better 
educated than the base category, proved to be less trusting. Only the university 
graduates appeared as more trusting than the least educated, yet the difference between 
the two groups is not significant, either.  
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The comparison of Model I and Model II further shows that university attendance 
is significantly different for trust relationships in comparison with all other education 
levels. Hence, at least for the Turkish case, only university education makes a 
significant difference in people‟s tendency to trust others. The implication of this 
finding is that those bridging structures which are designated as beneficial for 
generalized trust, are also likely to bring about power asymmetries as well as to sustain 
the existing ones. Hence their influence is likely to interact with the given social and 
political context.  
The contextual features also come to the fore once the analysis focuses on the 
influence of city differences. Model I and Model II show that living in Istanbul, Ankara, 
and Izmir in comparison to other smaller cities in Turkey influences generalized trust 
negatively. Living in a big city would expose one to more diverse people; however, the 
risks and vulnerabilities associated with bigger cities would also be higher. Hence, it 
seems that the socio-political context in which the diverse relationships take place is 
also important in order to comment on trust relations. When people rate the potential 
risks associated with these relations higher than potential opportunities, they may well 
refrain from trust behavior. This is the case for the people who are primary, secondary 
or high school graduates, as well as for those living in the three big cities in Turkey. 
These findings show that generalized trust has to do with individuals‟ experiences, yet 
the influence of both network relations and bridging structures are not uniform, and are, 
in addition, much more complicated than is hypothesized by the social capital literature.  
What about those variables which are found insignificant in the analyses? Is it 
likely that the age and the education heterogeneity are highly related to the age and the 
education variables respectively, hence distorting the findings? What about the sex 
variable? In their analysis of the application of the name generator/interpreter items in 
mass surveys in Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Cenker showed that women were more likely 
than men to name no discussants; they were also more likely to designate a family 
member or a relative as the discussant than a friend or an acquaintance.
322
 Is it likely 
that the network size and network density variables capture the influence of sex, since 
men‟s networks are likely to be more extensive and women‟s networks denser?  
In order to answer these questions, a series of separate analyses were conducted. 
Table 6.22 on page 147 presents Model III and Model IV, which show the analyses 
                                                          
322 Çarkoğlu and Cenker, “Learning from name generator/interpreters in mass surveys: 
findings from Turkey,” 170. 
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without the network variables. The first of these models contrasts university education 
with all education groups. Model IV, in turn, contrasts different education levels with 
those who had lower than primary school education. 
Alternatively, Table 6.23 on page 148 presents the analyses without the inclusion 
of age and education heterogeneity variables. This table also reports two models, which 
counts on different education groups. 
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Table 6.22 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses without network variables: Model III & 
IV 
  Model III Model IV 
  
Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| 
Bridging structures     
Employed 0,14 0,34 0,67 0,15 0,34 0,65 
Primary school -0,72 0,48 0,13       
Secondary school -0,86 0,62 0,16       
High school -0,51 0,54 0,35       
University 0,50 0,59 0,40 1,14 0,35 0,00 
Individual level features     
Subjective happiness 0,10 0,05 0,06 0,10 0,05 0,08 
Control variables     
Sex (Man=1) -0,23 0,32 0,47 -0,27 0,31 0,38 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,30 0,01 0,01 0,20 
Household size 0,09 0,08 0,27 0,08 0,08 0,30 
Istanbul -1,00 0,28 0,00 -0,98 0,28 0,00 
Ankara -1,51 0,43 0,00 -1,50 0,44 0,00 
Izmir -1,09 0,45 0,01 -1,10 0,45 0,01 
Constant -2,75 0,91 0,00 -3,42 0,75 0,00 
Number of observations 987 987 
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Table 6.23 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses without age and education 
heterogeneity: Model V & VI 
  Model V Model VI 
  
Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P> |z| 
Network variables     
Network size 0,15 0,14 0,28 0,14 0,14 0,32 
Closeness density 0,11 0,12 0,37 0,12 0,12 0,34 
Extent of close friends 0,00 0,01 0,51 0,00 0,01 0,52 
Worldview heterogeneity -0,05 0,05 0,31 -0,05 0,05 0,32 
Bridging structures     
Employed 0,12 0,34 0,71 0,14 0,34 0,68 
Primary school -0,73 0,47 0,13       
Secondary school -0,88 0,61 0,15       
High school -0,51 0,53 0,33       
University 0,43 0,58 0,46 1,08 0,36 0,00 
Individual level features     
Subjective happiness 0,10 0,05 0,06 0,10 0,06 0,07 
Control variables     
Sex (Man=1) -0,20 0,33 0,54 -0,24 0,33 0,46 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,34 0,01 0,01 0,23 
Household size 0,08 0,08 0,31 0,08 0,08 0,33 
Istanbul -1,09 0,29 0,00 -1,07 0,29 0,00 
Ankara -1,55 0,43 0,00 -1,54 0,43 0,00 
Izmir -1,18 0,46 0,01 -1,19 0,46 0,01 
Constant -3,05 0,98 0,00 -3,74 0,81 0,00 
Number of observations 987 987 
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Table 6.22 and Table 6.23 show that the network variables do not capture the 
independent influence of the sex, age and education levels variables. The analyses thus 
far revealed that both the women and the older people are more likely to trust unknown 
others. However neither influence is significant both with and without the network 
variables. Also, only the comparison of the university graduates with all other education 
levels shows a significant and positive influence on generalized trust. 
 What about the influence of the alternative measures to age and education 
heterogeneity? The analysis showed the positive influence of age differences on 
generalized trust. This result was related to the individual‟s familiarity with different 
life experiences as a result of age differences. Is it likely that this influence is more 
related to age heterogeneity among the discussants only? Or, is it possible that 
generalized trust becomes more likely with the increase in discussants‟ ages?  
What about the differences in education levels? It is argued that these differences 
result in increased suspicion towards the unknown others. Is it likely that we observe a 
similar result for education heterogeneity only among the discussants? Or, can this 
suspicion be more related the better-educated discussants than the respondent? In order 
to test these alternative hypotheses, a series of analyses were run. Table 6.24 on the next 
page shows the results of these analyses. Accordingly neither the discussants‟ age and 
education heterogeneity nor the extent of the older and the better-educated discussants 
explained generalized trust. Hence, only the age heterogeneity measure, which includes 
the respondent‟s age as well, emerged as a positive and significant determinant of 
generalized trust. Though insignificant, the negative influence of worldview and 
education heterogeneity further showed the unease regarding the influence of 
discussants‟ diverse features on generalized trust.  
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Table 6.24 INFORMALITY Multivariate analyses with alternative measures to age 
and education heterogeneity: Models VII, VIII, IX 
  Model VII Model VIII 
  Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P> |z| Coeff. 
Robust 
Std. Err. P> |z| 
Network variables     
Network size 0,16 0,15 0,30 0,19 0,15 0,21 
Closeness density 0,09 0,13 0,48 0,12 0,12 0,33 
Extent of close friends 0,00 0,01 0,47 0,00 0,01 0,48 
Worldview het. -0,05 0,05 0,31 -0,05 0,05 0,30 
Discussants' age het. 0,26 0,17 0,13       
Discussants' education het. -0,25 0,25 0,31       
The extent of older discussants       -0,18 0,11 0,11 
The extent of better edu. diss.       0,09 0,10 0,39 
Bridging structures     
Employed 0,15 0,33 0,66 0,16 0,33 0,63 
University 1,00 0,38 0,01 0,93 0,36 0,01 
Individual level features     
Subjective happiness 0,10 0,06 0,07 0,11 0,06 0,06 
Control variables     
Sex (Man=1) -0,24 0,32 0,44 -0,26 0,32 0,42 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,17 0,02 0,01 0,12 
Household size 0,09 0,08 0,30 0,07 0,08 0,37 
Istanbul -1,11 0,30 0,00 -1,09 0,29 0,00 
Ankara -1,58 0,43 0,00 -1,57 0,43 0,00 
Izmir -1,23 0,45 0,01 -1,24 0,83 0,00 
Constant -3,71 0,84 0,00 -3,89 0,83 0,00 
Number of observations 987 987 
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The analyses thus far point to the relevance of the discussion networks for 
generalized trust. Despite the small numbers of discussants INFORMALITY was able 
to question, a wealth of information became available as to the types and nature of 
people‟s relationships at the community level. The positive influence of age 
heterogeneity and the negative influences of both worldview and education 
heterogeneity on trust emerged as a research puzzle. The positive influence of a 
university education further showed that the proposed straightforward relationship 
between the network diversity measures and bridging structures on the one hand, and 
generalized trust on the other, is neither straight nor forward! 
 What about the tie-level relationships? Descriptive analyses on discussion 
networks already revealed quite close relationships irrespective of the role labels of the 
discussants. Yet, some differences were also in order between the relationships with the 
family and relatives on the one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. 
Despite these differences, the analyses thus far focused on the network level variables 
which are concerned with both the kinship and non-kinship ties. Is it likely that these 
different types of ties exert different influence on generalized trust? 
In order to answer this question, the discussion networks are partitioned into 
different types of ties. These ties are the family and relatives on the one hand, and 
friends and acquaintances on the other. Every network variable was re-generated for 
these different types of ties. Table 6.25 below provides the descriptive statistics of the 
variables, which are generated with the separate kinship and the non-kinship ties of the 
discussion networks. The following Table 6.26 on the next two pages presents the 
correlations between all variables of interest. 
Table 6.25 INFORMALITY summary statistics for kinship and non-kinship 
ties  
  Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Size: kinship ties 1002 0,82 1,04 0 3 
Size: non-kinship ties 1002 0,99 1,14 0 3 
Density: kinship ties 1002 1,48 1,82 0 4 
Density: non-kinship ties 1002 0,80 0,93 0 2 
Age heterogeneity: kinship ties 997 0,37 0,78 0 6,25 
Age heterogeneity: non-kinship ties 997 0,11 0,31 0 4 
Education heterogeneity: kinship ties 993 0,26 0,58 0 5,56 
Education heterogeneity: non-kinship ties 993 0,16 0,41 0 4,25 
Worldview heterogeneity: kinship ties 1002 1,84 3,11 0 16 
Worldview heterogeneity: non-kinship ties 1002 2,07 3,08 0 16 
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Table 6.26 INFORMALITY correlation analysis of kinship, non-kinship and other variables 
  
Size: 
kinship 
Size: 
non-
kinship 
Density: 
kinship 
Density: 
non-
kinship 
Extent 
of close 
friends 
W.view: 
kinship 
W.view: 
non-
kinship 
Age 
het.: 
kinship 
Age 
het.: 
non-
kinship 
Edu. 
het.: 
kinship 
Edu.het.
: non-
kinship 
Size: kinship 1,00                     
Size: non-kinship -0,47 1,00                   
Density: kinship 0,79 -0,52 1,00                 
Density: non-kinship -0,53 0,81 -0,65 1,00               
Extent of close friends 0,04 0,14 -0,01 0,07 1,00             
Worldview heterogeneity: 
kinship 0,55 -0,26 0,55 -0,35 0,03 1,00           
Worldview heterogeneity: 
non-kinship -0,26 0,54 -0,30 0,51 0,08 0,05 1,00         
Age heterogeneity: kinship 0,55 -0,29 0,50 -0,32 -0,03 0,38 -0,14 1,00       
Age heterogeneity: non-
kinship -0,14 0,31 -0,15 0,26 0,07 0,04 0,31 -0,07 1,00     
Edu. heterogeneity: kinship 0,47 -0,25 0,43 -0,27 0,01 0,31 -0,14 0,46 -0,05 1,00   
Edu. heterogeneity: non-
kinship -0,19 0,36 -0,19 0,31 0,09 -0,10 0,29 -0,12 0,41 -0,09 1,00 
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Table 6.26 continued… 
  
Size: 
kinship 
Size: 
non-
kinship 
Density: 
kinship 
Density: 
non-
kinship 
Extent 
of close 
friends 
W.view: 
kinship 
W.view: 
non-
kinship 
Age 
het.: 
kinship 
Age het.: 
non-
kinship 
Edu. 
het.: 
kinship 
Edu.het.: 
non-
kinship 
Employed -0,14 0,21 -0,11 0,18 0,11 -0,08 0,18 -0,16 -0,04 -0,12 0,01 
University -0,09 0,19 -0,13 0,19 0,08 -0,04 0,08 -0,05 0,02 -0,02 -0,01 
Subjective happiness -0,05 0,03 -0,04 0,02 0,07 -0,04 0,02 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 
Sex -0,12 0,14 -0,09 0,08 0,15 -0,06 0,13 -0,12 -0,04 -0,08 -0,03 
Age 0,04 -0,12 0,10 -0,15 -0,01 0,01 -0,14 0,09 0,12 0,08 -0,02 
Household size 0,03 -0,02 0,01 -0,05 0,03 0,00 0,00 -0,07 -0,02 -0,02 0,05 
Istanbul 0,09 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,04 0,02 -0,02 0,02 0,01 0,04 -0,01 
Ankara -0,15 0,09 -0,14 0,12 -0,10 -0,13 0,02 -0,08 0,02 -0,08 0,03 
Izmir 0,22 -0,05 0,18 -0,08 0,01 0,22 0,06 0,18 -0,01 0,11 -0,02 
 
 
Table 6.26 continued… 
  
Employed University 
Sub. 
Happiness 
Sex Age 
Household 
size 
Istanbul Ankara Izmir 
Employed 1,00                 
University 0,20 1,00               
Subjective happiness 0,00 0,09 1,00             
Sex 0,49 0,15 0,03 1,00           
Age -0,33 -0,06 -0,03 0,04 1,00         
Household size 0,05 -0,19 -0,09 0,00 -0,24 1,00       
Istanbul 0,05 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,05 0,11 1,00     
Ankara -0,01 0,15 0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,10 -0,38 1,00   
Izmir -0,05 0,05 -0,10 0,00 0,08 -0,09 -0,34 -0,17 1,00 
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The above-mentioned variables are regressed over the generalized trust variable 
and this analysis revealed differences between relations with family and relatives on the 
one hand, and friends and acquaintances on the other. Table 6.27 on the next page 
presents this analysis. According to this table, age differences have a significant 
influence on trust only for the non-kinship ties. It should be remembered that the 
majority of the respondents in Turkey named friends and acquaintances discussants 
with identical age groups (38,5%). The percentage of respondents who named younger 
friends and acquaintances as discussants was 15,2 percent and the percentage who 
named older friends and acquaintances as discussants was 11,5. Both of these latter 
groups seem to make significant influence on people‟s tendency to trust.  
The primacy of the non-kinship relationships comes to the fore with the 
significant influence of the network size variable on non-kinship ties as well. In the 
prior analysis, the extent of discussion networks was found to be unrelated to 
generalized trust, yet Table 6.27 shows a positive and significant influence of network 
size for friends and acquaintances.  
In Turkey, age heterogeneity among friends and acquaintances is found to be a 
positive determinant of generalized trust. This may be related to culture in Turkey, 
which puts emphasis on seniority and hierarchical relations. Hence, different life 
experiences are likely to influence generalizations made about the unknown others 
when they are contextualized within the older-younger age relationships.  
The situation is the contrary for both the worldview and the education 
heterogeneity variables. These variables influence generalized trust negatively for both 
the kinship and non-kinship ties. Although both types of variables are not significant, 
these findings are still important because they show us that the influence of relational 
ties on generalized trust varies according to diverse tie properties.  
The focus on diverse tie properties, in turn, provides clues about the lack of 
significant relationship between the extent of close friends and generalized trust. 
Initially, the extent of close friends‟ networks was hypothesized to influence 
generalized trust positively. However, even the smaller discussion networks in Turkey 
displayed substantial variability in terms of tie properties, which influenced generalized 
trust differently. Hence, more variability is likely for more extensive friends‟ networks. 
As a result, more detailed enquiries on close friends‟ networks besides their size are 
necessary to comment more decisively about the influence of the more extensive close 
friends‟ networks on generalized trust. 
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Table 6.27 INFORMALITY multivariate analysis for tie-based 
relationships 
  Model X 
  
Coefficients 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P>|z| 
Tie based relations   
Size: kinship ties -0,11 0,22 0,60 
Size: non-kinship ties 0,49 0,23 0,03 
Density: kinship ties 0,13 0,15 0,41 
Density: non-kinship ties -0,41 0,32 0,20 
Extent of close friends 0,01 0,01 0,32 
Worldview het.: kinship ties -0,01 0,06 0,93 
Worldview het.: non- kinship ties -0,02 0,05 0,66 
Age het.: kinship ties 0,26 0,15 0,08 
Age het. : non-kinship ties 0,73 0,34 0,03 
Edu. het.: kinship ties -0,09 0,26 0,73 
Edu. het.: non- kinship ties -0,76 0,40 0,06 
Bridging structures   
Employed 0,09 0,33 0,79 
Attended university 1,13 0,36 0,00 
Individual level features   
Subjective happiness 0,10 0,06 0,07 
Control variables   
Sex -0,27 0,33 0,41 
Age 0,01 0,01 0,44 
Household size 0,10 0,09 0,25 
Istanbul -1,11 0,31 0,00 
Ankara -1,58 0,44 0,00 
Izmir -1,24 0,47 0,01 
Constant -3,50 0,86 0,00 
Number of observations 987 
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What about the magnitude of the influence of these variables? Two scenarios are 
examined in order to discuss the weight of the influence of the given variables. The first 
scenario compares the influence of the family and friends networks for different values 
of age heterogeneity; the second shows the change in probabilities to trust across 
Turkey‟s cities.  
Table 6.28 on the next page shows the values for the first scenario. This scenario 
uses the coefficients obtained from Model X of Table 6.27 and it compares the 
influence of age heterogeneity separately for the kinship and non-kinship ties. Only the 
family ties are examined for the kinship relations, and only the friendship ties for the 
non-kinship relations. Also, the maximum number of ties for each group, which is three, 
is considered. The rest of the continuous variables were set to their mean values. As to 
the binary variables, the scenario displays predicted probabilities for the man who had 
less than university education, was employed and lived in smaller cities than Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir. The smaller cities are small in terms of their populations rather than 
geography.  
Figure 6.7 INFORMALITY Scenario 1 
Comparison of the probability to trust across different values 
of age heterogeneity for all family or all friends ties
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Table 6.28 INFORMALITY Scenario 1: Probability calculations across different 
values of age heterogeneity for all family or all friends networks 
  
Scenario 1a: Set values 
when the values of age 
heterogeneity for non-
kinship ties change 
  
Scenario 1b: Set values 
when the values of age 
heterogeneity for kinship 
ties change 
Variables                     
Size: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 
Size: non-kinship  3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Density: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 
Density: non-kinship  2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Extent of close friends 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 
Worldview het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 
Worldview het.: non-kinship 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 0 0 0 0 0 
Age het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Age het.: non-kinship  0 1 2 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Edu. Het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 
Edu.het.: non-kinship  0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0 0 0 0 0 
Employed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Subjective happiness 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 
Household size 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 
Istanbul 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ankara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Izmir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pr (Trust=1) 0,14 0,25 0,43 0,59 0,75 0,10 0,12 0,15 0,18 0,22 
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Figure 6.7 shows that when there are no age differences among the discussants, 
having only the friends‟ ties increases the likelihood to trust by only four percent. 
However, this difference rises to more than fifty percent for the maximum value of age 
heterogeneity.  
Differences across the values of age heterogeneity within each group are also 
striking. As age heterogeneity of the family ties increases from zero to four, the 
probability to trust increases by twelve percent. This percentage is much higher for the 
friends‟ ties and it amounts to nearly sixty percent. Hence, although the kinship and 
non-kinship relations are likely to exert different influence on generalized trust, age 
differences within the networks emerge as a more significant determinant.     
Another set of significant differences in probabilities to trust is observed across 
Turkey‟s cities. Figure 6.8, below, presents the second scenario. Table 6.29 on the next 
page presents the values for this scenario. These values rest on the maximum size of the 
friendship ties and it computes the probability to trust across different cities for the 
minimum and the maximum value of the age heterogeneity. As noted earlier, the 
smaller cities which are referred to in the figure, underscore size in terms of population 
rather than geography.  
Figure 6.8 INFORMALITY Scenario 2 
Differences in probability to trust across Turkey's cities for only 
friends' ties of three for the minimum and maximum age 
heterogeneity
0,14
0,05
0,74
0,47
0,05 0,03
0,48
0,40
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
0,80
Smaller cities Istanbul Ankara Izmir
Age het.=0
Age het.=4
 159 
 
 
Table 6.29 INFORMALITY Scenario 2: Probability calculations across 
Turkey's cities for the minimum and maximum age heterogeneity of the non-
kinship relations  
  
Scenario 2a: Set 
values when Turkey's 
cities change for age. 
het.=4 
  
Scenario 2b: Set values 
when Turkey's cities 
change for age. het.=0 
Variables                 
Size: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Size: non-kinship  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Density: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Density: non-kinship  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Extent of close friends 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 9,3 
Worldview het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Worldview het.: non-kinship  2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
Age het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age het.: non-kinship  4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 
Edu. Het.: kinship  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Edu.het.: non-kinship  0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
Employed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Attended university 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,1 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 42,2 
Household size 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,7 
Istanbul 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Ankara 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Izmir 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pr (Trust=1) 0,74 0,48 0,40 0,47 0,14 0,05 0,03 0,05 
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Figure 6.8 shows that living in smaller cities than the major metropolitan areas 
increases the likelihood to trust by nine percent when age heterogeneity is zero. Among 
the metropolitan cities, the differences in probabilities to trust change between one and 
two percent. However, the differences become pronounced when probabilities are 
calculated for the maximum value of age heterogeneity. The probability to trust 
increases to nearly seventy-five percent for people who live in smaller cities and it 
decreases by more than thirty percent for those who live in Istanbul or Izmir. The 
probability difference is even greater for those who reside in Ankara. 
 The analysis has thus far revealed non-kinship relations and the age 
heterogeneity of those relations as significant determinants of generalized trust. Yet the 
negative influence exerted by education heterogeneity on the one hand, and the positive 
influence of university education in comparison to other education levels on the other, 
pointed to salient power asymmetries in Turkey as well. These asymmetries, in turn, are 
likely to interfere in the ways individuals connect to each other.  
In other words, diverse relationships seem to influence generalized trust, yet these 
relations do not take place in a vacuum, either. Socio-economic variables of education 
and age proved to be significant structures which influence the way individuals relate to 
each other; these relationships, in turn, exert different influence on generalized trust. 
Besides the relational ties, the socio-political context - the city of residence in this case - 
was also designated as a significant determinant of generalized trust as well. Hence it 
would not be wrong to suggest that the influence of the relational ties become more 
meaningful once they are contextualized within the given socio-economic and/or socio-
political milieu. 
Given these analyses, can we talk about the potential for bottom-up generation of 
generalized trust in Turkey? Data on core discussion networks do not point to isolated 
individuals. Non-kinship ties are quite abundant in Turkey and they are found as 
significant determinants for generalized trust. These types of ties have the potential to 
bring people from different walks of life together; hence they may act as the 
foundations for civic activism as well. 
However the analysis also showed the variable influence of network ties. The 
weaker non-kinship ties with age differentials proved positive and significant for 
generalized trust, whereas education exerted negative influence. Also, network density 
is found unrelated to trust. The variance about both the tie properties and their influence 
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on generalized trust shows that the social network influence on generalized trust is not 
unidirectional as it is often claimed by the social capital literature. 
Moreover, the socio-economic and the socio-political contexts in which 
individuals relate to each other seem important as well. The present data showed that 
the socio-economic differences both at the network and the individual levels influence 
generalized trust significantly.  
How far can we generalize findings for Turkey to other democracies? The next 
chapter will continue the enquiry regarding the influence of relational ties on 
generalized trust within a cross-country context. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES OF SOCIAL NETWORKS AND 
GENERALIZED TRUST 
 
 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the ISSP cross-country data of 2001 on social networks in 
order to discuss the extent to which the findings from Turkey are comparable with other 
countries. Turkey was not included in the ISSP 2001 study; hence the comparison with 
the Turkish case will not be endogenous to the analysis. However, the countries which 
were included in the ISSP data, provide a wide range of variability in terms of 
democratic institutionalization and socio-economic development. This variability, in 
turn, is expected to shed further light on the relationship between social networks and 
generalized trust, which is deemed important to better understand the Turkish case.  
Table 7.1, Table 7.2, and Table 7.3 on the following pages compare ISSP 
countries with Turkey across a range of variables. Egypt, Pakistan and Iran are also 
included in the comparison because, in general, Turkey is compared with these 
countries on the premise of sharing high percentages of Muslim populations. The 
objective of the comparisons is to discern the extent of comparability of the Turkish 
case with countries that were included in the ISSP data.   
Table 7.1 shows countries‟ membership of OECD, G-20 and the EU. Turkey is a 
founding member of OECD, a member of G-20, and a candidate country for the EU. 
According to the table, Turkey shares at least one membership in an organization with 
all countries, except the Philippines, Egypt, Pakistan and Iran.  
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Table 7.1 Membership in International/Regional 
Organizations
323
 
Country OECD G20 The EU 
Turkey X X   
Australia X X   
Austria X   X 
Brazil   X   
Canada X X   
Chile X     
Cyprus     X 
Czech Republic X   X 
Denmark X   X 
Egypt       
Finland X   X 
France X X X 
Germany X X X 
Great Britain X X X 
Hungary X   X 
Iran       
Israel X     
Italy X X X 
Japan X X X 
Latvia     X 
New Zealand X     
Norway X     
Pakistan       
Philippines       
Poland X   X 
Russia   X   
Slovenia X   X 
South Africa   X   
Spain X     
Switzerland X     
United States X X   
                                                          
323
 For OECD members see, 
http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, for G-20 
members see, http://www.g20.org/index.aspx, and for the EU members see 
http://europa.eu/ , accessed August 10, 2011. 
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Table 7.2 on page 166 compares countries across a range of economic 
indicators.
324
 According to this table, Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines are 
economically the worse off countries. Turkey shares the 10,000-15,000$ range 
income with countries like Iran, Brazil, South Africa and Chile. Although Turkey and 
Chile are the better off countries within this group, Turkey scores worse in terms of 
the ranking based on the human development indicator index along with South 
Africa. This index is a composite indicator that accounts for educational attainment 
and life expectancy besides the income per capita. Economic inequalities are the 
highest in Brazil and South Africa. Turkey is in the same league as Iran, the US, 
Israel in terms of the Gini index. 
Lastly, Table 7.3 presents the Freedom House political and civil liberties 
scores.
325
 Among all countries, Egypt and Iran emerge as the only “Not Free” 
countries. Russia, Pakistan and the Philippines are “Partly Free” along with Turkey. 
Freedom House designate Brazil, Latvia and South Africa as “Free”; although their 
scores indicate some problems regarding the extent of both the political and civil 
liberties in terms of comparison with the other “Free” countries. Indeed Turkey is 
closer to this group and the Philippines than it is to Russia and Pakistan. 
In sum, comparisons from Table 7.1 to Table 7.3 show that the ISSP countries 
are, in general, better institutionalized democracies and economies than Turkey. 
However Turkey is not completely out of the league of the ISSP countries either. 
Turkey shares overlapping membership of various international and regional 
organizations with many of these countries. Especially important among these 
countries, are the ones which recently became members of the EU, because Turkey is 
also an EU candidate country. In terms of economic indicators, Turkey compares 
closely with Brazil and South Africa. Their democratic indicators together with the 
                                                          
324 The shaded rows show the economically worse off countries. GNI ranking, 
income per capita, and Gini index data are taken from The World Bank, 2011 World 
Development Indicators, 10-12. GNI ranking and income per capita for Cyprus is 
derived from another World Bank source, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf  The 
World Bank data did not provide the Gini index for Cyprus and it is taken from the 
EUROstat:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language
=en&pcode=tessi190&plugin=1. Lastly, the Human Development Index ranking is 
taken from UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/, accessed August 3, 2011. 
 
325 The shaded rows show the “Not Free” countries. Data is from Freedom House 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, accessed August 3, 2011 
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Philippines are also similar to Turkey. Russia is a worse off case than Turkey in terms 
of its democracy. Lastly, among the Muslim countries, which are not included in the 
ISSP data, Iran emerges close to the Turkish case only in terms of the economic 
indicators.  
Given the relationship between generalized trust and democratic 
institutionalization, it makes sense to account for the social network underpinnings of 
generalized trust for a series of countries with democratically elected governments. 
ISSP data provides this opportunity, and includes a series of countries with which the 
comparison with the Turkish case seems relevant. 
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Table 7.2 Cross-country comparison of economic indicators 
Country 
Gross 
National 
Income Rank 
Gross 
National 
Income-PPP 
Per capita ($) 
Gini 
index  
Human 
Development 
Indicator 
Rank 
Turkey 17 13.500 39,7 83 
Australia 15 38.510 35,2 2 
Austria 25 38.410 29,1 25 
Brazil 8 10.160 53,9 73 
Canada 10 37.280 32,6 8 
Chile 48 13.420 22,6 45 
Cyprus 40 30.290 28,4 35 
Czech Republic 43 23.940 25,8 28 
Denmark 28 38.780 24,7 19 
Egypt 45 5.680 31,1 101 
Finland 33 35.280 26,9 16 
France 5 33.950 32,7 14 
Germany 4 36.850 28,3 10 
Great Britain 6 45.640 36,0 26 
Hungary 51 19.090 31,2 36 
Iran 26 11.470 38,3 70 
Israel 40 27.010 39,2 15 
Italy 7 31.870 36,0 23 
Japan 2 33.440 24,9 11 
Latvia 88 17.610 35,7 48 
New Zealand 53 27.790 36,2 3 
Norway 24 55.420 25,8 1 
Pakistan 46 2.680 32,7 125 
Philippines 47 3.540 44,0 97 
Poland 21 18.290 34,2 41 
Russia 12 18.330 42,3 65 
Slovenia 72 26.470 31,2 29 
South Africa 31 10.050 57,8 110 
Spain 9 31.490 34,7 20 
Switzerland 18 47.100 33,7 13 
United States 1 45.640 40,8 4 
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Table 7.3 Cross-country comparison of democratic 
indicators 
Country 
Political 
Liberties 
Civil 
Liberties Status 
Turkey 3 3 Partly Free 
Australia 1 1 Free 
Austria 1 1 Free 
Brazil 2 2 Free 
Canada 1 1 Free 
Chile 1 1 Free 
Cyprus 1 1 Free 
Czech Republic 1 1 Free 
Denmark 1 1 Free 
Egypt 6 5 Not Free 
Finland 1 1 Free 
France 1 1 Free 
Germany 1 1 Free 
Great Britain 1 1 Free 
Hungary 1 1 Free 
Iran 6 6 Not Free 
Israel 1 2 Free 
Italy 1 2 Free 
Japan 1 2 Free 
Latvia 2 2 Free 
New Zealand 1 1 Free 
Norway 1 1 Free 
Pakistan 4 5 Partly Free 
Philippines 3 3 Partly Free 
Poland 1 1 Free 
Russia 6 5 Partly Free 
Slovenia 1 1 Free 
South Africa 2 2 Free 
Spain 1 1 Free 
Switzerland 1 1 Free 
United States 1 1 Free 
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7.1. ISSP Survey on Social Networks 
 
ISSP conducts annual cross-national surveys. It was founded in 1983 by the joint 
efforts of the US, Great Britain, (then) West Germany and Australia. The survey theme 
focused on social networks both in 1986 and 2001, and the present analysis is 
concerned with the latter survey. By the time this survey was conducted, ISSP had 
thirty-eight member nations. The analysis accounts for countries rather than nations, 
hence the Northern Ireland sample is not included in the analysis. Moreover, East and 
West Germany are coded as the single country of Germany. Likewise, Israeli Jews and 
Arabs are coded as a single country of Israel. Subsequently, the present analysis counts 
on twenty-seven countries for its enquiry into the social network influence on 
generalized trust.
326
  
 ISSP surveys are funded and administered by participating countries; hence, 
variations are observed in survey methods. For instance, different survey methods such 
as face-to-face interviews, mail interviews or telephone interviews were used in 
different countries. In addition, some countries employed simple random sampling from 
the census data or the electoral rolls, whereas others went for multistage probability 
sampling. Variability is also observed in terms of post-survey weights. Table 7.4 on the 
next page shows the countries, their sample sizes as well as the sample methodologies. 
The ISSP codebook lacked country descriptions for Brazil, Israel and New Zealand. 
Since no weighting factors were used for these cases, their samples were assumed to be 
nationally representative. This assumption is based on similar cases which did not use 
any weights because they mostly relied on simple random sampling from the census 
data.
327
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
326 ISSP Codebook for 2001 Survey on Social Networks, 7. See http://www.issp.org/, 
accessed August, 7, 2011.   
 
327
 Ibid., 22-100. 
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Table 7.4 ISSP Countries, sample sizes, sampling and weight information  
  
Sample 
Size Percent Sample type Weight by  
Country         
Australia 
1352 3,79 
Simple random from the 
electoral roll 
No weight 
Austria 
1011 2,84 
Stratified multistage clustered 
random  
Sex, age, province of 
residence 
Brazil 
2000 5,61 
No information provided 
No information 
provided 
Canada 1114 3,12 Stratified random Provincial population 
Chile 
1504 4,22 
Probability multi-stage 
cluster 
Gender, age and 
urbanity 
Cyprus 1006 2,82 Stratified random No weight 
Czech 
Republic 
1200 3,37 Stratified random 
Region, sex, 
education, age, size of 
community 
Denmark 
1293 3,63 
Simple random sample from 
the Central Population 
Register 
No weight 
Finland 
1376 3,86 
Simple random sample from 
population register; implicit 
geographic stratification 
Gender, age, 
municipality, type of 
community 
France 1398 3,92 Random equal probability Post stratification  
Germany 
1369 3,84 
Two stage random sample 
Weight factor for East 
and West Germany 
Great 
Britain 
912 2,56 
Stratified random probability 
Address, household 
and the individual 
Hungary 
1524 4,27 Two stages random sample 
Sex, age, highest 
education level, type 
of place of residence 
Israel 
1207 3,39 
No information provided 
No information 
provided 
Italy 999 2,8 Representative of adults  Education level 
Japan 1276 3,58 Two stage stratified random No weight 
Latvia 1000 2,8 Multistage stratified random No weight 
New 
Zealand 
1146 3,21 
No information provided 
No information 
provided 
Norway 
1560 4,38 
Simple random sample from 
the Central Register of 
Persons 
No weight 
Philippines 
1200 3,37 
Multistage probability sample 
Population weight for 
area domains 
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 ISSP did not include any name generator/interpreter questions; rather, the survey 
posed detailed questions about relations with the family, the friends, and the relatives. 
ISSP survey also included questions on civil society involvement. As has been noted, 
different types of network questions posed in ISSP and INFORMALITY respectively, 
challenge the comparability of the two analyses. However, both surveys derive the 
network information from tie-level relationships. Moreover, in both analyses, the 
emphasis falls onto the enquiry into the influence of both the kinship and non-kinship 
relations on generalized trust. Hence, data availability in both surveys regarding the tie-
level relationships with family and friends, render them comparable.   
 The ISSP survey of 2001 focused nearly exclusively on social networks. This 
means that it had detailed questions about relations with the family members, relatives 
and friends. Similar to the previous chapter, these questions were used to gauge the 
influence of the network size, network density and the network diversity on generalized 
trust. Moreover, the influence of civil society involvement would also be accounted for. 
Hence, all revised hypotheses which were presented in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 are tested 
with the ISSP data. The next section, then, starts the analysis with the presentation of 
the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable as well as the social network 
variables of interest.  
 
 
Table 7.4 Continued... 
  
Sample 
Size Percent Sample type Weight by  
Country         
Russia 
2000 5,61 
Multistage 
stratification 
Regional population, 
gender, age, education level 
Slovenia 
1077 3,02 
Two stage stratified 
random 
region and type of 
settlement 
South 
Africa 
1563 7,19 
Stratification by 
province and 
population  
SAS Procedure Survey 
Select 
Spain 
1214 3,41 
Representative of 
adults Sex and age groups 
Switzerland 
980 2,75 
Stratified random  
Sex, age, size of household, 
employment status 
United 
States 
1149 3,22 
Multi-state area 
probability No weight  
Total 34651 100 -------- --------- 
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7.2. ISSP Generalized Trust and Social Network Variables 
 
 
 
The ISSP posed a three item question to account for trust in people.  
Table 7.5 ISSP trust module 
  
Agree 
strongly 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
There are a few people 
I can trust completely 
1 2 3 4 5 
Most of the time you 
can be sure that other 
people want the best 
for you 
1 2 3 4 5 
If you are not careful, 
other people will take 
advantage of you 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 The third statement comes close to the generalized trust question, which was 
asked for in INFORMALITY. In this survey, the response for lack of trust was related 
to the proposition that one should be careful in dealing with others. Likewise, the third 
statement above underscored a general suspicion towards the intentions of other people. 
The explicit reference given to the “other people” was also important because 
generalized trust concerns individuals‟ orientations towards the general others. Hence, 
those respondents who agreed with the statement “if you are not careful, other people 
will take advantage of you” were treated as respondents who lacked trust in the fellow 
man. The higher values of this variable, then, indicated more trust. Table 7.6 on the next 
page shows the percentage distribution of this variable. The following Table 7.7 
presents the chi-squared significance of demographic variables on generalized trust. 
Lastly, Table 7.8 displays the distribution of generalized trust levels across countries. 
For presentation purposes, in Table 7.8, the five-point scale of the generalized trust 
variable has been reduced to three values of Trust (percentage for Disagree strongly and 
Disagree), Neutral (percentage for neither agree nor disagree) and No Trust (Agree and 
Agree strongly) respectively. 
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Table 7.7 Chi-squared significance of 
demographic variables on generalized 
trust 
Generalized trust 
Sex 0,00 
Education 0,00 
Work status 0,00 
Age 0,00 
Countries 0,00 
 
Table 7.6 shows that nearly sixty percent of people agreed that people should be 
careful in dealing with others. Yet nearly sixteen percent disagreed with this statement, 
which indicates trust in the fellow men. Although this figure is more than double the 
percentage of people who trusted others in Turkey, it is still low in comparison with 
those who were skeptical about others‟ intentions. 
 Table 7.7 shows that values of sex, education, work status, age and country 
made significant differences in the decision to trust or not to trust. Yet the direction and 
magnitude of the influence of these demographic variables can only be discerned once 
the multivariate analysis is conducted. 
 Table 7.8 on the next page is interesting and it shows striking differences across 
countries in terms of generalized trust. More than forty percent indicated trust in the 
fellow man in Finland and Denmark. This corresponding figure is lower than five 
percent in Poland and Hungary and less than ten percent in Spain, South Africa, Chile, 
Slovenia, and Brazil. Given the noticeable discrepancy in trust levels, whether and to 
what extent the societal relationships influence generalized trust emerges as an 
interesting question. 
 
 
  
Table 7.6 ISSP Generalized trust question 
If you are not careful, other people will take 
advantage of you 
  Frequency Percentage 
Agree strongly 8702 25,49 
Agree 13343 39,08 
Neither agree nor disagree 6258 18,33 
Disagree 4522 13,25 
Disagree strongly 1316 3,85 
Total 34141 100 
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Table 7.8 ISSP row percentage distribution of 
generalized trust for individual countries 
  Generalized trust 
  Trust (3) Neutral (2) No trust (1) 
Finland 47,9 20,6 31,5 
Denmark 41,3 22,6 36,0 
Switzerland 38,9 19,1 42,0 
France 30,2 27,1 42,7 
Norway 26,9 36,0 37,1 
Australia 26,7 26,2 47,1 
Japan 24,9 30,2 44,9 
New Zealand 23,4 21,2 55,4 
Canada 21,3 20,2 58,5 
Israel 17,5 17,7 64,8 
Great Britain 17,3 18,3 64,5 
Cyprus 16,5 25,9 57,7 
Czech Republic 15,3 22,3 62,4 
Philippines 15,2 8,3 76,5 
Russia 15,1 26,2 58,8 
United States 13,7 15,9 70,1 
Latvia 12,5 23,7 63,9 
Italy 12,4 20,6 66,9 
Germany 11,6 15,8 72,7 
Austria 11,4 14,3 74,3 
Spain 9,4 15,1 75,5 
South Africa 6,6 8,4 85,1 
Chile 6,4 8,2 85,3 
Slovenia 6,2 16,0 77,8 
Brazil 5,3 6,8 87,9 
Poland 4,6 11,3 84,1 
Hungary 4,3 12,0 83,7 
 
 The analysis can now turn to the social network variables. ISSP posed detailed 
questions about respondents‟ ties to brothers/sisters and the sons/daughters, who were 
older than eighteen years old, hence, adults. Besides these, the relations with the mother 
and the father were examined. Table 7.9 presents these questions. 
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Table 7.9 ISSP questions about family ties 
1) We would like to begin with your brothers and sisters. How many adult brothers 
and/or sisters- we mean brothers or sisters who are aged 18 or older- do you have? (We 
mean brothers and sisters who are alive. Please include step-brothers and sisters, half-
brothers and -sisters, and adopted brothers and sisters) 
2) Of your adult brothers and sisters, with whom do you have the most contact? 
3) How often do you see or visit this brother or sister? 
Lives in the same household as I do 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
4) How often do you have any other contact with this brother and sister besides 
visiting, either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail? 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
5) Now some questions about your children who are aged 18 or older. How many 
children age 18 or older do you have? (We mean children who are still alive. Please 
include step-children and adopted children) 
6) Of your children aged 18 or older, with whom do you have the most contact? 
7) How often so you see this son or daughter? 
Lives in the same household as I do 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
8) And how often do you have any contact with this son or daughter besides visiting, 
either by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail? 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
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Table 7.9 Continued… 
9) And now some questions about your father. How often do you see or visit your 
father? 
Lives in the same household as I do 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
My father is no longer alive 
I do not know where my father lives 
10) And how often do you have any contact with your father besides visiting, either by 
telephone, letter, fax or e-mail? 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
11) And what about your mother? How often do you see or visit her? 
Lives in the same household as I do 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
My mother is no longer alive 
I do not know where my other lives 
12) And how often do you have any contact with your mother besides visiting, either 
by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail? 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
 
 It should be noted that ISSP questions accounted for either the presence or the 
absence of the tie on the one hand, and the tie strength on the other. The latter was 
measured with the frequency of contact questions.  
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Adult family network size and network density variables are computed from the 
above questions. The adult family network size corresponded to a respondent‟s total 
number of ties to his/her brothers/sisters and sons/daughters, who are eighteen or older 
as well as ties to the mother and the father. 54,1% of all respondents had lost their 
fathers and 38,5% of the respondents had lost their mothers. Ties to mother and father 
are included in the computation of the adult family size with the assumption that the 
numbers of ties for emotional support would increase if both parents were alive. 
 Adult family network size is a continuous variable, which ranges between 0 and 
36. The mean of this variable is 4,6 and 95% of distribution lies between 0 and 10. The 
first column in Table 7.10 on the next page shows the mean distribution of this variable 
across countries, and the second column shows whether the mean is statistically 
different from the base country. Finland is designated as the base country because the 
trusting individuals were found to be the highest in this country. In the rest of the 
analysis, the presentation of the mean distributions follows the same pattern; hence, the 
country means will be compared with respect to the mean of the given variable in 
Finland. The weighted data is used for all of the mean calculations. 
 According to Table 7.10, the adult family size is the highest in the Philippines 
(7,42), followed by Brazil (6,91), Chile (5,98), Israel (5,54) and Canada (5,35). Both 
Brazil and Chile are Latin American countries, but other than these, this group of 
countries does not seem to fit into a geographical/historical and/or religious block. On 
the other hand, the mean adult family network size is the lowest in Latvia (3,01), Russia 
(3,45) and Hungary (3,49), all of which are the ex-communist states. Yet this group is 
followed by Italy (3,77) and Switzerland (3,91) and they do not have much to do with 
the communist legacy. Lastly, the mean adult family network size emerged as similar to 
the case in Finland (4,17) in Great Britain (4,08), Austria (4,02), Poland (4,12), Cyprus 
(4,15) and Denmark (4,01).    
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Table 7.10 ISSP mean distribution 
of adult family network size across 
countries and significance of mean 
differences with respect to Finland 
  
Adult family 
network size 
Country Mean p>t 
Australia 5,02 0,00 
Germany 3,71 0,00 
Great Britain 4,08 0,36 
United States 4,95 0,00 
Austria 4,02 0,15 
Hungary 3,49 0,00 
Italy 3,77 0,00 
Norway 4,65 0,00 
Czech Republic 3,53 0,00 
Slovenia 3,97 0,04 
Poland 4,21 0,72 
Russia 3,45 0,00 
New Zealand 5,25 0,00 
Canada 5,35 0,00 
Philippines 7,42 0,00 
Israel 5,54 0,00 
Japan 4,64 0,00 
Spain 4,49 0,00 
Latvia 3,01 0,00 
France 4,50 0,00 
Cyprus 4,15 0,77 
Chile 5,98 0,00 
Denmark 4,01 0,06 
Switzerland 3,91 0,01 
Brazil 6,91 0,00 
South Africa 4,55 0,00 
Finland 4,17 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 4,61 
 
The second variable of interest is the family network density variable. The 
frequency of contact with the father, mother, and the most contacted brother/sister and 
son/daughter is computed for this variable. Yet, it should be noted that the ISSP 
frequency of contact questions accounted for both the face-to-face contact and contact 
through telephone, fax or email. The present analysis deemed both types of contacts 
significant because the concern is to account for the influence of the weight of the given 
relationship on generalized trust. Hence the sustenance of the contact through any 
means is of concern.  
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In order to capture this influence, a series of new variables were generated which 
took into account the highest frequency of contact through any indicated means. These 
variables were labeled as the brother/sister contact; the son/daughter contact; the father 
contact; and the mother contact respectively. Values of these variables ranged between 
0 to 7: zero corresponded to lack of any contact, and seven corresponded to living in the 
same household, hence the most frequent contact. The frequency of lack of any contact 
was found quite low for brother/sister contact and son/daughter contact because the 
relevant questions asked about the most contacted brother/sister and son/daughter. 
People were also found to contact their fathers and mothers quite frequently. Yet, as 
noted, the bulk of the respondents had lost their mothers and fathers. Table 7.11 on the 
next page reported the means of all the frequency of contact variables and it accounts 
for the mean frequency of contact for the fathers and the mothers who were still alive.  
 The mean brother/sister contact is 4,06. The most frequent contact is found in 
Israel (5,11), Cyprus (5,06), Spain (4,92), Italy (4,88), and Slovenia (4,62). The lowest 
figure is in Japan (3,34) followed by Finland (3,44) and Australia (3,52). The means of 
brother/sister contact are not statistically different among the latter countries. 
 The mean son/daughter contact is 5,48. This shows that people in general 
contact more with their adult children than their siblings, which is not a particularly 
interesting finding. Mean son/daughter contact is the highest in Italy (6,16), Spain 
(6,14), Slovenia (6,11), Cyprus (6,08), and Israel (6,02). The mean differences are not 
significantly different from Finland (4,87) for New Zealand (4,83), Denmark (4,89), and 
France (4,93). All these countries also score the lowest for son/daughter contact.   
 The mean for father contact is 4,59. The highest scores are observed in Cyprus 
(5,77), Spain (5,74), Italy (5,64), Israel (5,61) and Slovenia (5,02). The lowest scores 
are in the US (3,74), Finland (3,80), Canada (3,87), New Zealand (3,91) and Australia 
(3,99). The mean differences across this group are not significant either. 
 Lastly, the mean for mother contact is 4,94. The countries with the highest mean 
values are Israel (5,82), Cyprus (5,81), Spain (5,80), Italy (5,79), and Slovenia (5,41). It 
should be noted that these countries score the highest across all variables of the 
brother/sister contact, the son/daughter contact, the father contact, and the mother 
contact. Hence family relations emerge as denser across these countries. One striking 
point is that Table 7.10 showed Italy as one of the countries with the lowest mean for 
adult family network size. According to Table 7.11, Italians had strong ties to their most 
contacted brother/sister, son/daughter as well as father and mother. This means that 
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Italians, in general, have a small family in terms of size, but they forge strong relations 
within the family. 
Table 7.11 ISSP mean distribution of the most contacted family members across 
countries 
  
Brother/Sist
er contact 
Son/Daughte
r contact 
Father 
contact 
Mother 
contact 
Country 
Mea
n p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 3,52 0,15 5,16 0,00 3,99 0,10 4,25 0,38 
Germany 3,85 0,00 5,40 0,00 4,36 0,00 4,69 0,00 
Great Britain 3,78 0,00 5,26 0,00 4,26 0,00 4,77 0,00 
United States 3,96 0,00 5,12 0,01 3,74 0,55 4,54 0,00 
Austria 4,29 0,00 5,57 0,00 4,83 0,00 5,12 0,00 
Hungary 4,42 0,00 5,90 0,00 4,92 0,00 5,28 0,00 
Italy 4,88 0,00 6,16 0,00 5,64 0,00 5,79 0,00 
Norway 3,57 0,01 5,04 0,03 4,11 0,00 4,49 0,01 
Czech Republic 4,05 0,00 5,74 0,00 4,76 0,00 5,09 0,00 
Slovenia 4,62 0,00 6,11 0,00 5,02 0,00 5,41 0,00 
Poland 4,15 0,00 5,83 0,00 4,67 0,00 5,08 0,00 
Russia 3,98 0,00 5,77 0,00 4,65 0,00 5,26 0,00 
New Zealand 3,30 0,02 4,83 0,67 3,91 0,27 4,17 0,07 
Canada 3,61 0,01 5,08 0,01 3,87 0,56 4,30 0,84 
Philippines 4,13 0,00 5,78 0,00 4,43 0,00 4,37 0,57 
Israel 5,11 0,00 6,02 0,00 5,61 0,00 5,82 0,00 
Japan 3,34 0,11 5,52 0,00 4,66 0,00 4,74 0,00 
Spain 4,92 0,00 6,14 0,00 5,74 0,00 5,80 0,00 
Latvia 3,93 0,00 5,48 0,00 4,39 0,00 5,05 0,00 
France 3,62 0,00 4,93 0,48 4,03 0,01 4,36 0,56 
Cyprus 5,06 0,00 6,08 0,00 5,77 0,00 5,81 0,00 
Chile 4,63 0,00 5,94 0,00 4,56 0,00 5,17 0,00 
Denmark 3,60 0,00 4,89 0,74 3,93 0,14 4,44 0,06 
Switzerland 3,78 0,00 5,07 0,02 4,11 0,01 4,44 0,15 
Brazil 4,04 0,00 5,48 0,00 4,78 0,00 5,29 0,00 
South Africa 4,37 0,00 5,24 0,00 4,78 0,00 5,07 0,00 
Finland 3,44 0,00 4,87 0,00 3,80 0,00 4,32 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 4,06 5,48 4,59 4,94 
 
The lowest scores for the mother contact variable are found in New Zealand 
(4,17), Australia (4,25), Canada (4,30), Finland (4,32), Philippines (4,37), Denmark 
(4,44), and Switzerland (4,44). The means differences are not statistically different 
across these countries either. Table 7.11 revealed Finland, Denmark, Australia and 
Canada as countries in which primordial relations are not as strong. In particular, the 
former two countries score the highest for generalized trust. Hence do the findings so 
far support the hypothesis of the inverse relationship between the strong family ties - 
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hence dense networks - and the generalized trust? This question needs to await the 
multivariate analysis. Although less dense relations found in high trust societies seem to 
support such relationships, the least trusting societies such as Hungary, Brazil, South 
Africa and Chile were not found to display denser relations either. Hence the 
relationship between network density and generalized trust may not be as 
straightforward as it is suggested by social capital literature. Multivariate analysis will 
be helpful to comment more definitely on this question. 
 The family network density variable is computed on the basis of the above 
frequency of family contact variables in order to account for the influence of the tie 
strength on generalized trust. This variable accounts for the mean frequency of contact 
at the family network level.
328
 Its formula is: 
Family network density   = (Σi Frequency of contacti) / N  where i is contact with 
      of the most contacted                                                           brother/sister; father, 
                                                                                                   son/daughter; mother  
                                                                                                   N is the total size of the  
                                                                                                   contact variables (Eq. 7.1) 
 
 The family network density variable is a continuous variable and its values range 
between zero and seven. Table 7.12 below shows the mean distribution of this variable 
across countries. In line with Table 7.11, the densest family networks are found in Italy, 
Spain, Cyprus, Israel and Slovenia and the least dense family networks are found in 
Finland and New Zealand. 
Table 7.12 ISSP mean distribution of 
family network density across countries  
  
Family network 
density of the most 
contacted 
Country Mean p>t 
Australia 4,22 0,00 
Germany 4,27 0,00 
Great Britain 4,17 0,00 
United States 4,24 0,00 
Austria 4,70 0,00 
Hungary 4,97 0,00 
Italy 5,50 0,00 
Norway 4,11 0,00 
Czech Republic 4,77 0,00 
Slovenia 5,25 0,00 
  
                                                          
328 The network boundary is the most contacted family members.  
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Table 7.12 Continued… 
  
Family network 
density of the 
most contacted 
Country Mean p>t 
Poland 4,78 0,00 
Russia 4,68 0,00 
New Zealand 3,90 0,94 
Canada 4,09 0,00 
Philippines 4,47 0,00 
Israel 5,52 0,00 
Japan 4,35 0,00 
Spain 5,35 0,00 
Latvia 4,53 0,00 
France 4,11 0,00 
Cyprus 5,59 0,00 
Chile 4,99 0,00 
Denmark 4,09 0,00 
Switzerland 4,09 0,00 
Brazil 5,00 0,00 
South Africa 4,58 0,00 
Finland 3,90 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 4,60 
 
 ISSP posed questions about friendship ties as well. One set of the friendship 
questions concerned close friends from the workplace, the neighborhood and other 
places. These questions were very similar to the ones asked in INFORMALITY. A 
second set of questions asked about the role relationship as well as the frequency of 
contact with the best friend. Table 7.13 on the next page shows these questions.    
 The extent of the close friends variable is computed by summing the number of 
close friends from the workplace, the neighborhood and the other places. Alternatively, 
the frequency of contact with the best friend variable is computed similarly to the other 
frequency of contact questions. Hence, the higher frequency of contact score either 
through visits, or through other means, was taken as the value for the frequency of 
contact with the best friend variable.  
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Table 7.13 ISSP questions about friendship ties 
1) Now we would like to ask you about people you know, other than your family and 
relatives. The first question is about the people at your workplace. Thinking about 
people at your workplace, how many of them are close friends of yours? 
2) Thinking now of people who live near you-in your neighborhood or district: How 
many of these people are close friends of yours? 
3) How many other close friends do you have-apart from those at work, in your 
neighborhood, or family members? Think, for instance, of friends at clubs, church or 
the like  
4) Now think about your best friend, the friend you feel closest to (but not your 
partner). Is this best friend… 
A male relative 
A female relative 
A man who is not a relative 
A woman who is not a relative 
5) How often do you see or visit your friend (the friend you feel closest to)? 
Lives in the same household as I do 
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
6) And how often do you have any other contact with this friend besides visiting, either 
by telephone, letter, fax or e-mail?  
Daily 
At least several times a week 
At least once a week 
At least once a month 
Several times a year 
Less often 
Never 
 
It should be noted that the frequency of contact with the best friend concerns only 
one tie. Hence, it is not a network variable but it accounts for tie-based relationships. 
Another question, which arises regarding this variable, concerned the role label of the 
best friend. ISSP asked whether the best friend is a relative other than the family or a 
non-relative. More than seventy percent of the respondents provided non-relative 
friends. Also, more than eighty-percent of this figure was of the same sex for both the 
male and the female respondents. These figures showed that in general, people‟ best 
friends are different from the kinship relations and they tend to be of the same sex.  
In sum, ISSP questions on friendship ties are used to generate one network 
variable and one tie-based variable. The extent of close friends is a continuous variable 
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and its values change between 0 - 294. Nearly 95% of distribution lies within the 0 to 33 
range. Alternatively, frequency of contact with the best friend variable is an ordinal 
variable and its values change between zero and seven. The details of these variables 
across countries are provided in Table 7.14 below. 
Table 7.14 ISSP mean distribution of the extent of 
close friends and the frequency of the best friend 
contact across countries  
  
Extent of 
close 
friends 
Best friend 
contact 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 15,02 0,00 3,97 0,02 
Germany 10,18 0,00 4,29 0,00 
Great Britain 13,53 0,00 4,30 0,00 
United States 12,84 0,00 4,44 0,00 
Austria 10,67 0,00 4,61 0,00 
Hungary 5,25 0,00 4,85 0,00 
Italy 5,60 0,00 4,82 0,00 
Norway 15,66 0,00 4,18 0,06 
Czech Republic 9,84 0,00 4,49 0,00 
Slovenia 15,17 0,00 4,78 0,00 
Poland 8,76 0,00 4,47 0,00 
Russia 6,45 0,94 4,82 0,00 
New Zealand 13,01 0,00 3,93 0,00 
Canada 10,52 0,00 3,87 0,00 
Philippines 10,40 0,00 4,85 0,00 
Israel 13,03 0,00 5,13 0,00 
Japan 13,23 0,00 4,16 0,23 
Spain 6,82 0,24 4,93 0,00 
Latvia 4,43 0,00 4,49 0,00 
France 9,36 0,00 3,83 0,00 
Cyprus 6,10 0,03 5,54 0,00 
Chile 7,09 0,15 4,62 0,00 
Denmark 10,92 0,00 4,16 0,17 
Switzerland 14,59 0,00 4,40 0,00 
Brazil 27,72 0,00 5,38 0,00 
South Africa 5,68 0,01 5,06 0,00 
Finland 6,47 0,00 4,09 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 10,73 4,56 
 
 According to Table 7.14, the respondents in Brazil have the most extensive close 
friends‟ ties (27,72), which is followed by Norway (15,66), Slovenia (15,17), and 
Australia (15,02). The fewest close friends‟ ties are found in Hungary (5,25), Italy 
(5,60), Russia (6,45), Finland (6,47), Spain (6,82) and Chile (7,09). The mean 
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differences in close friends‟ ties across the latter four countries are also found 
statistically not significant. 
 The mean distribution of close friends‟ ties revealed a series of interesting 
results. First, close friends were the most abundant in Brazil, though generalized trust 
was found scarce in this country. Hence the relationship between extensity of friendship 
ties and generalized trust may not be as direct as the social capital literature argues for. 
The comparison of Table 7.12 and Table 7.14 also shows that the less dense relations 
with family members do not directly translate into more extensive ties with friends. 
Finland is a case in point. However, Italy and Spain introduce a different case, which is 
more in line with the expectation of the social capital literature. Family network density 
is found high in both countries, whereas the extensity of close friends is found low. A 
more definitive answer as to the influence of the close friends‟ ties on generalized trust 
awaits the multivariate analysis.   
 The mean frequency of contact with the best friend is 4,56 for all countries. This 
figure is the highest in Cyprus (5,54), Brazil (5,38), Israel (5,13), and South Africa 
(5,06). Frequency of contact with the best friend is low in Australia (3,97), New 
Zealand (3,93), Canada (3,87), and France (3,83). The means for Denmark, Norway, 
Finland and Japan are not statistically significant. Indeed a Scandinavian pattern has 
emerged for the first time for this variable. Although Scandinavian countries score high 
in terms of generalized trust, their relations with family members and friends fall short 
of revealing similar patterns, except for the frequency of contact with the best friend 
variable.  
 Besides the extent and the strength of the community level relationships, ISSP 
also posed a series of questions about ties for social exchanges. These questions are 
provided in the following Table 7.15.   
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Table 7.15 ISSP questions of ties for expressive and instrumental action 
1) Now we would like to ask you how you would get help in situations that anyone 
could find herself or himself in. First suppose you had the flu and had to stay in bed for 
a few days and needed help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who would 
you turn to first for help? 
2)And who would you turn to second if you had the flu and needed help around the 
house? 
a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) daughter-in-law f) son g) 
son-in-law h) sister i) brother j) other blood relative k) other in-law relative l) neighbor 
m) someone you work with n)someone at a social services agency o) someone you pay 
for help p) someone else r)no one 
  
3)Now suppose you needed to borrow a large sum of money. Who would you turn to 
first for help? 
4) And who would you turn to second if you needed to borrow a large sum of money? 
a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) son f) sister g) brother h) 
other blood relative i) other in-law relative j) god parent k) close friend l) neighbor m) 
someone you work with n)employer o) government or social services agency p) a bank 
or credit union r) a private money lender s) someone else t)no one 
  
5) Now suppose you felt just a bit down or depressed, and you wanted to talk about it. 
Who would you turn to first for help? 
6) And who would you turn to second if you felt a bit down or depressed and wanted 
to talk about it? 
a) husband, wife, partner b) mother c) father d) daughter e) son f) sister g) brother h) 
other blood relative i) other in-law relative j) close friend k) neighbor l) someone you 
work with m) priest or member of the clergy n) family doctor o) a psychologist or 
another professional counselor p) a self-help group r)  s) someone else t)no one 
  
7) There are many ways people hear about jobs-from other people, from 
advertisements or employment agencies and so on. Please indicate how you first found 
out about work at your present employer (IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY 
WORKING FOR PAY, PLEASE ANSWER THIS QUESTION FOR YOUR LAST 
JOB) 
a) I have never paid for work b) from parents, brothers, and sisters c) from other 
relatives d) from a close friend  e) from an acquaintance f) from a public employment 
agency or service g) from a private public employment agency h) from a school or 
university placement office  i) from an advertisement or a sign  j) the employer 
contacted me about a job k) I just called them and went there to ask for work 
 
 ISSP provided a long list of role labels for its questions on the above social 
exchanges. In line with Lin‟s definition, these social exchanges can be grouped 
according to purpose of action. Lin conceptualized the social exchanges which 
concerned individual well-being and support, as the expressive action. The questions in 
Table 7.15, which are about the first and the second choice of ties in times of illness and 
feeling of depression, provide examples of such a kind of action. Alternatively, the 
 186 
purpose of action can be geared towards individuals‟ urge for power, reputation, or 
wealth. Lin labeled these types of actions as instrumental action. Questions about 
borrowing large sums of money or finding a job of Table 7.15 are examples of 
instrumental action.  
 The present analysis used the above ISSP questions on both expressive and 
instrumental action to generate a series of variables which concerned the use of kinship 
and non-kinship ties for both types of actions. It should be noted that the choices to the 
questions of Table 7.15 allow for the focus on kinship and non-kinship ties
329
. In 
INFORMALITY, non-kinship ties of the important matters discussion network proved a 
positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. How far can we generalize this 
finding to other types of social exchanges? Do individuals‟ non-kinship ties always 
exert a positive and significant influence on generalized trust? Or, does their influence 
change when they are employed for different purposes of action? What is the influence 
of non-kinship ties on generalized trust when they are used for expressive action? 
Alternatively, what about their influence once they are mobilized for instrumental 
action?    
 Similar types of questions can be posed for kinship ties as well. 
INFORMALITY designated a negative influence of the kinship ties on generalized 
trust. However that influence was not significant in the Turkish context. How far can we 
generalize this finding? What is the influence of kinship ties on generalized trust when 
they are used either for expressive or instrumental action? 
 Four variables accounted for these questions. Two of them concerned kinship 
ties. These family and relatives‟ ties, which were used in times of illness and feeling 
depressed, were used to generate the kinship ties for expressive action variable. 
Alternatively, when these types of ties were mobilized for borrowing large sums of 
money and finding a job, they made up the kinship ties for instrumental action variable. 
 Similar variables were generated for the non-kinship ties as well. The tie count 
of friendship and acquaintanceship for illness and feeling depressed constitute the non-
                                                          
329 Spouse, mother, father, daughter, son, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, brother, sister 
are accepted as family. Other blood relatives, other in-law relatives and god-parents are 
accepted as relatives. Though god-relative may not be a relative, it is likely that this 
person will be close to the respondent‟s parents. Hence he /she is different from one‟s 
friends. God-parent is coded as relative because he/she is as close as parents but not 
from the immediate family. Close friends, acquaintances, neighbors, someone from 
work, and someone else are coded as friends and acquaintances.  
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kinship ties for expressive action variable. Lastly, the employment of these ties for 
borrowing large sums of money and finding a job was labeled as non-kinship ties for 
instrumental action variable. Table 7.16 below gives the mean values of these variables 
across ISSP countries. Similar to all other descriptive tables for country mean scores, 
the table also shows the statistical significance of the mean difference from Finland in 
bold. The values of the kinship and the non-kinship ties for expressive action range 
between 0 and 4, whereas the values of the kinship and the non-kinship ties for 
instrumental action range between 0 and 3. 
Table 7.16 ISSP mean distribution of kinship and non-kinship ties for expressive 
and instrumental action 
  
Kinship: 
Expressive 
Kinship: 
Instrumental 
Non-kinship: 
Expressive 
Non-kinship: 
Instrumental 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 2,64 0,00 1,14 0,00 0,76 0,00 0,28 0,00 
Germany 2,80 0,00 1,09 0,00 0,88 0,00 0,31 0,00 
Great Britain 2,82 0,00 1,10 0,00 0,82 0,00 0,26 0,00 
United States 2,71 0,00 1,32 0,00 1,04 0,00 0,61 0,02 
Austria 2,79 0,00 1,15 0,00 0,85 0,00 0,18 0,00 
Hungary 2,73 0,00 0,93 0,00 0,62 0,00 0,49 0,00 
Italy 2,91 0,00 1,40 0,00 0,77 0,00 0,37 0,00 
Norway 2,76 0,00 1,05 0,00 0,76 0,00 0,27 0,00 
Czech Republic 2,97 0,00 1,20 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,51 0,00 
Slovenia 3,05 0,00 1,23 0,00 0,67 0,00 0,52 0,00 
Poland 3,18 0,00 1,24 0,00 0,62 0,00 0,52 0,00 
Russia 2,82 0,00 1,03 0,00 0,86 0,00 0,77 0,00 
New Zealand 2,57 0,00 0,94 0,00 0,85 0,00 0,26 0,00 
Canada 2,83 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,76 0,00 0,28 0,00 
Philippines 3,11 0,00 1,66 0,00 0,55 0,00 0,61 0,00 
Israel 2,75 0,00 1,18 0,00 0,76 0,00 0,48 0,00 
Japan 3,09 0,00 1,41 0,00 0,70 0,00 0,26 0,00 
Spain 3,08 0,00 1,54 0,00 0,50 0,01 0,36 0,00 
Latvia 2,33 0,00 0,83 0,00 1,06 0,00 0,78 0,00 
France 2,50 0,00 1,06 0,00 0,74 0,00 0,28 0,00 
Cyprus 2,93 0,00 1,19 0,00 0,89 0,00 0,39 0,00 
Chile 2,99 0,00 1,28 0,00 0,54 0,00 0,54 0,00 
Denmark 2,78 0,00 0,89 0,00 0,84 0,00 0,23 0,00 
Switzerland 2,59 0,00 1,31 0,00 1,15 0,00 0,39 0,00 
Brazil 2,77 0,00 1,15 0,00 0,62 0,00 0,50 0,00 
South Africa 2,64 0,00 1,07 0,00 0,98 0,00 0,56 0,00 
Finland 1,95 0,00 0,54 0,00 0,41 0,00 0,14 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 2,78 1,14 0,76 0,43 
 
 Table 7.16 shows that individuals often rely on their kinship ties for both 
expressive and instrumental action. Kinship ties seem to be mobilized more frequently 
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for both types of action in the Philippines, Japan, and Spain. The mean scores of those 
countries for expressive ties are 3,11; 3,09; and 3,08 respectively, which are well above 
the mean score of all countries (2,78). Alternatively, their scores for instrumental action 
are 1,66; 1,41; and1,54. Those scores are also higher than the mean score for kinship 
instrumental ties for all countries (1,14). 
 Non-kinship ties seem less prevalent for both expressive and instrumental 
action. Switzerland (1,15), Latvia (1,06), and the US (1,04) score the highest for the 
non-kinship ties for expressive action. Alternatively, mean scores for non-kinship ties 
for instrumental action are well above the average for all countries (0,43) in Latvia 
(0,78), Russia (0,77), and the US (0,61).  
What about the institutional contacts? ISSP questions on expressive and 
instrumental action also provide choices for institutional contacts besides the kinship 
and the non-kinship ties. Only less than two percent of discussants contacted institutions 
in times of illness. This figure was found a little higher - at around five percent - for the 
cases of feeling depressed. Hence institutional contacts remained quite marginal for 
expressive action. However, nearly twenty-six percent of the respondents indicated 
institutions as the first contact to borrow large sums of money. This figure fell to 
approximate seventeen-percent for the second contact. Institutional contacts scored the 
highest for finding a job. Nearly fifty-five percent of the ISSP respondents indicated 
that they found their most recent jobs through institutional contacts.  
 These figures make the enquiry about institutional contacts curious: what is the 
influence of institutional contacts for expressive and instrumental action on generalized 
trust? This is a crucial question because it focuses on the influence of the difference 
between the tie-based relations and the societal institutions on generalized trust. Two 
variables of the institutional contact were generated in order to focus on this question: 
the institutional contact for expressive action and the institutional contact for 
instrumental action. Similar to other variables of expressive and instrumental action, the 
values for institutional contact for expressive action range between 0 and 4 and the 
values for instrumental action range between 0 and 3. Table 7.17 on  page 189 presents 
the mean values of these variables across countries. 
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Table 7.17 ISSP mean distribution of institutional 
contacts for expressive and instrumental action 
  
Institutional: 
Expressive 
Institutional: 
Instrumental 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 0,12 0,00 1,15 0,00 
Germany 0,11 0,00 1,15 0,00 
Great Britain 0,11 0,00 1,18 0,02 
United States 0,04 0,08 0,67 0,00 
Austria 0,11 0,00 1,08 0,00 
Hungary 0,06 0,84 0,74 0,00 
Italy 0,09 0,06 0,75 0,00 
Norway 0,19 0,00 1,33 0,01 
Czech Republic 0,14 0,00 0,87 0,00 
Slovenia 0,08 0,08 0,81 0,00 
Poland 0,03 0,00 0,76 0,00 
Russia 0,02 0,00 0,30 0,00 
New Zealand 0,20 0,00 1,27 0,79 
Canada 0,23 0,00 1,35 0,00 
Philippines 0,02 0,00 0,25 0,00 
Israel 0,07 0,40 0,87 0,00 
Japan 0,05 0,19 0,99 0,00 
Spain 0,07 0,39 0,59 0,00 
Latvia 0,05 0,30 0,81 0,00 
France 0,36 0,00 1,13 0,00 
Cyprus 0,09 0,01 1,15 0,00 
Chile 0,12 0,00 0,57 0,00 
Denmark 0,17 0,00 1,46 0,00 
Switzerland 0,12 0,00 0,86 0,00 
Brazil 0,16 0,00 0,55 0,00 
South Africa 0,15 0,00 0,63 0,00 
Finland 0,06 0,00 1,26 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 0,12 0,88 
 
 The mean score of institutional contacts for expressive action for all countries 
(0,12) is very low. As noted, only very few respondents indicated institutions as 
contacts in times of illness and feeling depressed. In France (0,36), Canada (0,23), New 
Zealand (0,20), and Norway (0,19), this figure is relatively higher. Alternatively, the 
mean score of all countries for institutional contacts for instrumental action (0,88) 
surpasses the same variable for the non-kinship ties (0,43). Hence, individuals seem to 
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prefer institutions to borrow large sums of money and to find jobs rather than relying on 
their non-kinship ties.
330
  
Among all variables of expressive and instrumental action, the non-kinship ties 
are expected to influence generalized trust positively because these types of ties are 
more likely to make different others known to people. Hence, they become more 
informed about the variable human condition, which is expected to familiarize the 
complex modern world so that the fellow man would be accorded trust. Likewise, the 
institutional contacts are among the bridging structures in which new relationships can 
be forged. It is likely that these new relationships are more of the weak and bridging 
ties. Hence, institutional contacts for both expressive and instrumental action are 
expected to influence generalized trust positively as well. Different from these 
variables, kinship ties for expressive and instrumental action are hypothesized to 
influence generalized trust negatively. The reason is their delimitation of individuals‟ 
relationships to close circles of the similar others. Those hypotheses will be tested with 
a series of multivariate analyses once other variables of interest are introduced. 
 
 
 
7.3. Other Variables of Interest 
 
 
 
 ISSP posed questions about relations with a series of relatives as well as civil 
society involvement. Both types of questions relate to community level relationships; 
however, they are not asked on tie-level as well. Hence the frequency of contact with a 
series of relatives such as the uncles/aunts, brother-/sister-in laws, cousins, nephews and 
the like are requested. Likewise, ISSP asked about respondents‟ frequency of 
participation in a series of civil society institutions. The present analysis labels relations 
with the relatives as group-based relations, while the civil society involvement is 
examined as bridging structures, along with the education and the employment 
variables. Table 7.18 on the next page provides the ISSP questions about the relatives.  
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 This assertion invited for further test of Granovetter‟s study as well, since this study 
claimed weak friendship ties to be more strategic for finding jobs than institutional 
contacts. 
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Table 7.18 ISSP question on relations with the relatives 
Now some questions about your contact 
with other relatives. Please indicate how 
often you have been in contact with any of 
the following types of relatives in the last 
four weeks 
1- More than twice in last 4 weeks 
2-Once or twice in last 4-weeks 
3-Not at all in last 4 weeks 
4- I have no living relative of this type 
a) Uncles and aunts 
b) Cousins 
c)Parents-in-law 
d)Brother-or sisters-in-law 
e) Nieces and nephews 
f) [OPTIONAL] God-parents 
 
 
The frequency of contact with the godparents was not requested in nine countries, 
since the choice was optional. Out of the eighteen countries in which the godparents 
were asked about, more than the half of the respondents said that they did not have 
relatives of this type. Hence, the ensuing analysis focuses on relations with all types of 
relatives except the godparents.  
 As Table 7.18 shows, ISSP asked this question along a 1 - 4 scale, which 
indicated higher values for less frequent contact. This scale is re-coded along 0 - 3 so 
that the higher values indicated more frequent contact. Table 7.19 on the next page 
shows the means distributions of the contact with the relatives variables.  
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Table 7.19 ISSP mean distribution of the relations with uncles/aunts, 
cousins, parents-in-law, brother-/sister-in-law, nieces and nephews 
  Uncles/aunts Cousins 
Parents-in-
law 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 1,08 0,00 1,24 0,00 1,02 0,00 
Germany 1,25 0,46 1,40 0,59 1,16 0,29 
Great Britain 1,22 0,80 1,31 0,03 1,23 0,91 
United States 1,41 0,00 1,59 0,00 1,03 0,00 
Austria 1,11 0,01 1,28 0,01 0,94 0,00 
Hungary 1,12 0,00 1,53 0,00 0,96 0,00 
Italy 1,30 0,06 1,56 0,00 1,08 0,02 
Norway 1,50 0,00 1,62 0,00     
Czech Republic 1,27 0,28 1,40 0,65 1,04 0,00 
Slovenia 1,44 0,00 1,70 0,00 1,06 0,00 
Poland 1,29 0,06 1,39 0,80 0,98 0,00 
Russia 1,08 0,00 1,30 0,00 0,85 0,00 
New Zealand 1,00 0,00 1,38 0,98 1,22 0,97 
Canada 1,33 0,01 1,44 0,06 1,24 0,68 
Philippines 1,55 0,00 1,94 0,00 1,11 0,03 
Israel 1,46 0,00 1,60 0,00 1,11 0,04 
Japan 1,18 0,10 1,22 0,00 1,04 0,00 
Spain 1,36 0,00 1,60 0,00 1,00 0,00 
Latvia 0,92 0,00 1,22 0,00 0,88 0,00 
France 1,33 0,00 1,48 0,00 1,48 0,00 
Cyprus 1,51 0,00 1,90 0,00 1,17 0,37 
Chile 1,23 0,95 1,32 0,08 1,06 0,00 
Denmark 1,16 0,06 1,30 0,00 1,39 0,00 
Switzerland 1,16 0,11 1,31 0,02 0,86 0,00 
Brazil 1,64 0,00 1,81 0,00 1,64 0,00 
South Africa 1,45 0,00 1,68 0,00 0,97 0,00 
Finland 1,23 0,00 1,38 0,00 1,22 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 1,29 1,49 1,09 
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Table 7.19 continued… 
  Brother-/sister-in-law Nieces & nephews 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 1,58 0,00 1,50 0,00 
Germany 1,52 0,00 1,48 0,00 
Great Britain 1,61 0,00 1,55 0,00 
United States 1,58 0,00 1,73 0,00 
Austria 1,39 0,00 1,34 0,73 
Hungary 1,53 0,00 1,48 0,00 
Italy 1,74 0,00 1,90 0,00 
Norway 1,95 0,00 1,70 0,00 
Czech Republic 1,44 0,00 1,39 0,12 
Slovenia 1,46 0,00 1,51 0,00 
Poland 1,46 0,00 1,45 0,00 
Russia 1,04 0,00 1,48 0,00 
New Zealand 1,70 0,00 1,64 0,00 
Canada 1,79 0,00 1,75 0,00 
Philippines 1,85 0,00 2,28 0,00 
Israel 1,66 0,00 1,70 0,00 
Japan 1,29 0,01 1,33 0,87 
Spain 1,58 0,00 1,59 0,00 
Latvia 0,94 0,00 1,00 0,00 
France 1,78 0,00 1,60 0,00 
Cyprus 1,75 0,00 1,61 0,00 
Chile 1,50 0,00 1,75 0,00 
Denmark 1,71 0,00 1,43 0,01 
Switzerland 1,40 0,00 1,32 0,95 
Brazil 2,01 0,00 2,23 0,00 
South Africa 1,28 0,01 1,48 0,00 
Finland 1,18 0,00 1,32 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 1,54 1,59 
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The mean scores of all countries show that brothers-/sisters-in-law and nieces and 
nephews are among the most frequently contacted relatives, whereas relations with 
parents-in-law emerged as the least frequent. These scores are likely to reflect the 
influence of age, since the older age relatives like parents-in-laws as well as the uncles 
and aunts prove to be the least contacted. 
 It is predictable that relations with the relatives are stronger in Brazil since it is 
in the highest scoring countries for relations with all types of relatives. Brazil is 
followed by the Philippines in terms of strong relatives relations, except its mean score 
for relations with the parents-in-law. Latvia stands at the opposite pole; it is among the 
lowest scoring countries for all groups of relatives. Japan follows Latvia in terms of the 
least frequent relations with the relatives. Russia scores better for relations with nieces 
and nephews though its scores for the remaining groups are among the lowest as well.  
How did the analysis account for the relations with the relatives? A single variable 
was computed by summing up all frequency of contact scores across the relatives 
variables. In Norway, the relations with the parents-in-laws were not asked, hence this 
variable was not entered into the computation. The new variable is labeled as the 
relations with the relatives and its values changed between 0 and 12. The mean 
distributions of this variable across the countries can be found in Table 7.20 on the next 
page.   
In line with the previous Table 7.19, Table 7.20 discerned more frequent relations 
with the relatives for Brazil (7,03) and the Philippines (7,62) and the least frequent 
relations for Latvia (4,09), Finland (4,55), Russia (4,87) and Japan (4,90). 
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Table 7.20 ISSP mean distribution of the 
relations with the relatives variable 
  
Relations with the 
relatives 
Country Mean p>t 
Australia 5,28 0,00 
Germany 5,26 0,00 
Great Britain 5,14 0,00 
United States 6,30 0,00 
Austria 5,07 0,00 
Hungary 5,65 0,00 
Italy 6,20 0,00 
Norway 6,11 0,00 
Czech Republic 5,38 0,00 
Slovenia 6,11 0,00 
Poland 5,49 0,00 
Russia 4,87 0,00 
New Zealand 4,98 0,00 
Canada 6,12 0,00 
Philippines 7,62 0,00 
Israel 6,38 0,00 
Japan 4,90 0,00 
Spain 6,03 0,00 
Latvia 4,09 0,00 
France 5,40 0,00 
Cyprus 6,78 0,00 
Chile 5,75 0,00 
Denmark 5,10 0,00 
Switzerland 5,05 0,00 
Brazil 7,03 0,00 
South Africa 5,59 0,00 
Finland 4,55 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 5,66 
 
 Another ISSP question which is important for the present analysis, relates to the 
civil society involvement. The exact wording of this question is provided in the 
following Table 7.21. A 1 to 4 scale was used to indicate participation in each of the 
given institutions. One stood for “I have participated more than twice” and four 
corresponded to “I do not belong to such a group”. Those variables were re-coded along 
a 0 to 3 scale in an order whereby the higher values indicated more frequent 
participation. Table 7.22 on page 197-198 presents the means distribution of civil 
society participation across countries. 
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Table 7.21 ISSP question on civil society participation 
People sometimes belong to 
different types of groups or 
associations. The list below 
contains different types of 
groups. For each type of group, 
please tick a box to say whether 
you have participated in the 
activities of this group in the last 
12 months. 
I have 
participated 
more than 
twice 
I have 
participated 
once or 
twice 
I belong 
to such a 
group but 
never 
participate 
I do not 
belong to 
such a 
group 
 
A political party, club, or 
association 
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
A trade union or professional 
association 
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
A church or other religious 
organization  
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
A sports group, hobby or leisure 
club 
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
A charitable organization or 
group 
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
A neighborhood organization or 
group 
      ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
Other associations or group       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫       ⁫ 
 
 Table 7.22 shows that the mean civil society participation across countries is 
between the 0 to 1 range; hence, more often, the respondents either belong to an 
institution but do not participate or they do not belong to the given institution. The 
highest mean frequency of participation is found for the sports, hobby, and leisure club 
(0,77) and for the church or other religious organizations (0,66). Both types are the 
Putnam type institutions, which concern more community level, non-hierarchical civic 
activism. 
 The highest mean score for sports and leisure clubs is found in New Zealand 
(1,73), followed by Finland (1,47), France (1,39), and Denmark (1,33). Indeed, after the 
frequency of contact with the best friend, this is the second instance a Scandinavian 
pattern is designated. Hungary (0,20), the Philippines (0,36), and Spain (0,48) scored 
the lowest for this group of institutions. 
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Table 7.22 ISSP mean distribution of civil society participation 
  
Political parties 
or clubs 
Trade union or 
professional org. 
Church or 
other religious 
group 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 0,52 0,00 0,40 0,00 0,78 0,00 
Germany 0,22 0,41 0,32 0,00 1,02 0,77 
Great Britain 0,14 0,00 0,34 0,00 0,66 0,00 
United States 0,54 0,00 0,50 0,00 1,53 0,00 
Austria 0,26 0,62 0,37 0,00 0,55 0,00 
Hungary 0,03 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,19 0,00 
Italy 0,22 0,44 0,26 0,00 0,41 0,00 
Norway 0,35 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,68 0,00 
Czech Republic 0,22 0,57 0,30 0,00 0,39 0,00 
Slovenia 0,11 0,00 0,41 0,00 0,49 0,00 
Poland 0,03 0,00 0,19 0,00 0,17 0,00 
Russia 0,05 0,00 0,23 0,00 0,12 0,00 
New Zealand 0,45 0,00 0,56 0,00 0,92 0,10 
Canada 0,53 0,00 0,76 0,00 1,18 0,01 
Philippines 0,21 0,31 0,12 0,00 0,76 0,00 
Israel 0,27 0,41 0,29 0,00 0,76 0,00 
Japan 0,17 0,01 0,30 0,00 0,24 0,00 
Spain 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,00 0,31 0,00 
Latvia 0,02 0,00 0,15 0,00 0,17 0,00 
France 0,20 0,19 0,36 0,00 0,38 0,00 
Cyprus 0,34 0,00 0,55 0,00 0,16 0,00 
Chile 0,07 0,00 0,19 0,00 0,60 0,00 
Denmark 0,19 0,07 0,82 0,00 0,75 0,00 
Switzerland 0,48 0,00 0,40 0,01 0,58 0,00 
Brazil 0,18 0,02 0,30 0,00 0,59 0,00 
South Africa 0,66 0,00 0,24 0,00 1,67 0,00 
Finland 0,24 0,00 0,93 0,00 1,01 0,00 
Mean (all countries) 0,26 0,37 0,66 
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Table 7.22 continued… 
  
Sports, 
hobby, or 
leisure club 
Charitable 
org. or 
groups 
Neighborhood 
ass. & groups 
Other ass. & 
groups 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 1,31 0,00 0,70 0,00 0,48 0,00 0,73 0,53 
Germany 1,34 0,02     0,31 0,37 0,52 0,00 
Great Britain 1,21 0,00 0,48 0,00 0,26 0,69 0,47 0,00 
United States 1,02 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,44 0,00 0,68 0,79 
Austria 0,82 0,00 0,23 0,71 0,18 0,00 0,43 0,00 
Hungary 0,20 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,10 0,00 
Italy 0,65 0,00 0,27 0,42 0,14 0,00 0,21 0,00 
Norway 1,32 0,01 0,38 0,00 0,65 0,00 0,96 0,00 
Czech Republic 0,74 0,00 0,14 0,00 0,22 0,12 0,31 0,00 
Slovenia 0,66 0,00 0,32 0,03 0,32 0,20 0,36 0,00 
Poland 0,17 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,15 0,00 
Russia 0,17 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,06 0,00 
New Zealand 1,73 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,59 0,00 0,93 0,00 
Canada 1,29 0,01 0,84 0,00 0,45 0,00 0,90 0,00 
Philippines 0,36 0,00 0,27 0,39 0,36 0,02 0,24 0,00 
Israel 0,69 0,00 0,44 0,00 0,28 0,95 0,28 0,00 
Japan 1,00 0,00 0,11 0,00 1,08 0,00 0,45 0,00 
Spain 0,38 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,20 0,01 0,14 0,00 
Latvia 0,48 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,11 0,00 
France 1,39 0,21 0,41 0,00 0,41 0,00 0,79 0,09 
Cyprus 0,25 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,13 0,00 
Chile 0,42 0,00 0,20 0,19 0,20 0,01 0,16 0,00 
Denmark 1,33 0,02 0,26 0,61 0,76 0,00 0,73 0,53 
Switzerland 1,24 0,00 0,40 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,44 0,00 
Brazil 0,25 0,00 0,21 0,23 0,24 0,20 0,11 0,00 
South Africa 0,53 0,00 0,19 0,10 0,39 0,00 0,14 0,00 
Finland 1,47 0,00 0,24 0,00 0,28 0,00 0,70 0,00 
Mean (all 
countries) 0,77 0,29 0,32 0,38 
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 Although the mean for participation in church or other religious groups is among 
the higher means, the differences between the countries are also striking. Respondents 
in South Africa (1,53), the US (1,53) and Canada (1,18) are likely to be quite active in 
religious organizations, whereas in Russia (0,12), Cyprus (0,16), Poland (0,17), Latvia 
(0,17), and Hungary (0,19), people do not seem very interested in this type of 
organization. It should also be noted that most of the countries with the lowest mean 
scores are the ex-communist countries. 
 Political parties or clubs seem to attract fewer participants than the other types of 
civil society institutions (0,26). Charitable groups and organizations follow this group 
(0,29). Respondents in South Africa (0,66), Canada (0,53), the US (0,54), and Australia 
(0,52) emerged as active in political groups. Alternatively, respondents in the US (0,80), 
New Zealand (0,80), and Canada (0,84) proved active in charitable organizations. These 
figures remain at very low levels across the ex-communist states of Latvia, Russia, 
Poland and Hungary. 
 Lastly, activism in trade unions and other professional organizations are the 
highest across the Scandinavian states of Finland (0,93), Denmark (0,82), and Norway 
(0,80). The lowest scores are found in the Philippines (0,12), Spain (0,13) and Latvia 
(0,15). 
The present analysis regarded civil society as one of the bridging structures in 
which individuals of different walks of life come together; hence, it provides a means to 
familiarize the complex modern world and its institutions. This familiarity, in turn, is 
hypothesized to influence generalized trust positively.  
However, the analysis also differentiated among different types of civil society 
institutions. According to this differentiation, the Olson type civil society institutions, 
which are hierarchical groups with likely rent-seeking behavior, are hypothesized to 
influence generalized trust negatively due to their potentially exclusive character. 
Alternatively, Putnam type community level, non-hierarchical institutions are argued to 
influence generalized trust positively. Besides the types of civil society institutions, the 
more active type of involvement is also argued to change the likelihood of trust since 
non-active types of participation would fall short of exerting any influence on the 
people about the fellow men. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the frequency of contact across all types of 
organizations is summed up. This summation reflected the number of groups the 
respondents participated in on the one hand, and the extent of their activism within 
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these groups on the other. The civil society participation variable is a continuous 
variable and its values range between 0 and 18.  
Variables for Olson and Putnam type participation are computed similarly. The 
Olson type participation variable is the sum frequency of contact for political parties 
and clubs as well as trade unions and professional organizations. Its values range 
between 0 and 6. On the other hand, two variables are generated for Putnam type 
participation. The first variable includes religious organizations and it is the sum score 
for religious organizations, sports and leisure clubs and neighborhood associations. 
Participation in charitable organizations was not asked about in Germany, hence this 
variable is omitted from the calculation for the Putnam type participation variable and 
from the ensuing analysis. This variable is labeled as PUTNAM1 and its values range 
between 0and 9.  The second Putnam type variable repeats the same formula, but it does 
not include religious organizations in the summation. This alternative variable is called 
PUTNAM2 and its value range between 0-6. The mean distributions of these variables 
can be found in Table 7.23 on the next page. 
In line with the above Table 7.22, Canada (4,98), the US (4,71), New Zealand 
(4,51), Denmark (4,13), Australia (4,08), Finland (4,08), and Norway (3,93) emerged as 
countries which are richer in terms of civil society participation. The US, New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Finland score high both for the Olson groups and the 
Putnam groups with the religious organizations (PUTNAM1). Once the religious 
organizations are omitted from the Putnam type groups (PUTNAM2), the high score of 
the US falls. However, the mean score for this latter group remains high for New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Finland. Japan emerges as an interesting 
case as well. Though it scores low on Olson groups, its mean scores are among the 
highest for both types of Putnam groups. 
The ex-communist states of Russia (0,68), Poland (0,78), Hungary (0,76) and 
Latvia (1,00) scored the lowest for the total sum of civil society participation. Their 
scores for both the Olson and Putnam type groups are also low. Although the Czech 
Republic was also an ex-communist state its scores are not as low. Spain (0,23) and 
Chile (0,26) score especially low for the Olson group of institutions. Alternatively, the 
score for Cyprus (0,45) is among the lowest for PUTNAM1 groups; it is even the lower 
(0,26) for PUTNAM2 groups. 
 201 
Table 7.23 ISSP mean distribution of total civil society participation and 
participation in Olson and Putnam groups  
  
Total civil 
society 
participation 
Olson type 
participation 
Putnam type 
participation 
(PUTNAM1) 
Putnam type 
par. except 
the religious 
groups 
(PUTNAM2) 
Country Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t Mean p>t 
Australia 4,08 0,60 0,91 0,00 2,52 0,65 1,76 0,52 
Germany 3,48 0,00 0,53 0,00 2,56 0,99 1,62 0,16 
Great Britain 2,83 0,00 0,47 0,00 2,05 0,00 1,44 0,00 
United States 4,71 0,00 1,03 0,13 2,99 0,00 1,46 0,00 
Austria 2,60 0,00 0,63 0,00 1,54 0,00 1,00 0,00 
Hungary 0,76 0,00 0,22 0,00 0,44 0,00 0,25 0,00 
Italy 1,85 0,00 0,47 0,00 1,19 0,00 0,78 0,00 
Norway 3,93 0,48 1,11 0,77 2,38 0,03 1,85 0,06 
Czech Republic 2,15 0,00 0,52 0,00 1,34 0,00 0,96 0,00 
Slovenia 2,36 0,00 0,53 0,00 1,47 0,00 0,98 0,00 
Poland 0,78 0,00 0,22 0,00 0,42 0,00 0,25 0,00 
Russia 0,68 0,00 0,28 0,00 0,34 0,00 0,22 0,00 
New Zealand 4,51 0,00 0,98 0,02 2,98 0,00 2,22 0,00 
Canada 4,98 0,00 1,27 0,05 2,89 0,00 1,73 0,90 
Philippines 2,05 0,00 0,33 0,00 1,47 0,00 0,72 0,00 
Israel 2,57 0,00 0,56 0,00 1,73 0,00 0,97 0,00 
Japan 3,17 0,00 0,46 0,00 2,28 0,00 2,05 0,00 
Spain 1,25 0,00 0,23 0,00 0,87 0,00 0,57 0,00 
Latvia 1,00 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,72 0,00 0,56 0,00 
France 2,81 0,00 0,54 0,00 1,95 0,00 1,69 0,71 
Cyprus 1,47 0,00 0,89 0,00 0,45 0,00 0,29 0,00 
Chile 1,62 0,00 0,26 0,00 1,21 0,00 0,61 0,00 
Denmark 4,13 0,34 1,00 0,01 2,68 0,18 2,01 0,00 
Switzerland 3,29 0,00 0,88 0,00 1,99 0,00 1,41 0,00 
Brazil 1,66 0,00 0,48 0,00 1,08 0,00 0,49 0,00 
South Africa 3,54 0,00 0,89 0,00 2,55 0,94 0,91 0,00 
Finland 4,01 0,00 1,13 0,00 2,56 0,00 1,72 0,00 
Mean (all 
countries) 2,64 0,62 1,71 1,08 
 
Besides civil society participation, education and the workplace are also 
designated as the bridging structures through which individuals come across different 
others. Hence, similar to INFORMALITY, both variables are included in the 
multivariate analyses. University attendance is a dummy variable, which takes the value 
of one for the cases of university attendance.
331
 Likewise, employment is also a dummy 
                                                          
331
 In INFORMALITY, respondents‟ last completed schools constituted the education 
variable. Yet in ISSP, data was available for those who still attended to university. 
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variable, which accounts for the cases of full time and part time employment as well as 
self-employment.  
Similar to INFORMALITY, ISSP also included a question about subjective 
happiness. Different from INFORMALITY, this question was asked along a 1- 4 rather 
than a 1-10 scale. This variable is also included in the analysis and it is re-coded so that 
1 corresponded to “not happy at all” and 4 corresponded to “very happy”. 
Sex and age are also included in the analyses as the usual demographic 
background variables. The sex variable took the value of one for the male respondents. 
The age variable is a continuous variable. The descriptive statistics of all variables 
which are used in the ensuing analyses is reported in Table 7.24 below. The correlation 
table between those variables are provided in Table B.1 in Appendix B.  
Table 7.24 Descriptive statistics of ISSP variables 
Variable Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Adult family network size 35562 4,62 2,86 0 36 
Family network density  35476 4,58 1,56 0 7 
Extent of close friends 35148 10,66 17,70 0 294 
Kinship: expressive 35293 2,77 1,11 0 4 
Kinship: instrumental 35377 1,13 0,90 0 3 
Non-kinship: expressive 35293 0,76 0,90 0 4 
Non-kinship instrumental 35377 0,42 0,63 0 3 
Institutional: expressive 35293 0,12 0,00 4   
Institutional: instrumental 35377 0,88 0,82 0 3 
Relations with relatives 35056 5,66 2,64 0 12 
Frequency of contact: best 
friend 30194 4,56 1,32 0 7 
Total civil society 
participation 35049 2,65 3,11 0 18 
Olson type groups 33791 0,61 1,21 0 6 
PUTNAM1 type of groups 34578 1,72 2,10 0 9 
PUTNAM2 type of groups 34333 1,08 1,60 0 6 
Religious groups 33630 0,67 1,13 0 3 
Other civil society groups 33210 0,38 0,93 0 3 
Subjective happiness 34458 3,01 0,76 1 4 
Age 35439 45,86 17,13 18 101 
University Attendance 35153 0,29 0,45 0 1 
Employment 35262 0,52 0,50 0 1 
Sex 35614 0,46 0,50 0 1 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Since higher education is hypothesized to influence generalized trust, those attending to 
university are also accepted as part of the better educated respondents.  
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7.4. ISSP Multivariate Analyses 
 
 
 
The present analysis used the ISSP agreement scores to the following statement as 
the generalized trust variable: “If you are not careful, other people will take advantage 
of you”. This statement was asked along an ordinal scale and its values range between 1 
and 5. Because most of the variables of interest violated the parallel regression 
assumption, a multinomial logit model (MNLM) is used to compute the cross-country 
social network underpinnings of generalized trust.
332
 For this purpose, the five point 
ordinal scale was re-coded into three outcomes. Those who strongly agreed or agreed 
with the above statement are coded as “No Trust”; those who neither agreed nor 
disagreed are labeled as “Neutral”; and those who strongly disagreed or disagreed with 
this statement are named as “Trust”. In all analyses, “No Trust” is used as the base 
category and its comparison with “Trust” reported. Hence, the ensuing tables show the 
effect of each independent variable on trust in comparison with its influence on lack of 
trust. Comparisons between “Neutral and No-trust” and “Neutral and Trust” are 
provided in Table B.2 and Table B.3 respectively of Appendix B. 
Table 7.25 on page 204-205 presents three models, which are only different in 
terms of the civil society participation variables. Although the frequency of contact with 
the best friend was examined in detail in the previous section, the inclusion of this 
variable in the analyses resulted in a substantial loss of cases due to missing variables. 
Also, this variable is found to be insignificant so, as a result, the models of Table 7.25 
do not take into account this variable. This table does not report the country 
coefficients, either. In all three models, the country coefficients are found significant 
except for Denmark. 
                                                          
332 Ordinal regression model (ORM) is used when the dependent variable is ordinal. 
This model computes parallel regression functions for all cut points, but the base 
category. It assumes identical coefficients for the separate binary regressions. This 
assumption is called the parallel regression assumption. In cases when this assumption 
is violated, an alternative model is used to account for the analysis of interest. In the 
present analysis, a Wald test is employed and it is found that many of the variables 
violate the parallel regression assumption. For ORM and parallel regression assumption, 
see J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent 
Variables Using Stata (Texas: Stata Press, 2006), 197-200. 
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Table 7.25 Multinomial analyses of Trust versus No-trust  
  Model I Model II 
  Coeff. exp (b) P> |z| Coeff. exp (b) P> |z| 
Network/ tie-based variables             
Adult family network size -0,02 0,98 0,02 -0,02 0,98 0,02 
Close friends network size 0,00 1,00 0,14 0,00 1,00 0,16 
Family network density  0,00 1,00 0,87 0,00 1,00 0,86 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0,04 1,04 0,22 0,04 1,04 0,22 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 0,09 1,09 0,00 0,09 1,09 0,00 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 0,11 1,11 0,00 0,10 1,11 0,00 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental -0,08 0,92 0,03 -0,09 0,92 0,03 
Group level relations             
Relations with the relatives -0,01 0,99 0,32 -0,01 0,99 0,30 
Bridging structures             
Total civil society participation 0,05 1,05 0,00       
Olson type participation       0,02 1,02 0,12 
PUTNAM1 type participation       0,06 1,06 0,00 
PUTNAM2 type participation             
Church or other religious org.             
Other associations or org.       0,04 1,04 0,03 
Employment  0,14 1,15 0,00 0,14 1,16 0,00 
University attendance 0,41 1,51 0,00 0,42 1,52 0,00 
Institutional contact: Expressive -0,12 0,89 0,05 -0,12 0,89 0,05 
Institutional contact: Instrumental -0,04 0,97 0,29 -0,03 0,97 0,31 
Individual level variables             
Subjective happiness 0,27 1,31 0,00 0,27 1,31 0,00 
Control variables             
Sex -0,40 0,67 0,00 -0,39 0,68 0,00 
Age 0,02 1,02 0,00 0,02 1,02 0,00 
Constant -1,47 ---- 0,00 -1,48 ----- 0,00 
Number of observations 29446 29446 
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Table 7.25 continued… 
  Model III 
  Coeff. exp (b) P> |z| 
Network/ tie-based variables       
Adult family network size -0,02 0,98 0,02 
Close friends network size 0,00 1,00 0,16 
Family network density  0,00 1,00 0,86 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0,04 1,04 0,22 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 0,09 1,09 0,00 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 0,10 1,11 0,00 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental -0,08 0,92 0,03 
Group level relations       
Relations with the relatives -0,01 0,99 0,31 
Bridging structures       
Total civil society participation       
Olson type participation 0,02 1,02 0,12 
PUTNAM1 type participation       
PUTNAM2 type participation 0,06 1,06 0,00 
Church or other religious org. 0,06 1,06 0,00 
Other associations or org. 0,04 1,04 0,03 
Employment  0,14 1,16 0,00 
University attendance 0,42 1,52 0,00 
Institutional contact: Expressive -0,12 0,89 0,05 
Institutional contact: Instrumental -0,03 0,97 0,31 
Individual level variables       
Subjective happiness 0,27 1,31 0,00 
Control variables       
Sex -0,30 0,68 0,00 
Age 0,02 1,02 0,00 
Constant -1,47 ---- 0,00 
Number of observations 29446 
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Table 7.25 yields very interesting results. First, it should be noted that the three 
different models are different only in terms of the civil society participation variables. 
Model I shows that civil society participation influences generalized trust positively. 
Hence it is likely that the civil society acts as one of the bridging structures in which 
different people come together and forge relationships for common purposes.  
Model II and Model III further show that different types of civil society 
institutions exert different influence on generalized trust. According to these models, 
only the community level, less-hierarchical and more self-expressive Putnam type 
institutions are significant for trust relations. This finding is in line with the initial 
hypothesis. Although Olson type institutions were hypothesized to influence 
generalized trust negatively, Table 7.25 does not display this type of influence. Further, 
participation in Olson type institutions does not exert any significant influence on trust, 
either. Hence the analysis underscored only the community level civil society activism 
as a significant determinant of generalized trust. Model III also showed that 
participation in religious organizations is as influential in generalized trust as other 
Putnam type institutions such as sports and leisure groups, as well as the neighborhood 
associations.  
These findings are important because they show us the fact that individuals who 
are ready to come together with the fellow men for common purposes at the community 
level are more likely to be open to different others as well. This type of civil society 
participation seems different from the one which is induced by modern production 
structures, such as professional organizations and/or trade unions.   
The comparison between the Putnam and the Olson type civil society institutions 
become all the more interesting once the analysis focuses on the tie-based variables. It 
should be noted that the coefficients, signs of influence and the significance of those 
variables do not change across the models. Tie-based variables show the significant 
influence of individuals‟ relations on generalized trust. 
First, as the adult family size increases, the tendency to trust the fellow men 
decreases. This is a finding in line with the social capital literature‟s emphasis on the 
constricting role of strong family ties. It also shows that the network boundary should 
be considered when hypotheses are generated about the possible social network 
influence on trust. The present study, for instance, hypothesized a positive influence of 
network size on generalized trust. However it seems as though in family networks, the 
size can run counter to trust relationships.  
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The relationship between social ties and generalized trust becomes more puzzling 
once the analysis focuses on ties that are used for different purposes of action. Table 
7.25 shows the negative influence of adult family size on the one hand, and the positive 
influence of kinship ties for instrumental action on the other. What do those findings tell 
us? They tell us the fact that the purpose for which the given ties are used is a 
significant determinant for generalized trust. As family ties extend, they may constrict 
relationships beyond the familiar circles. However, when family ties are used for 
instrumental action, the tendency to trust the unknown others also increases.  
This finding brings forth the possibility that the availability of a safety net which 
allows one to embrace risks about the fellow men may prove more significant than their 
awareness of different others for individuals‟ decision to trust or not to trust. Once 
individuals feel that they can act on their close kinship ties for instrumental action, they 
may become more pro-active in social life as well.  
Because the variables for kinship and non-kinship ties as well as the institutional 
contact for expressive and instrumental action are derived from the same series of 
questions, the findings of these variables complement each other. A reliance on kinship 
ties for instrumental action would crowd out reliance on both the non-kinship ties and 
on institutional contact for the same purposes. This situation explains the negative 
coefficients of the latter variables as well.  
The picture becomes the more complicated - yet the more interesting - once we 
also consider the positive and the significant influence of the non-kinship ties for 
expressive action. The influence of the kinship relations for expressive action is also 
positive, yet insignificant. Lastly, the variable for institutional contacts for expressive 
action proves to be a negative and significant determinant of generalized trust.  
All findings of social network and tie-based relations tell us that we are subject to 
multiple and sometimes conflicting influence(s) from our kinship and non-kinship ties. 
An extension in family network size may prove detrimental to forging relations with 
others based on trust. Yet, reliance on family for instrumental action may make us more 
confident about embracing risks about others; hence, we choose to trust. It is interesting 
that if a certain amount of kinship ties for both expressive and instrumental action is 
absent, the sole reliance on non-kinship ties or the institutional ties for instrumental 
action would not help to build trust relationships. Institutional contacts for expressive 
action would further make us more suspicious about the fellow men. Hence, it seems 
that people become quite skeptical and perhaps uneasy without the safety net provided 
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by community level relationships. Both kinship ties for instrumental action and non-
kinship ties for expressive action are positive and significant findings of the present 
study which explain generalized trust. All in all, the social network and tie-based 
relations variables say that people need each other and individuals‟ relations with each 
other forge trust relations.  
However, these interactions do not take place in a vacuum. Modern institutions 
induce a series of bridging structures which connect people to potential diverse others. 
Table 7.25 revealed employment and education as two significant bridging structures 
together with civil society involvement, which influenced generalized trust positively. 
In line with the prior research, subjective happiness also emerged as a significant 
determinant of generalized trust. Among the demographic control variables, women 
proved more likely to trust than men, and old age emerged as a positive and significant 
determinant of trust. It is likely that old age makes people more mature and experienced 
about different others, which may provide an optimistic orientation towards the world 
one inhabits in general, and the fellow men in particular. 
What about the magnitude of influence? How strong are the variables of social 
networks, tie-based relations, and bridging structures? Table 7.26 on the following page 
displays the marginal and discrete change the variables of Model III in Table 7.25 exert 
on predicted probability to trust the fellow men in Finland (See Table B.4 in Appendix 
B for the discrete change in probability to trust across countries, other than Finland).  
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Table 7.26 ISSP Marginal and discrete change the variables of Model III exert 
on predicted probability to trust the fellow man 
  
Min-
>Max -+1/2 -+sd/2 
Marginal 
change 0->1 
Network/ tie-based variables           
Adult family network size (0-36) -0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.00      - 
Close friends network size (0-294) 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00      - 
Family network density (0-7) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00      - 
Kinship ties: Expressive (0-4) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00      - 
Kinship ties: Instrumental (0-3) 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02      - 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive (0-4) 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01      - 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental (0-3) -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02      - 
Group level relations         
 Relations with the relatives (0-12) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      - 
Bridging structures           
Olson type participation (0-6) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00      - 
PUTNAM2 type participation (0-6) 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01      - 
Church or other religious org. (0-3) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01      - 
Other associations or org. (0-3) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01      - 
Employment          0.03 
University attendance         0.06 
Institutional cont.: Expressive (0-4) -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02     -- 
Institutional cont.: Instrumental (0-3) -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00     -- 
Individual level variables           
Subjective happiness (1-4) 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.05     -- 
Control variables             -- 
Sex         -0.08 
Age (18-101) 0.27 0.00 0.05 0.00     -- 
 
Table 7.26 shows that the negative influence of adult family size is much smaller 
than the influence exerted by both kinship and non-kinship ties. It seems that having a 
few kinship ties on which individuals can rely for strategic instrumental action, and a 
few non-kinship ties for well-being and expression increase the probability of trust by 
around twelve percent. In the event that individuals also get involved in community 
level civil society institutions, this percentage rises further. Hence, different types of 
social interactions in general, and individuals‟ community level relational ties in 
particular, emerge as significant determinants of generalized trust.  
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Besides relational ties, the bridging structures of the workplace and education add 
another ten percent to the probability of trusting. Table.26 also shows that the men‟s 
probability to trust is lower than the women‟s by around eight percent, which is quite a 
high amount. Alternatively, feeling “very happy” adds fifteen percent to the probability 
to trust.  
Table 7.26 displays the influence of the marginal and the discrete changes on 
probability to trust for the case of Finland. How far do these probabilities change as the 
country changes? In other words, what is the influence of the cross-country differences 
on generalized trust? As noted, all country dummy variables, except for Denmark, 
proved significantly different from the base category of Finland. Hence country 
differences are significant determinants of generalized trust as well.  
Figure 7.1 on the following page presents the cross-country differences in 
predicted probabilities to trust for the employed man who did not attend university. The 
rest of the variables, apart from those dummy variables, are set to their mean scores. 
Figure 7.1 shows substantial differences across the countries. Holding all the network 
and tie-based variables constant at their mean values, the likelihood to trust in Finland 
(0,38), Denmark (0,36), Switzerland (0,29), and France (0,25) emerged as the highest 
among all countries. Alternatively, the country level dynamics in Poland (0,04), 
Hungary (0,04), Slovenia (0,05), Brazil (0,05) and South Africa (0,05) are likely to 
hinder trust relations.   
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Figure 7.1 Cross-country differences in predicted probability to trust for the 
employed man who did not attend the university 
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 Given the substantial difference in trust levels across countries, how far can we 
talk about the relevance of relational ties on generalized trust? Does the influence of 
these ties remain steady across countries, or does it vary with either the more or the less 
enabling socio-political environments? In order to answer these questions, a cluster 
analysis was run, and the countries were divided into three groups on the basis of their 
mean trust scores. These groups were labeled High Trust, Medium Trust, and Low Trust 
countries respectively (See Table B.5 in Appendix B for those groupings). One country 
in each group whose mean trust score was closest to the cluster mean, was selected as 
the representative country of the given group. Switzerland emerged as the representative 
of the High Trust countries, Canada the Medium Trust countries, and Chile was 
representative of the Low Trust countries. Two scenarios were run for these three 
countries. 
 The first scenario displayed the mean trust scores in each country when 
individuals‟ non-kinship ties for expressive action increase from 0 to 4. The values used 
in this scenario are provided in Table 7.27 on the following page. Figure 7.2 shows the 
probability values across the countries. 
Figure 7.2. ISSP Scenario1 
Predicted probability to trust across three representative countries 
as non-kinship expressive ties increase between 0-4
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Table 7.27 ISSP Scenario 1: Probability calculations for representative countries over 
the values of non-kinship expressive ties 
  
Scenario 1a: Change 
across values of non-
kinship expressive ties for 
Switzerland 
Scenario 1b: Change 
across values of non-
kinship expressive for 
Canada 
Variables                     
Adult family network size 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Close friends network size 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Family network density  4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relations with the relatives 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 
Olson type participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUTNAM2 type participation 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 
Church or other religious org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other associations or org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University attendance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional cont.: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional cont.: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pr(Trust=1) 0,30 0,32 0,30 0,36 0,37 0,15 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 
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According to Figure 7.2, the probability to trust increases by seven percent in 
Switzerland when non-kinship expressive ties increase from zero to four. This figure is 
five percent in Canada and three percent in Chile. Hence, the overall influence of 
relational ties seems to remain at a minimum within low trust socio-political contexts 
rather than the high trust ones.  
The possible relationship between the micro-level relational determinants and the 
macro-level socio-political determinants of generalized trust become clearer if we 
Table 7.27 continued… 
  
Scenario 1c: Change across 
values of non-kinship 
expressive ties change for 
Chile 
Variables           
Adult family network size 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Close friends network size 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Family network density  4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 0 1 2 3 4 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 
Relations with the relatives 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 
Olson type participation 0 0 0 0 0 
PUTNAM2 type participation 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,01 
Church or other religious org. 0 0 0 0 0 
Other associations or org. 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment  1 1 1 1 1 
University attendance 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: 
Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 3 3 3 3 3 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 
Pr(Trust=1) 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,08 
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continue the analysis for different countries across values of PUTNAM2 institutions. 
Figure 7.3 does this. In this figure, the non-kinship ties for expressive action are set to 
the maximum value of four. Other values for this second scenario are indicated in Table 
7.28 on the following pages.  
Figure 7.3 ISSP Scenario 2 
Predicted probability to trust across three representative countries 
as participation in PUTNAM2 institutions increase between 0-6
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 Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 together show that an increase in individuals‟ non-
kinship ties for expressive action and Putnam type civil society participation from the 
minimum to the maximum values increases the likelihood to trust in Switzerland at 
around fifteen percent. This figure is an approximate ten percent in Canada and only 
five percent in Chile. Hence the focus on the socio-political context in which micro-
level social interactions take place seems important in order to make better sense of 
social network underpinnings of generalized trust.  
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Table 7.28 ISSP Scenario 2: Probability calculations for representative 
countries over the values of PUTNAM2 type participation 
  
Scenario 2a: Change across values of 
PUTNAM2 for Switzerland 
Variables               
Adult family network size 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Close friends network size 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Family network density  4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relations with the relatives 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 
Olson type participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUTNAM2 type participation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Church or other religious org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other associations or org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University attendance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pr(Trust=1) 0,36 0,37 0,39 0,40 0,41 0,43 0,44 
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Table. 7.28 continued… 
  
Scenario 2b: Change across values of 
PUTNAM2 for Canada 
Variables               
Adult family network size 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Close friends network size 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Family network density  4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relations with the relatives 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 
Olson type participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUTNAM2 type participation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Church or other religious org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other associations or org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University attendance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pr(Trust=1) 0,19 0,20 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,23 0,24 
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Table 7.28 continued... 
  
Scenario 2c: Change across values of 
PUTNAM2 for Chile  
Variables               
Adult family network size 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Close friends network size 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Family network density  4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 
Kinship ties: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kinship ties: Instrumental 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Non-kinship ties: Expressive 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Non-kinship ties: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Relations with the relatives 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 
Olson type participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PUTNAM2 type participation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Church or other religious org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other associations or org. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Employment  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University attendance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Expressive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Institutional contact: Instrumental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subjective happiness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 45,9 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pr(Trust=1) 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10 
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 Although substantial cross-country differences in generalized trust scores 
revealed macro-level socio-political determinants as significant, the relational ties still 
deserve special attention. The present analysis has shown that ties for different purposes 
of action significantly influence generalized trust. Another finding was the different 
influences exerted by kinship versus non-kinship ties. The third interesting finding was 
the diverse influence exerted by similar types of ties. For instance, as the family 
network size increases, generalized trust decreases, yet in the event that family ties are 
used for instrumental action, then the tendency to trust increases. Lastly, the bridging 
structures such as university attendance, employment and participation in Putnam type 
institutions emerged as significant determinants of generalized trust; on the other hand, 
participation in Olson type institutions was not a significant determinant of trust. The 
institutional contacts for expressive action are also found as negatively related to 
generalized trust. All these findings show that societal relationships are relevant and 
significant for trust relations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Hypotheses of the social capital literature about generalized trust are quite 
straightforward: strong ties of the bonding relations influence generalized trust 
negatively and weak ties of the bridging relations influence generalized trust positively. 
The present study tried to accommodate these hypotheses within the social network 
approach and its method, which counts on individual level tie-based information. The 
survey analyses for both the Turkish and cross-country contexts showed that social 
network influence on generalized trust is not as straightforward as is assumed by the 
social capital literature.   
First of all, the network boundary emerged as a significant contextual feature in 
which social relationships take place. The focus on the influence of network size and 
network density on generalized trust makes sense only when the network boundary is 
clearly specified. Even when this specification is made, it is likely that different aspects 
of individual level relationships will exert diverse and sometimes contradictory 
influence(s) on generalized trust. For instance, in the cross-country analysis, on the one 
hand, the adult family network size was found as a significant and negative determinant 
of generalized trust. On the other hand, kinship ties which are used for instrumental 
action, proved to be significant and positive determinants of generalized trust. Along 
similar lines, the network size of the Turkish discussion networks was not a significant 
determinant of generalized trust. However, when those networks were partitioned on the 
basis of kinship and non-kinship ties, the network size of the non-kinship ties surfaced 
as a positive and significant determinant of generalized trust. The specification of the 
network boundaries is important because they display different aspects of societal 
interactions.  
A second finding of the research relates to the comparison of the influences of the 
network size, the network density and the network diversity variables on generalized 
trust. Network diversity measures, which focused on various tie properties, yielded 
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more interesting results than both the network size and network density measures. For 
instance, in both the Turkish and cross-country research, the extensity of the close 
friends is found as insignificant. It is likely that this finding relates to multiple pressures 
different close friends‟ ties exert on individuals. Analyses of Turkey showed that 
individuals are subject to varying influences from their associates‟ multiple features 
such as their ages and/or education levels. Likewise, cross-country analyses discerned 
different pressures put on trust relations by ties for different purposes of action. Hence it 
seems that the diversity of network ties matter more than both the numbers and the 
weights of those ties. 
This brings us to the third important finding, which relates to the extent of tie 
diversity.  The extent of the kinship and the non-kinship ties on the one hand, and the 
purpose for which the tie is mobilized on the other, emerged as significant determinants 
of generalized trust. In both survey analyses, qualitative and quantitative differences 
emerged between the kinship and non-kinship ties. Ties to friends and acquaintances 
within one‟s discussion networks in Turkey were found to be positive and significant 
determinants of generalized trust.  
The cross-country analysis was also able to analyze both the kinship and the non-
kinship ties with an emphasis on purpose of action. The analysis showed positive and 
significant influence of the kinship ties for instrumental action and of the non-kinship 
ties for expressive action. These findings become more meaningful when they are 
considered with the positive and significant influence of participation in Putnam type 
civil society institutions. They all point to the relevance of an active community life for 
trust relations. It can well be claimed that those people who are social and participating 
in their communities, who have friends to rely on for emotional well-being, and who 
possess family ties to mobilize for power and wealth are also the ones who are more 
likely to trust people at large. 
Indeed these latter findings deserve special attention. Social capital literature 
prioritizes the relations which are used for strategic and instrumental action. The 
emphasis on bridging social capital - hence potentially the weak and bridging ties - is a 
case in point. However, this conceptual framework reduces individual level 
relationships to a strategic fellow hunt, which apparently only reflects one side of the 
story; the present study shows the other side too, which is about people‟ need for the 
fellow men. Individuals seem to become more familiar with different others through 
emotional connections to their friends. A series of bridging structures such as the 
 222 
workplace, education, and civil society involvement seem to breed this process of 
familiarization as well. Hence knowing about others who provide emotional support 
seems crucial for trust relations and friends seem to matter more than the utilitarian 
count.  
Alternatively, the kinship ties prove more strategic for trust relations. In general, 
people rely on their primordial relations for emotional support. The present study also 
affirmed this point, yet, going one step further, it also showed that reliance on kinship 
relations for emotional support does not crowd out their instrumental use as well. This 
finding also underlines a much-neglected aspect in the operational definition of trust. 
Generalized trust is about familiarity with variable human conditions, as it is about 
being willing to embrace risks about those unknown others. This willingness, in turn, 
boils down to an ability to deal with possible disappointment as a result of one‟s 
decision to trust. The safety net family ties provide emerges as significant to ease the 
risk-taking tendency.  
The acknowledgement that relations with the unknown people involve certain 
risks brings us to the fourth finding of the present study. People do not forge social 
relationships in a vacuum. On the contrary, their relationships are structured within 
given socio-economic and socio-political contexts. In Turkey, education differences 
seem to set people apart from each other, whereas age differences ease connections with 
the fellow men. The influence of socio-economic differences on generalized trust 
proved to be more pronounced in the metropolitan rather than smaller cities, which 
points to the relevance of socio-political environment for trust relations. In Turkey, 
people‟s tendency to trust the fellow men decreases more substantially across the 
metropolitan cities than the smaller cities. Cross-country analyses also show the 
relevance of socio-political environment for trust relations. The influence of the 
relational ties become more pronounced in high trust contexts. Hence social networks 
and relational ties influence generalized trust. Yet these networks and ties do not come 
into existence in a vacuum; they are bound to the given socio-political environment.   
This brings us to the study‟s fifth finding, which relates to the influence of the 
bottom-up relational ties on generalized trust in Turkey. A persistently divisive socio-
political structure frames individual level social relations in Turkey. Turkish 
modernization, which dates back to the late Ottoman period of the nineteenth century, 
has created an enduring political contestation about the proprietorship of both the 
modern state and the citizenry between the forces of the modernizing elite and their 
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more traditional corollaries. The present day cleavage between the so-called seculars 
and Islamists is a continuation of this more than a century-old political controversy. An 
examination of the general political and civic attitudes in Turkey also shows that the 
citizens are readily aligned along this deep-rooted cleavage, which breeds conservatism 
too. Irrespective of religiosity, citizens of all political walks display dogmatic and 
intolerant attitudes towards change and difference. How can people become familiar 
with the variable human condition when both partisanship and conservatism close them 
off from others‟ ideas? 
Turkey is among the low trust countries and its socio-political context is likely to 
influence generalized trust in the country. The present study has shown that the 
discussion of the social network underpinnings of generalized trust within the Turkish 
context is not irrelevant, either. The analysis focused on important matters discussion 
networks in Turkey; hence, the network boundary was rather limited. Moreover, the 
survey on Turkey did not differentiate between ties for expressive and instrumental 
action respectively. It also did not include any questions on civil society participation. 
However, the survey was detailed in terms of tie-based properties at the discussion 
networks level. 
Turkish discussion networks are mostly populated by friendship ties, though 
family ties are also important. Hence, it is difficult to argue for social isolation in the 
Turkish case. However, celebrating the diversity of the community level relationships 
on the basis of this limited data would also be a stretch. The analysis of the social 
network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey points out the relevance of the 
friendship ties for discussion, which proved significant for generalized trust. The 
influence of these ties increases with the increase in age differences at the discussion 
network level.  
Although age differences influence generalized trust positively, education 
differences are found to exert negative influence on generalized trust. Moreover, 
university graduates emerged as a more likely group than other educational groups to 
display trust in unknown others. These findings underscore education as a structural 
impediment in Turkey which influences the way people relate to each other.  
Once the socio-economic cleavages in Turkey are considered together with the 
prevalent political cleavages, low participation levels in civil society institutions and a 
series of deficiencies in terms of the political and the civil rights, people in Turkey seem 
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to be set far away from each other. As a result, the potential to extend trust to unknown 
others in Turkey remains low. 
The examination of the Turkish case within a comparative framework showed that 
individuals‟ social networks are quite diverse; hence, it is not very easy to generalize 
about the social network influence on generalized trust. Despite the multiplicity of 
social networks, the differentiation between the kinship and the non-kinship ties proved 
important. The examination of relational ties in terms of their purpose of action also 
yielded interesting results. Lastly, the emphasis on tie diversity, based on both the 
attribute and attitude characteristics, related significantly to generalized trust. However, 
the magnitude of the influence of social networks remained rather limited in both the 
Turkish and the cross-country analyses.  
Democratization literature in general, and political culture studies in particular, 
put emphasis on the primacy of the cultural features which are deemed crucial for 
democratic institutionalization. Social capital literature, in particular, argues for the 
importance of the civic community and solidarity among the fellow citizens as 
important determinants of democratic regime performance. In this regard, the present 
study considered the focus on the individual in relation to his/her social relationships as 
significant. The research revealed dynamism at the level of individuals‟ social 
relationships both, for the Turkish case and for the cross-country analysis. This 
dynamism, however, seems to be multi-faceted. Hence, the present study does not lend 
support to the rather straightforward and simplistic relationship the social capital 
literature seems to have established between the negative influence of the bonding and 
strong ties on generalized trust on the one hand, and the positive influence of the 
bridging and weak ties on generalized trust on the other. Moreover, rather than reducing 
generalized trust to an apolitical phenomenon by relying too heavily on different 
configurations of relational ties, the present analysis points to the possible impelling 
influence of the socio-political context on relational ties, which may, in turn, influence 
generalized trust in different ways.  
For the Turkish case, this last assertion invites further enquiry into  the ways the 
existing socio-political and socio-economic cleavages interact with individual‟s social 
networks and relational ties: How do the social ties established within the civil society 
institutions influence generalized trust? Do social ties in different types of civil society 
institutions have different bearings on generalized trust? What about the role of 
religiosity and/or ethnic identity in social network formation and how do these networks 
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influence generalized trust? How does political partisanship influence individuals‟ 
discussion networks, and do political diversity and knowledge influence generalized 
trust?  
All these questions are relevant to, and invite further comment on the social 
network underpinnings of generalized trust. Following the traces of trust, in turn, is 
related to the larger question regarding the ways individuals who are embedded within 
their social relationships, familiarize the complexity of the modern world. This 
familiarity is significant because it underscores the way people as fellow men and 
citizens relate to each other. Only then, could people be expected to take an interest in 
their own fate as members of a political community. By rendering the citizens attentive 
to each other and the public goods at large, generalized trust constitutes the link 
between the citizens and democratic institutionalization.  
In sum, generalized trust is significant for democracies, and societal interactions 
prove significant for generalized trust. In-depth comparative analyses of the social 
network underpinnings of generalized trust in Turkey has shown that what is seen as 
static and unchanging at the macro socio-political level may be quite diverse and 
dynamic at the community level. More detailed social network accounts and tie-based 
relationships are likely to provide detailed information about the bottom-up relational 
potential for generalized trust, as well as democratic institutionalization. Without this 
focus, political analysis will be incomplete at best. 
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